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FOREWORD
Views about the effect of the burden of taxation and govern-
ment spending on economic growth and welfare differ sharply 
between classical liberals and social democrats. The social dem-
ocrat belief, that welfare can be improved by taking resources 
from one group of people and giving them to another or by pro-
viding goods and services to the population that are financed by 
taxation, is at odds with the classical liberal view that spending 
decisions are best made by individuals who can, as Hayek would 
say, discover the most valuable ways to serve one another.
one of the greatest problems in the debate is the implicit as-
sumption that the actions of government in increasing taxation 
and government spending are a zero sum game – one group 
benefits and another (less-deserving) group loses. The idea that 
there may be welfare losses and that those welfare losses may be 
so large that everybody loses out from increasing government 
spending is rarely entertained. 
This problem is exacerbated by a lack of reliable data and stat-
istical analyses which show the burdens of government spending 
and taxation on economic growth. 
The authors of this monograph have taken a rigorous and 
data-driven approach to discovering and documenting the size 
of the state and how government spending and regulation affect 
the wider economy. But, most importantly, they have undertaken 
a major and original statistical analysis of the economic costs of 
high taxes and, equally importantly, which taxes cause the most 
economic harm.
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This book is therefore a vital and timely addition to the eco-
nomic debate, particularly coming as even the mild and begrudg-
ing efforts at fiscal consolidation from the previous coalition and 
Conservative governments appear to be at risk of reversal. 
As the opening section of the book points out, while the state 
has undoubtedly grown vastly since the dawn of the twentieth 
century, measuring its growth is plagued with technical and 
accounting issues. David B. Smith explains the difficulty of even 
getting true facts and figures on government spending – and 
how often the debate on tax and spending figures has been based 
on statistics that are subsequently invalidated or retrospectively 
changed.
But, even once these are accounted for, the efforts of the 
coalition and Conservative governments to impose so-called 
‘austerity’ on the public finances were exaggerated and subject 
to historical error. Leaving aside changes in national accounting 
conventions which have made true and robust comparisons dif-
ficult, the small scale of real spending consolidation means that 
attempts to claim, as some have, that cuts are returning Britain 
to the world of The Road to Wigan Pier are simply wrong.
Having identified the problem with existing statistics, in the 
second section of the monograph Patrick Minford and Lucy Min-
ford, in separate contributions, examine the possible economic 
benefits from cutting the size of the state – particularly cutting 
the tax burden – and also develop robust new techniques for 
identifying the real effect that government intervention has on 
the wider economy.
Having determined the level of taxation and government 
spending that is appropriate, the next question that needs to be 
considered is how to raise the required tax revenues. The final 
section of the monograph, Chapters  9–11 by Rory Meakin, is 
nothing less than a full blueprint for an effective, fair, liberal and 
welfare-maximising taxation policy. The UK’s current tax system 
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is a very long way from the ideal. The author of this section identi-
fies twenty current taxes that should be abolished, and presents 
a reformed tax system to raise 20–25 per cent of national income 
from five main forms of tax: income tax, VAT, a housing con-
sumption tax, a land-value tax and fuel duty.
With the UK currently in a state of political and policy up-
heaval, with a new ministerial team in office and the economic 
opportunities (and risks) of Brexit in the near future, this mono-
graph is an exciting and radical piece that charts both why 
taxes and government spending must be cut and the tax system 
changed beyond all recognition. The knowledge and expertise of 
the authors, not to mention the statistical analysis and original 
research that this work includes, means this monograph de-
serves close attention from anyone with an interest in the size of 
the state or the taxation system.
M a r k Littlewood
Director General and Ralph Harris Fellow
Institute of Economic Affairs
october 2016
The views expressed in this monograph are, as in all IEA publica-
tions, those of the authors and not those of the Institute (which 
has no corporate view), its managing trustees, Academic Advis-
ory Council members or senior staff. With some exceptions, such 
as with the publication of lectures, all IEA monographs are blind 
peer-reviewed by at least two academics or researchers who are 
experts in the field.
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SUMMARY
• Measuring taxation and government spending as a 
proportion of national income is beset with difficulties. 
However, it is clear that there has been a strong upward 
trend in taxation and government spending as a proportion 
of national income in the developed countries over the 
last 100 years. At the beginning of World War I, the UK 
government spent just over one eighth of national income; 
now it spends between 40 per cent and slightly over 45 per 
cent (depending on how national income is measured).
• Government spending as a proportion of national income 
in the UK is at a similar level to that in Germany but is 
considerably higher than in Switzerland, Australia and 
Ireland. Government spending is also somewhat higher in 
the UK than in Canada, the US and New Zealand. Thus, it is 
clear that a welfare state of significant size can be provided 
at levels of government spending far below those in the 
UK. It is also notable that, in some UK regions, government 
spending is between two thirds and three quarters of 
regional GDP, depending on the definition employed.
• It is government spending rather than taxation that 
ultimately determines the total burden of government 
activity on the private sector. Although government 
spending can be financed by borrowing or creating inflation, 
all government spending is normally a call on resources that 
have alternative uses or involves transfers from one group in 
society to another. If a government borrows money, this has 
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to be financed at the time of borrowing and then serviced by 
future generations of taxpayers.
• Although there is a general perception that there has been 
a significant reduction in government spending since 2010, 
there has not been. Nominal spending increased by 4.6 per 
cent in total between 2010 and 2015 and real spending fell 
by just 0.5 per cent a year. Real spending per capita fell by a 
little more – about 1 per cent per year. By 2015, government 
spending remained at over 45 per cent of GDP (at factor cost). 
over the five years to 2020, nominal government spending is 
planned to continue to rise, real government spending to go 
up slightly and spending as a proportion of national income 
at factor cost fall to 41 per cent.
• Some forms of government spending can promote growth, 
especially capital spending. However, this does not mean 
that the resources concerned might not be better employed 
elsewhere, including for supply-side enhancing tax cuts. 
Spending on government consumption tends to harm growth. 
Spending on badly designed transfer payment systems can 
be especially damaging as they can reduce work incentives. 
Despite rising government spending in general, there has 
been a fall in spending on investment while there has been 
a huge rise in spending on government consumption and 
transfer payments. Government spending on investment is 
extremely volatile, but, by way of example, it has fallen from 
over 6 per cent of national income in the late 1960s to less than 
3 per cent today. Welfare payments have almost doubled over 
the same period as a percentage of national income to their 
current levels of around 14 per cent (this excludes health and 
education spending). Even during the period 2010–15, there 
was a significant reorientation of spending. Public order and 
safety (comprising much of the ‘nightwatchman’ functions of 
the state) had reductions in real spending of about 15 per cent 
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while transport saw cuts of 10 per cent. Meanwhile, spending 
on both health and social protection increased in real 
terms. These trends will not be reversed and may be further 
reinforced in the years to 2020.
• The taxes that have to be raised to finance government 
spending damage growth through a number of channels. 
These include reduced incentives for work and saving 
and reduced incentives for entrepreneurship. over the 
last three decades a considerable amount of evidence has 
been amassed that suggests that tax has a significant 
negative impact on growth. This evidence suggests that 
a 10 percentage point increase in the tax or government 
spending burden is associated with approximately a 
1 per cent fall in the growth rate in the long term. The 
negative impact of tax on growth is also far greater than 
the benefits to growth that might arise from increased 
government spending, even if that spending is on investment 
or subsidising private sector research and development. 
There are, however, problems with the ‘growth regression’ 
approach that generates these results. For example, they 
cannot necessarily distinguish between cause and effect.
• In many ways, regulation and tax are substitutes for each 
other and have similar effects. For example, politicians 
can attempt to improve living standards by regulating 
wages and other working conditions or by providing 
in-work welfare benefits. Robust new modelling has been 
undertaken as part of the research for this project on 
the impact of tax and regulation on productivity. This 
modelling is not subject to the problems of the earlier 
tax and growth studies. This research finds that a 10 
percentage point fall in a combined index of top marginal 
tax rates and regulation relative to its trend produces a 
rise in output over about thirty years of 24 per cent. This 
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is equivalent to an increase in the growth rate over the 
thirty years following the cut of about 0.8 percentage 
points per annum. The model does not distinguish between 
regulation and tax. However, the model uses data from a 
period in which falls in marginal tax rates have been much 
more frequent than changes in regulation. As such, it is 
reasonable to infer that a 10 percentage point cut in the top 
marginal tax rate would bring about the improvement in 
growth indicated by the model.
• In theory at least, we can identify a growth-maximising, a 
welfare-maximising and a revenue-maximising share of 
taxation in national income. The last of these points is the 
‘top’ of the Laffer curve – that is, the point at which, if the 
government tries to raise more in taxation, the negative 
effects of taxation on growth are so great that tax revenue 
is actually reduced. The maximum sustainable level of 
government spending is a little different from this as a result 
of the existence of non-tax-based government revenue and 
the complications of debt dynamics. The welfare-maximising 
share of taxation in national income is greater than the 
growth-maximising share because there may be some 
functions that increase welfare while reducing measured 
economic growth.
• The growth-maximising share of government spending in 
GDP is probably in the range 18.5–23.5 per cent of national 
income, using current (July 2016) UK definitions at market 
prices. The welfare-maximising share is probably in the 
range 26.5–32.5 per cent of national income. The maximum 
sustainable level of government spending is probably in 
the range 37–38 per cent of national income. Even on the 
projections set out in the March 2016 Budget and without 
any relaxation of the purse strings, government spending 
will only just come down to sustainable levels by 2020/21.
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• All taxes do not affect growth in the same way. For example, 
taxes on mobile capital and high marginal rates of tax 
on income affect growth disproportionately. Taxes on 
land, consumption and on economic activities that lead to 
harmful ‘spillover’ effects reduce growth to a lesser extent 
and can even improve economic welfare.
• The overall design of the tax system also affects economic 
growth. Ideally, a tax system should have low negative effects 
on welfare and economic efficiency; low administration and 
compliance costs; fair and non-discriminatory procedures 
in the way companies and individuals are treated; and be 
transparent and easily understandable. The UK system is a 
long way from meeting these goals.
• More specifically, tax systems should be designed so that 
there is a broad understanding of the basic facts of who pays 
how much, with simple rules, thresholds, schedules and 
rates. Tax should be codified so that taxpayers know what is 
expected and can arrange their affairs accordingly with any 
ambiguity kept to a minimum. To facilitate this, a formal tax 
strategy should be adopted by the government, with changes 
announced in advance and with explanations of how each 
change helps bring the system closer to implementing the 
overall strategy.
• The UK has a very badly designed tax system with high 
marginal rates, huge complexity, taxes that discourage 
wealth-creating economic activity and wide-ranging 
exemptions. Current property taxes provide a good example 
of how badly our tax system is designed. These taxes raise 
nearly 4 per cent of national income. Council tax is based 
on a complex system of thresholds and is, in fact, regressive, 
at least in part. Stamp duty land tax artificially depresses 
property values, discourages investment and distorts the 
allocation of assets – for example, by discouraging older 
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people from moving to smaller accommodation when they 
no longer need as much space. Current property taxes should 
be abolished and replaced with taxes that damage economic 
welfare to a much lesser degree.
• overall, the UK government should abolish twenty current 
taxes. Among other taxes, corporation tax, national 
insurance, capital gains tax, inheritance tax, council tax, 
business rates, the television licence fee, the apprenticeship 
levy, stamp duties, alcohol duties, tobacco duties, vehicle 
excise duty and air passenger duty should be abolished. A 
radically reformed tax system should be designed to raise 
around 20–25 per cent of national income. It would comprise 
the following main elements:
• A flat-rate income tax set at 15 per cent of income above 
a personal allowance of around £10,000. Distributed 
corporate profits would also be taxed at this rate.
• VAT set at 12.5 per cent, with most exemptions abolished.
• A new housing consumption tax on rents and imputed 
rents to mimic VAT at 12.5 per cent.
• A new location land-value tax.
• Fuel duty retained at around half the current rate.
• If this package were implemented, static modelling would 
suggest that the poorest decile would enjoy tax cuts worth 
26 per cent of gross income, followed by 19 per cent, 17 per 
cent and then 13 per cent for the fourth poorest decile before 
further falling to 7 per cent for the fourth richest decile. The 
benefit of the proposed tax changes then rises slightly with 
income.
• Because lower taxes would lead to higher growth and 
because there would be a tax system that led to far 
fewer distortions of economic decisions, it is likely that 
employment, productivity and wage levels would rise 
considerably. These effects are likely to disproportionately 
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benefit the poor as they are more likely to be at the margins 
of the labour market in insecure, low-paid employment or 
unemployed.
• Tax policy should be formulated to increase certainty, 
stability and transparency. The government should set out 
a formal tax strategy that expresses its medium-term and 
long-term intentions. Tax policy decision-making should be 
taken out of annual budgets and implemented separately 
from periodic statements involving economic and fiscal 
forecasting so that fuller attention can be devoted to the 
implications of both tax policy changes and changes in 
budgetary and economic forecasts, respectively.
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11 INTRODUCTION
Philip Booth
The growth of government spending
The measurement of national income and government spending 
is perhaps surprisingly controversial. An indication of the diffi-
culties was given in the wake of the government’s 2014 Budget 
when one BBC commentator suggested that planned reductions 
in government spending as a proportion of national income 
would take us back to the days of The Road to Wigan Pier (that 
is, to the 1930s). More careful analysis of definitions of nation-
al income and the different categories of government spending 
demonstrated that this assertion was a long way wide of the 
mark – indeed, it was absurd.
Analysis of the data shows that since the beginning of the 
twentieth century there has been a huge growth in government 
spending. This growth has varied somewhat across countries, 
but the pattern has been remarkably consistent. 
So, what can we say about government spending over time? 
Table 1 shows government spending as a proportion of national 
income for six countries since 1870 and is a summary of Table 7 in 
Part 1. In the UK, government spending has grown from around 
10 per cent of national income at the beginning of the twentieth 
century to somewhat over 40 per cent today. There were big 
jumps in spending during the two world wars. 
The trends in the other countries are similar. It is notable 
that in the US, often regarded as different from other countries, 
INTRODUCTION
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government spending is nearly 40 per cent of national income, 
higher than in Australia. The ‘continental’ model is often 
regarded as being distinct from what is often described as the 
‘Anglo-Saxon neo-liberal’ model, and yet, interestingly, govern-
ment spending in Germany as a proportion of national income 
is more or less identical to that in the UK. There certainly are 
some continental outliers, with the governments of Italy, Sweden, 
Austria, Belgium and France (the latter shown in this table) all 
spending over 50 per cent of national income. However, the UK is, 
in fact, above the oECD average.
Indeed, the figures in Table 1, it can be argued, understate the 
rise in government spending that has taken place. In the table, 
national income is measured at market prices. Some regard this 
as inappropriate given that the market price measure of GDP in-
cludes taxes that are levied on goods and services that are sold 
rather than the underlying costs of those goods and services. If 
we measure government spending as a proportion of national 
income measured at what is known as ‘factor cost’, the current 
level of government spending is just over 45 per cent of national 
income. Indeed, using the factor-cost measure of national in-
come, government spending in the UK overtook private spending 
in the late 2000s, before falling back to its current level of a little 
less than half of national income.
Table 1 Ratios of general government expenditure, including transfers, 
to money GDP at market prices (%) – selected countries
1870 1913 1920 1937 1960 1980 2000 2010 2015
Australia 18.3 16.5 19.3 14.8 21.2 34.1 34.6 36.6 35.6
France 12.6 17.0 27.6 29.0 34.6 46.1 51.1 56.4 57.0
Germany 10.0 14.8 25.0 34.1 32.4 47.9 44.7 47.4 44.0
UK 09.4 12.7 26.2 30.0 32.2 44.7 37.8 48.8 43.2
USA 07.3 07.5 12.1 19.4 30.0 35.3 33.9 43.2 37.8
Sources: Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000),OECD Economic Outlook (June 2016, Annex Table 29), and 
OECD data bank.
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Government spending, taxation and growth
one of the major objectives of this book is to examine the impact 
of taxation on growth. However, the focus in much of the data and 
analysis is on government spending rather than taxation. The rea-
son is that, ultimately, it is government spending that determines 
the total tax burden. Especially in recent years, government spend-
ing has been considerably higher than taxation with the difference 
being made up by government borrowing. However, government 
borrowing requires financing and consumes real resources that 
could have an alternative use. Furthermore, government borrow-
ing leads to a future tax burden. There are potential qualifications 
to this argument, such as the fact that the debt burden falls (all 
other things being equal) as nominal national income grows. How-
ever, as a rule of thumb, it is assumed in much of this book that it 
is the financing of government spending that ultimately imposes 
a burden on the private sector rather than taxation as such. The 
focus is therefore very much on government spending as the main 
long-run determinant of the tax burden. 
Can government spending be growth enhancing?
Not all government spending harms economic growth. For ex-
ample, notwithstanding the literature on private governance 
(see, for example, Stringham 2015), it can be argued that effec-
tive judicial and policing systems are necessary for a thriving 
business economy. Furthermore, it is possible that investment in 
certain forms of economic activity (such as pure research) has 
public good qualities and will be under-provided in an entirely 
free market. Infrastructure such as ports and roads can also be 
important for promoting economic growth. In all these cases, 
there are arguments for private provision rather than state pro-
vision. But, even if spending on infrastructure or research is not 
as efficient in the public as in the private sector, such spending 
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could still increase growth as long as the rate of return from the 
spending is greater than zero.
Despite this, we should be cautious about assuming that 
even government investment and research spending will lead to 
higher growth, though it is more likely to do so than other cat-
egories of government spending. In Part 2 of this book, Patrick 
Minford suggests that tax-financed government spending on 
investment or on research and development reduces economic 
growth because the negative impact on growth of the taxes lev-
ied to finance the spending outweighs any positive impact on 
growth of the spending itself. This may be because, among other 
reasons, government-financed investment is determined by po-
litical criteria rather than economic criteria and so is not growth 
enhancing in practice even if it could be in theory.
Economic growth versus other measures of welfare
Government spending could improve economic welfare even if it 
does not lead to more economic growth as conventionally meas-
ured. For example, the provision of welfare benefits to the very 
poor may reduce growth both because of the effects on incen-
tives of the taxes levied to finance the benefits and also because 
the welfare benefits themselves might reduce incentives to work 
and save. However, such welfare benefits might still be regarded 
as desirable. 
There is also a huge range of government and private sector 
activities the welfare impact of which is imperfectly measured in 
national income accounts. This is true to such an extent that we 
may have no real idea whether a particular category of govern-
ment spending reduces economic welfare to a greater or lesser 
extent than is indicated by national income figures. Government 
spending on arts might enrich society in ways that cannot be 
captured in economic growth figures. However, on the other 
hand, arts spending might have no welfare benefit whatsoever 
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and be totally wasted and yet it would appear in national income 
figures at the amount spent rather than at the increase in soci-
etal welfare (zero).
When it comes to taxation, a reduction in measured growth 
arising from reduced work effort caused by the higher taxes nec-
essary to finance higher spending is likely to be compensated in 
welfare terms at least to some extent by an increase in leisure 
time. The value of that increase in leisure time would not appear 
in national income accounts at all, whereas the value of the re-
duction in working hours would be fully captured as a reduction 
in growth.
While it is difficult to be precise, taking all these issues into 
consideration, it is likely to be the case that the point at which 
government spending and taxation maximise welfare will be 
beyond the point at which government spending and taxation 
maximise economic growth.
It is also worth noting that there are some taxes that could, 
in theory at least, enhance economic welfare and even economic 
growth. For example, taxes on negative spillover effects from 
consumption or production activities of businesses might reduce 
those effects to a level that is more socially optimal. Designing 
such taxes though is difficult in practice and often their levels 
will be determined by political rather than economic consider-
ations. However, in principle, such taxes could raise economic 
welfare while replacing other taxes that are more harmful.
The revenue-maximising level of government spending
Although governments do not necessarily act rationally and prac-
tical government decisions can be determined by a whole range of 
factors such as the actions of vested interests, in principle at least, 
it would seem sensible for governments to spend money on func-
tions that both enhanced growth or other aspects of economic 
welfare. At some point, however, the ability of the government to 
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find spending projects that will enhance growth will be exhaust-
ed. Furthermore, the effect on growth of the taxes necessary to 
finance spending is likely to increase with the level of tax.
Eventually, the impact of additional taxes on growth may be 
so large that the fall in growth caused by raising taxes will ac-
tually lead to a drop in tax revenues. In other words, attempts 
to raise taxes further will actually reduce tax revenue and con-
sequently lead to a reduction rather than an increase in govern-
ment spending. The higher marginal rates of tax will generate 
no net revenue because of the shrinkage of the tax base caused 
by the extra taxes. This shrinkage of the tax base can be caused 
by lower growth, higher levels of illegal tax evasion or by legal 
tax avoidance. The point at which taxes cannot be raised further 
without reducing revenues is often described as the top of the 
Laffer curve.
If it follows that there is a point beyond which further in-
creases in tax rates can reduce tax revenues, it also follows that 
some governments might spend at such high levels that it is pos-
sible for them to reduce tax rates and actually increase revenues. 
In other words, in some high tax countries, it might be possible to 
reduce the burden of taxation and increase government spend-
ing. Even if that is not true in aggregate it might be true with 
regard to particular taxes. For example, it might be possible that 
reducing inheritance tax or the highest rate of income tax will 
increase tax yields even if there are other taxes which could gen-
erate increased revenue if they were increased.
When the UK government reduced the 50 per cent top tax rate, 
for example, it conducted a serious analysis of the dynamic be-
havioural effects.1 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
identified a number of potential impacts on behaviour. Their ana-
lysis suggested that, if there was no effect on economic behaviour, 
1 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140109143644/http:/www.hmrc.gov 
.uk/budget2012/excheq-income-tax-2042.pdf
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the Treasury would lose around £3.5 billion as a result of reduc-
ing the top tax rate from 50 per cent to 45 per cent. However, as 
a result of behavioural effects (identified to include, among other 
factors, reduced hours worked; reduced foreign direct invest-
ment; greater avoidance, tax planning and evasion; and reduced 
human capital formation) any decrease in tax revenue would be 
more or less totally reversed, making the revenue impact of the 
reduction in the top rate of tax negligible.
In practice, there would appear to have been a number of 
historical examples of governments reducing tax rates and see-
ing large increases in revenue. For example, as explained by Laf-
fer (2012), in 1978 the US brought in the Steiger–Hansen capital 
gains tax rate reduction and then, during the following 25 years 
or so, there were larger cuts in taxes. The results were interest-
ing. In 1980, the top 1 per cent of income earners paid taxes 
equal to 1.5 per cent of GDP or 17.5 per cent of all the income 
taxes in the US. By 2007, the top 1 per cent of income earners 
paid 3.2 per cent of GDP in income taxes and they paid 42.5 per 
cent of all the income taxes collected. There was a very similar 
trend in the UK after Nigel Lawson’s reduction in the top rates 
of tax in 1988.
Where does the UK stand?
The above analysis suggests that there are three points we can 
identify when looking at the appropriate level of government 
spending and taxation. The first point we hit is the growth-max-
imising level of government spending as a proportion of national 
income. Secondly, there is the welfare-maximising level of gov-
ernment spending. Thirdly, there is the maximum level of gov-
ernment spending beyond which any attempt to raise taxes will 
actually lead to lower tax revenues. In Chapter 5, David Smith 
suggests that the growth-maximising share of government 
spending in GDP is probably in the range 18.5–23.5 per cent of 
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national income, using current (July 2016) UK definitions at mar-
ket prices. The welfare-maximising share is probably in the range 
26.5–32.5 per cent of national income. The maximum sustainable 
level of government spending is probably in the range 37–38 per 
cent of national income.2
of course, there is a great deal of uncertainty attached to 
these numbers, even with the ranges suggested. In practice, the 
welfare-maximising level of taxation and government spending 
will depend on the institutional environment in which the pri-
vate sector can provide welfare, infrastructure and so on. These 
levels will also depend on the shape of the tax system and how 
government spending is allocated. If we have a badly designed 
tax system and government spending determined to a greater 
degree by vested interests and rent seekers, the optimal level 
of government spending is likely to be lower. However, what is 
perhaps most alarming is that, even on the projections set out in 
the March 2016 Budget and without any relaxation of the purse 
strings by the new administration, government spending will 
only just come down to sustainable levels by 2020/21.
Recent trends in types of government spending
While there was a dramatic increase in government spending in 
the last century, it is also of note that, as government spending 
has grown, it has become more focused on areas that tend to 
harm growth more or help growth less. For example, government 
spending on investment has fallen from over 6 per cent of nation-
al income in the late 1960s to less than 3 per cent today. Also 
since the late 1960s, welfare payments have almost doubled as a 
percentage of national income to their current levels of around 
14 per cent (this excludes health and education spending).
2 This is slightly different conceptually from the top of the Laffer curve, but both con-
cepts would give rise to similar empirical results.
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In the period from 2010–15, there has been further significant 
reorientation of spending. Public order and safety (comprising 
major parts of the ‘nightwatchman’ functions of the state) had 
reductions in real spending of about 15 per cent. Meanwhile, 
spending on both health and social protection increased in real 
terms. There is no sign of these trends being reversed. Indeed, 
they are likely to continue in the years to 2020.
Regional differences
Although government spending is around 45 per cent of na-
tional income in the country as a whole, there are considerable 
regional variations. Some government spending in high-spend-
ing regions is financed by transfers from low-spending regions. 
The high-spending regions do not therefore bear all the costs in 
terms of reduced growth of the taxes necessary to finance their 
spending. However, insofar as spending is directed towards 
programmes that reduce work incentives and crowd out private 
sector activity, there may still be a reduction in growth in those 
regions with high levels of government spending.
When looking at growth and government spending across the 
regions it is, of course, difficult to work out cause and effect – do 
the regions have low growth because they have high levels of gov-
ernment spending or does the government finance high levels of 
transfers to certain regions because they have experienced low 
growth? Nevertheless, the figures shown in Table 2, which is a 
summary of Table 10, are dramatic. Table 2 shows government 
spending as a proportion of local gross value added for one 
high-spending, one low-spending and one average-spending re-
gion of the UK, together with data on workless households and 
gross value added per head in the economy.
Perhaps the most interesting observation is the fact that, if 
London were a country, it would have among the lowest govern-
ment spending ratios in the oECD. Secondly, the spending ratios 
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in the North East, Northern Ireland and Wales are beyond any-
thing that is seen in developed countries.
But what about austerity?
The coalition government came to office in 2010 with an agenda 
to control government borrowing. This involved significant tax 
increases, but also proposed spending cuts. In public discourse 
around the so-called austerity agenda, some dramatic figures 
were often bandied around. There are two reasons for that. The 
first is that spending cuts were often defined relative to previous 
projected increases in spending. The second reason is that many 
government functions were protected from cuts while some 
functions were cut more deeply, as has been noted above.
So, what has the record been overall? Between 2010 and 2015, 
total government spending actually increased by 4.6 per cent. In 
real terms, government spending fell by just 0.5 per cent a year. 
Table 2 UK general government expenditure in 2012/13 – regional data
Ratio of 
government 
spending to 
GDP at basic 
prices (%)
Public sector 
employment in 
2016 Q1 (%)
Workless 
households in 
2014 (%)
GVA per head 
in 2014 (£)
North East 69.7 20.3 21.7 18,216
Eastern England 46.0 15.3 12.7 23,063
London 30.1 14.3 14.6 42,666
Wales 74.3 21.3 19.4  17,573
Northern Ireland 76.5 25.3 21.4 18,682
UK 48.2 17.0 16.4 24,616
Source: HM Treasury Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis 2014, 1 August 2015, Office for National 
Statistics Regional Gross Value Added (Income Approach), 1997 to 2014, 9 December 2015, Public 
Employment Statistical Bulletin, 15 June 2016 and Workless Households for Regions across the UK, 
6 October 2015. A workless household contains at least one person aged 16–64 where no one aged 
16 or over is in employment.
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Real spending per capita fell by a little more – by about 1 per cent 
per year. In other words, the overall adjustment in government 
spending was very small indeed – certainly, many private sector 
households and businesses had to make much greater adjust-
ments to their budgets given the economic realities that they 
faced after the financial crash. The large government spending 
cuts often quoted in the media relate not to the overall govern-
ment spending settlement but to the strategic choices that the 
last two governments have made to focus more spending on for-
eign aid, the health service, schools and social protection spend-
ing for older people. 
It is important in debates about government spending to 
make this distinction. It is reasonable to debate whether the 
overall level of spending is too high or too low. At the same time, 
we can have a separate debate about spending priorities within 
the overall spending envelope. overall, as has been noted above, 
government spending remained at over 45 per cent of national 
income (at factor cost) by the end of the coalition government. 
over the next few years, if anything, the picture is projected 
to be even less austere. Through to 2020, nominal government 
spending is planned to continue to rise, real government spend-
ing to go up slightly and spending as a proportion of national 
income at factor cost to fall to 41 per cent. In other words, gov-
ernment spending will only fall relative to national income and 
not in absolute or real terms.
Why does taxation affect economic growth?
For reasons already discussed, it is possible that the impact of 
taxation on underlying economic welfare may be different from 
its effect on growth. For example, if the government decides to 
tax the population to provide them with goods and services they 
would have not chosen to buy, economic welfare will be reduced, 
but measured growth is unlikely to change. This is because it is 
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normally the amount the government spends on the provision 
of services that enters national income computations in the ab-
sence of any measure of ‘market value’. Furthermore, very often 
government will provide services less efficiently than the private 
sector could provide them. (See, for example, Niemietz (2016) 
and the references contained therein.) However, national income 
measurement systems rarely take this into account.
At the same time, as discussed above, some forms of govern-
ment expenditure will be welfare and/or growth enhancing. For 
example, if a country needs to be defended from external threats 
or if it is necessary to have a government-funded police force, a 
Box 1 Key facts – government spending 2010–2020
• Nominal spending rose by 4.6 per cent from 2010 to 2015.
• Real spending fell by 0.5 per cent per annum from 2010 
to 2015.
• Real spending per capita fell by 1 per cent per annum 
from 2010 to 2015.
• Government spending as a proportion of national income 
measured at factor cost was 45 per cent in 2015.
• Real government spending is planned to rise from 2016 to 
2020.
• Government spending on health and social protection 
rose in real terms from 2010 to 2015.
• Government spending on public order and safety fell in 
real terms by 15 per cent from 2010 to 2015.
• By 2020, government spending as a proportion of national 
income measured at factor cost is planned to be over 40 
per cent – this is before any relaxation of the purse strings 
as hinted by the new government.
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court system and government-funded infrastructure, the provi-
sion of such services might well enhance growth (by providing a 
better environment for the business sector). Furthermore, such 
services might actually have a higher value than the amount of 
money spent on them by government.3
However, it is inconceivable that the government will tax its 
citizens and provide government-funded services to the right 
level and in the right areas. Public choice economics (see, for ex-
ample, Tullock et al. 2002) suggests that goods and services will 
be provided beyond the optimal level and that governments will 
also not provide goods, services and income transfers in a way 
that maximises welfare. Instead, they will respond to pressure 
from interest groups who might act as voters, lobbyists or gov-
ernment employees in order to redirect government spending 
towards their favoured projects. Indeed, the particular spending 
priorities of the current government, as discussed above, were 
predicted and analysed by Booth (2008) and Willetts (2011).
Notwithstanding the above comments, taxation and govern-
ment spending will also affect measured national income and 
economic growth. They do this in a variety of ways which can be 
summarised as follows:
• Taxation can lead to reduced incentives to supply labour 
and save and invest if wages and the returns to saving and 
investment are taxed heavily.
• Taxation on businesses and personal investment income and 
capital gains can reduce the incentive to innovate and take 
entrepreneurial risks.
• Discriminatory taxes in relation to different goods and 
services can lead to what economists call ‘deadweight losses’. 
Such discriminatory taxes lead people to buy products that 
3 It is worth noting again that there is a great deal of debate about the extent to 
which such services and infrastructure need to be provided by the government, as 
opposed to the private, sector.
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they value less rather than products they value more purely 
for tax reasons.4
• Specific taxes such as stamp duty charged only on 
transactions discourage people from moving house or 
exchanging assets in other ways.
• Tax-financed welfare benefits can reduce work incentives, 
incentives to train or take promotion, and incentives to save.
As should be clear from the above discussion, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that all increases in taxes at all times will have a 
negative impact on growth. The extent of the impact of tax on 
economic growth will depend on how responsive entrepreneurs, 
workers and savers are to the changes in net profits, wages and 
interest that result from the imposition of taxes and on other 
factors discussed above. So, ultimately, the question has to be 
investigated empirically. What does the empirical evidence say?
Tax and growth: the evidence
The main approach economists have used to investigate the im-
pact of tax on growth is through the development of what are 
known as ‘growth regressions’. Sophisticated data sets are used 
to estimate the effect of a range of economic variables on eco-
nomic growth, including taxation and government spending.
The results of these growth regressions are clear. Taxation 
has a strong relationship with growth – the higher the level of 
taxation and government spending, the lower the level of growth. 
Not only that, the effect is significant and substantial. There is a 
summary of all the main studies in Part 2. However, the head-
line result is easy to summarise. As a rough estimate, a rise of 
4 The most obvious example here is value added tax, which is not charged at the full 
rate on all goods and services in the UK. This includes, for example, domestic fuel. 
The government has a range of schemes that try to reduce carbon emissions, but the 
tax system strongly encourages domestic fuel consumption.
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10 percentage points in the ratio of taxation to national income 
reduces growth by 0.5–1.0 per cent per annum. Indeed, an oECD 
study has suggested that up to one third of the growth decelera-
tion in the oECD between 1965 and 1995 could be explained by 
higher taxes. Furthermore, because in some European countries 
tax burdens have increased much more dramatically than the 
oECD average it is likely that there would have been correspond-
ingly larger effects on their growth rates (Leibfritz et al. 1997).
Despite the apparent consensus in the growth–regression lit-
erature, economists do not necessarily find it convincing in terms 
of identifying a causal relationship between tax and growth. The 
very strong association found in such work does not demonstrate 
causality and certainly does not do so in particular situations. 
For example, an apparent relationship between growth and 
lower taxation might arise as a result of a third factor which af-
fects both (such as good legal institutions and the rule of law). 
The regressions might also be affected by outliers or particular 
circumstances that pertained at particular times or in specific 
groups of countries.
It may well be implausible, given the very high level of gov-
ernment spending in Western countries and given the consistent 
results of the growth regression literature, that a reduction in 
government spending and taxation would not increase growth 
– and substantially so. However, the growth regression literature 
does not prove that.
Given these doubts, more robust examination and modelling 
of the data was commissioned for this study and undertaken by 
Lucy Minford. The results of this are also reported in Part 2. Min-
ford uses modelling techniques that are particularly robust and 
which are very powerful at rejecting false models. There are two 
other insights which also make her work interesting.
Tax rates often have their impact at the margin. It is the ad-
ditional tax that an individual will pay on additional earnings 
that will determine their desire to work, save or take business 
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risks. Lucy Minford therefore uses the top marginal tax rate in 
her analysis of the effect of tax on growth. Secondly, regulation 
is often used as a substitute for taxation to achieve similar objec-
tives. one obvious example of this is the minimum wage, which 
Box 2 Dynamic scoring1
An important practical and policy reason for examining 
the relationship between tax and growth is given by the UK 
government’s recent exercises in so-called dynamic scoring 
(HMRC 2013, 2014). These papers represent the first efforts 
of a UK government to model the dynamic macroeconomic 
impacts of proposed tax reforms using what is known as a 
calibrated computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. CGE 
models of this type are used by the US Congressional Budget 
Office to analyse the effects of tax cuts. The UK corporation 
tax exercise (HMRC 2013) is based on the premise that, while 
reducing corporation tax rates represents a static cost to the 
Exchequer in lost revenues, it implies dynamic gains through 
the stimulation of business investment via the reduction 
in the cost of capital, and transitional productivity growth 
which, by raising taxable profits, allow much of that cost to 
be recovered.
If dynamic scoring is not used to assess the impact of tax 
changes, the government might overestimate the cost to the 
Exchequer of tax reductions or overestimate the revenue to 
be gained from tax increases. This could lead to serious policy 
misjudgements.
1 The substance and technical detail of this box follow very closely Minford 
(2015). However, the conclusions have been adapted by the author of the intro-
duction to relate it to the discussion in the rest of this book.
Smith.indd   16 14-Oct-16   3:19:48 PM
I N T RoDUC T IoN 
17
is designed to increase the incomes of the poor so that there is 
less reliance on benefits financed by taxation.
Lucy Minford constructs a measure that combines both tax 
and regulatory factors into one index and examines how changes 
from the trend in that index affect growth. overall, very strong 
evidence is found from this study that taxation affects growth, 
most likely through the channel of reduced entrepreneurship. 
The approach exemplifies the stance of the coalition 
government elected in 2010 and its successor Conservative 
government elected in 2015, that growth is a key policy objec-
tive: corporation tax reductions have been central to the gov-
ernment’s drive to stimulate growth and investment through 
supply side reforms (HMRC 2013: 5). 
It is not uncontroversial. Adam and Bozio (2009: 20), for 
example, point out that ‘dynamic scoring requires making 
numerous modelling assumptions and essentially guess-
ing the parameters for which no hard empirical evidence is 
available. This opens the door to large controversies if these 
guesses are made – or perceived to be made – in a politically 
biased way’ (my italics). They go on to say:
Proponents of tax cuts often argue that the economic effects 
are large. As noted earlier, health and safety regulations 
might be costly for businesses to implement, reducing profits, 
employment and tax revenue; or they might lead to a healthier 
and more productive workforce, with the opposite result. The 
nature and magnitude of these effects is likely to be exactly 
what proponents and opponents of regulations dispute. A 
body responsible for dynamic scoring is in effect asked to pass 
judgement. 
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The research finds that a 10 percentage point fall in a combined 
index of the top marginal tax rate and regulation relative to its 
trend produces a rise in output over about thirty years of 24 per 
cent. This is equivalent to an increase in the growth rate over the 
thirty years following the cut of about 0.8 percentage points per 
annum. The model does not distinguish between regulation and 
tax. However, it is changes in marginal tax rates that have driven 
the changes in the combined index over the period. As such, it 
is reasonable to infer that a 10 percentage point cut in the top 
marginal tax rate would bring about the improvement in growth 
indicated by the model. Given the government’s own research 
Of course, sensitivity tests can be conducted around 
important parameters, but this amounts to an admission that 
the range of potential effects could be extremely large.
The issue of dynamic scoring is therefore difficult. Lower 
taxes may well have a beneficial effect on growth, though the 
magnitude of that effect is widely disputed. On the other hand, 
if the government does not use dynamic scoring, it implicitly 
assumes that the impact of changes in taxes on variables such 
as economic growth and entrepreneurship is zero.
It is important to note that, when dynamic scoring is used, 
the government is examining the impacts of particular tax 
changes rather than the impact of changing the total tax bur-
den. One of the purposes of the further modelling undertaken 
later in this book is to shed more light on the relationship 
between tax and growth. However, as far as the state of know-
ledge that currently exists within the Treasury is concerned, 
dynamic scoring is probably best used to give an indication of 
the potential range of effects arising from tax changes. Other-
wise, there is a real danger of spurious accuracy.
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about the dynamic impact of reducing the top rate of tax from 
50 per cent to 45 per cent, this result is hardly a surprise.
Designing an effective tax system
Principles of an effective tax system
Though much of this book is about the impact of taxation and 
government spending on growth in general, the detail of the tax 
system is also important for economic performance. A badly 
designed tax system could, all other things equal, have a much 
greater cost in terms of economic growth and welfare.
The methods by which governments raise taxes can affect eco-
nomic growth through several channels. For example, taxes can 
be designed in ways that make them expensive for taxpayers to 
pay. This may raise the cost of establishing a business (especially 
as the costs of tax collection tend to be a fixed cost and there-
fore bear especially heavily on small businesses). More generally, 
unnecessary costs of tax collection are a deadweight cost on the 
economy. In addition, if there is uncertainty in the tax system, 
this can reduce the incentives for individuals and businesses 
to invest as it raises the risk premium required for investment. 
Thirdly, taxes can be costly if they discriminate against particu-
lar economic activities. This can distort decision making and 
lead individuals and businesses to take decisions that reduce 
welfare. This arises because the relative tax treatment of two 
courses of action can lead the less valuable one to appear more 
remunerative after tax is taken into account.
There are two exceptions to these general rules. Firstly, higher 
taxes on activities that have what economists call negative ex-
ternalities (that is, social costs or negative spillover effects on 
the rest of the economy) can increase welfare if they are well 
designed and targeted. That is because the taxes reflect the ad-
ditional costs to society of such activities that are not reflected 
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in market prices. Secondly, mobile factors of production should 
be relatively lightly taxed because their behaviour is affected by 
taxes to a greater extent than that of factors of production that 
are not mobile. This would justify lower taxes on capital or on 
labour that was especially mobile.5 Conversely, factors of pro-
duction that are extremely inelastic in terms of their supply can 
be more heavily taxed without affecting economic growth, the 
obvious example here being undeveloped land.
A new tax system for the UK
overall, Rory Meakin, the author of Part 3 of this book, proposes 
the abolition of twenty taxes which are especially badly designed. 
These include inheritance tax and also some comparatively new 
taxes such as the apprenticeship levy. It is proposed that other 
taxes should be radically reformed too in order to create a coher-
ent tax system designed to raise 20–25 per cent of national income.
Such a system would include the following major taxes:
• An income tax set at a rate of 15 per cent of income above a 
personal allowance of around £10,000.
• A value added tax (VAT) of 12.5 per cent, with most reduced-
rate, zero-rated and exempt items charged tax at this 
standard rate.
• A new housing consumption tax on rents and imputed rents 
designed to mimic VAT at 12.5 per cent.
• A new land value tax.
• A much-reduced fuel duty.
The move away from existing property taxes and towards a land 
value tax and a tax on the imputed rent from owner- occupied 
5 For example, this would justify a special system of taxes applying to ‘non-doms’ 
(those who are not permanently resident), as already exists in the UK.
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housing (or a housing consumption tax) would create a tax sys-
tem much more conducive to growth. Existing taxes on business 
property would be abolished and homeowners would no longer 
suffer stamp duty when they moved to take a more productive 
job. The tax on imputed rent would end the bias against rented 
property that exists in the UK tax system and a land value tax 
is well understood by economists to be one of the least growth- 
inhibiting taxes available.
Instead of separate taxes on corporate profits, income from 
shares would be taxed in a similar way as income from corporate 
bonds,6 thus ending the tax incentive companies currently have 
to take on more debt.
This set of taxes would be much easier to administer than the 
current UK tax code, which is among the most complex in the 
developed world. There would be a small number of taxes levied 
at low rates with no exemptions.
It is often thought that reducing taxes and making taxes ‘flat-
ter’ tend to help the rich and harm the poor. That is not the case 
with the proposed reform. Currently, the less-well-off pay a high 
proportion of their income in ‘sin’ taxes levied on products the 
governments deems to be harmful such as alcohol. The reduction 
in those taxes and other aspects of the package (the proposed 
property taxes, for example, are likely to affect the better off to 
a greater degree) mean that, overall, lower income deciles gain 
from the proposed tax reform. The modelling undertaken by 
Rory Meakin suggests that the poorest decile would enjoy tax 
cuts worth 26 per cent of gross income, followed by 19 per cent 
for the second poorest decile, 17 per cent for the third poorest 
decile and then 13 per cent for the fourth poorest decile. The 
third richest decile would enjoy a cut of just 9 per cent while the 
richest two deciles would both see their taxes cut by 13 per cent 
of their incomes.
6 That is, in the hands of the investor.
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As well as changes to the tax system, a number of changes to 
the way in which taxes are administered are proposed in Part 3. 
These would make the tax system much more stable, predictable 
and less prone to short-term political meddling.
Conclusion
overall, the authors of this important study make a major contri-
bution to the understanding of the role of taxation in a modern 
state. The extent to which the size of government has increased 
would probably take many by surprise. Furthermore, the extent 
of so-called austerity has been limited and will continue to be so. 
What has happened is that the government has made strategic 
choices to increase government spending in some areas and to 
reduce it in others.
Politicians who purport to govern in the name of promoting 
the welfare of all should be aware that taxation and government 
spending are not only beyond the levels at which economic 
growth would be maximised but almost certainly way above 
the levels which would be most beneficial for economic welfare. 
More worryingly, it is quite possible that, in the UK, government 
spending is at or beyond maximum sustainable levels. Certain-
ly, there would be significant benefits to economic growth from 
reducing government spending and taxation, which would ulti-
mately benefit all sections of society.
If the UK had a more coherent tax system, the same amount 
of revenue could be raised at a much lower economic cost. Such 
a tax system would involve the elimination of huge numbers of 
taxes and the simplification of many others. The UK has had 
successive Chancellors of the Exchequers who have systemati-
cally sought to make the tax system more complex for political 
purposes at great economic cost. There is now an opportunity to 
reverse the damage. However, it will be much easier to do so at 
lower levels of government spending and taxation.
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2 HOW SHOULD GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
AND TAX BURDENS BE MEASURED?
David B. Smith
Introduction
The main theme of this chapter is the practical problems that 
arise when trying to measure the burdens of government spend-
ing and taxation and how these have developed since the late 
nineteenth century, both internationally and in Britain. All 
systems of measurement, such as the National Accounts figures 
compiled by the UK office for National Statistics (oNS), are based 
on some underlying conceptual framework, even if this might be 
implicit or lost in the mists of time. For example, the statistics 
for gross domestic product (GDP) that appear in the national 
accounts were originally built around a Keynesian ‘effective 
demand’ paradigm in order to help maximise British military 
production in World War II. As a result, the GDP data are not 
necessarily well suited for other purposes, including trying to 
differentiate between government and private-sector activities.
Because it is important to be clear about the conceptual un-
derpinnings from the start, this chapter commences with two 
simple truisms that tend to be largely forgotten in the political 
debate on ‘tax and spend’ issues. The first truism is that the gov-
ernment has effectively zero resources of its own. The corollary 
is that, under normal circumstances, all government spending 
commitments imply higher taxes, either immediately or in the 
future, when the increased debt resulting from borrowing has to 
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be serviced.1 The second truism, which follows on from the first, 
is that the tax base is not total GDP, as appears to be believed by 
politicians and officials, but only the residual component of GDP 
after government spending has been subtracted.2 This is because 
it is impossible for any institution (or individual) to generate 
resources through taxing itself. In logic, real resources always 
have to come from outside the boundaries of the body concerned. 
Each of these two truisms will be considered in turn.
It is government spending and not taxation that 
determines the burden of government activity
In the distant past, monarchs had revenues from their own pri-
vate lands, which were known as the ‘Royal Domain’ and most 
of today’s Western governments enjoy non-tax receipts of some 
2 per cent to 3½ per cent of GDP from sources such as rent, in-
terest and dividend payments. However, the share of government 
spending in GDP currently runs from just over one third to 
something over one half in developed countries (Table 7), imply-
ing that all additional government spending eventually requires 
1 The fact that all government expenditure has to be paid for has been known since 
the 1960s as the ‘government’s budget constraint’. There is a third option, borrow-
ing from the banking sector. However, this is only non-inflationary during the tem-
porary period that lending to the private sector is being crowded off the asset side 
of bank balance sheets. once nearly all bank lending is to the government, any extra 
loans to the public sector boost bank liabilities – i.e. their deposits – and hence 
broad money. This is the ‘monetisation’ point at which inflation (and, in extreme 
cases, hyper-inflation) starts to take off.
2 For convenience, this will be referred to as private-sector (or ‘non-socialised’) GDP 
from now on. However, this is something of a misnomer because, being a residual 
item, public corporations and non-profit-making institutions are also included. 
The measurement problems involved are discussed more fully later. The term ‘mar-
ket sector’ might also be applied to that part of GDP which theoretically responds 
to market signals rather than being determined by bureaucrats and politicians. 
However, the office for National Statistics uses the term ‘Market Sector Gross Value 
Added’ to denote a rather different volume series in the national accounts. It was 
decided that it might cause confusion to employ the same terminology here.
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higher taxes under ‘normal circumstances’. These can be defined 
as a situation in which the economy concerned is: (1) running 
at reasonably full employment, and (2) not taxing to such an ex-
tent that a reduction in tax rates will generate more tax revenue. 
These are important qualifications, however, and have been hotly 
debated for decades.
Figure 1 shows the ratio of taxes to UK GDP since 1900. It 
suggests that the upper limit on taxable capacity is somewhat 
below 40 per cent of the factor-cost measure of GDP; the average 
figure during the twenty-first century has been 37.3 per cent, for 
example. However, as will be discussed below, this is only one 
possible measure of the tax burden.
Keynesian economists have long argued that in circum-
stances of mass unemployment small increases in government 
spending can induce a significantly larger increase in GDP; the 
ratio between the two being the Keynesian ‘multiplier’. How-
ever, most empirical estimates suggest that the multiplier can 
be negative as well as positive and is probably not much higher 
than one or two at most. Since government spending is included 
in the definition of GDP, the multiplier has to be greater than 
one before there is any improvement in private-sector activity 
as a result of increased government spending. otherwise, in-
creased public expenditure simply crowds out private activity, 
Figure 1 Ratio of UK non-oil tax receipts to UK non-oil GDP at factor cost 
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and exacerbates the contraction in the latter, and this may 
have been what has happened internationally since the global 
financial crash. Unfortunately, the literature dealing with the 
multiplier has sometimes fallen into the trap of reducing com-
plex systems of multivariate relationships to a simple ratio. The 
value of the multiplier is conditional on all the other variables 
in the system – including the reactions of the monetary author-
ities – and should not be expected to be stable over time, except 
by extreme coincidence.
The Laffer curve argument cuts the other way, of course, and 
suggests that beyond a certain point tax-financed increases in 
government spending lead to a reduction in aggregate supply, 
which is assumed to be fixed in simple Keynesian models.3 The 
introduction of a flexible supply side, which is influenced by the 
post-tax incentives to produce goods and services, noticeably 
alters the conclusions from conventional analyses that assume 
aggregate supply is fixed (see Smith 2006; Sinclair 2012). one 
important conclusion is that the long-term negative supply-side 
effects of the higher taxes associated with budget deficits have 
to be traded off against any short-term demand stimulus from 
increased spending. This point appears to have been rather for-
gotten since the financial crash of 2008.
Because the supply-side approach was heavily rooted in 
the ‘public finance’ literature, which tended to assume that all 
government spending was tax financed, it was originally left 
slightly vague as to whether tax-financed spending was more, 
or less, harmful than the deficit-financed sort, or whether both 
were equivalent in the long run. If deficit-financed spending is 
3 It remains something of a mystery why supply shocks have not been given more 
prominence in the macroeconomic debate. Almost a quarter of a century ago, 
Sterne and Bayoumi (1993) used time series methods to examine whether it was 
demand or supply shocks that produced the greatest disturbances to growth and 
inflation in the case of 21 oECD countries. They concluded that both effects were 
roughly equally important in the short term but that supply shocks dominated in 
the medium term in the ratio 72:28 where output was concerned. 
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as harmful as tax-financed spending, then the relevant macro-
economic concern becomes the public spending burden and not 
the tax burden. How government spending is financed becomes 
a secondary issue.
The Ricardian Equivalence theorem (Barro 1974) argued that 
any alleged stimulatory effects from deficit-financed public ex-
penditure were likely to prove minimal if people rationally feared 
higher future taxes, as a result of running a budget deficit today 
and therefore reduced their consumption or investment. In such 
circumstances, the macroeconomic consequences of taxation 
and spending become identical in the long run.4 While full Ric-
ardian Equivalence remains controversial, it certainly seems to 
exist to some extent – i.e. it is not zero – but it may be less than 
100 per cent.
In addition to Ricardian Equivalence effects, private capital 
formation also seems to be reduced by budget deficits, because of 
the uncertainties created with regard to future taxes and interest 
rates. This suggests that when spending is financed by deficits it 
will ultimately crowd out roughly the same volume of activity as 
if it is financed by taxes – though the effects of financing spend-
ing via taxes might come through less quickly. Indeed, in this 
context, it is conceivable that the present sluggish growth ob-
servable in so many Western economies reflects the supply-side 
hangover that followed the Keynesian-inspired public spending 
binge that was the politicians’ reaction to the financial crash.
This analysis suggests that the tax burden ought really to be 
measured by looking at total government spending which is fi-
nanced by taxes and borrowing (in effect, deferred taxes in most 
cases). The ratio of general government expenditure to national 
income is shown in Figure 2.
4 This does not invalidate the insights from the public finance approach indicating 
that high marginal rates of tax, and regulatory induced distortions, can both do 
severe microeconomic damage and lead to a reduction in aggregate supply that 
then has macroeconomic implications.
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No institution can tax itself
The second important truism, which follows from the previous 
analysis, is that the tax base is not total gross domestic product 
(GDP) but only the residual component of GDP after government 
spending has been subtracted – in other words, we should focus 
on the burden of government on the private sector. Individual 
arms of government pay taxes to other parts of government (e.g. 
local authorities pay VAT on their purchases). However, these 
transfers net out for government as a whole, even if this is not 
always apparent in the published statistics.
Regrettably, the longer-term projections for tax receipts 
made by the office for Budget Responsibility (oBR) appear to be 
largely driven by their predictions for money GDP. However, the 
public/private distinction is highly important when forecasting 
because the ratio of private to total GDP shows marked cycli-
cal swings (see Figure 2). Some of the forecasting errors in the 
official predictions of government receipts from the oBR – and 
HM Treasury before them5 – may have resulted from a failure to 
distinguish between the public and private sector components of 
GDP. However, making this distinction in practice is not entirely 
straightforward, as will be seen shortly.
Because there are limits to an economy’s taxable capacity, 
and increasing the share of national output absorbed by the 
state can reduce output per head and crowd out future growth,6 
it is essential to have accurate measures of public spending and 
tax burdens. Furthermore, it is important that these measures 
are defined consistently over time. This is both for politically 
important monitoring purposes – for example, to see whether 
5 The oBR is still working with the former HM Treasury forecasting model and many 
oBR staff are former Treasury employees.
6 See Sinclair (2012: 82–84) for a tabular summary of the published studies in this 
area from 1975 onwards.
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the government has abided by its spending plans7 – and to allow 
politically disinterested research to be undertaken into the wider 
consequences of government spending, borrowing and taxes. 
Unfortunately, the devil lies in the detail where measurement is 
concerned. This is partly because defining the boundary between 
the public and private sectors is often surprisingly difficult.
Measurement difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that 
official statisticians frequently rework their figures onto new – 
and, often, surprisingly incompatible – conceptual bases. one 
example is the European Union (EU) mandated switch from 
the 1995 European Standard Accounts (ESA  1995) to the new 
ESA 2010 national accounts conventions in the autumn of 2014.8 
This switchover led to extremely large methodological changes 
7 It will be seen later that there have been so many definitional changes since 
Mr Osborne introduced his first Budget after the 2010 election that it is almost 
impossible to know how far he succeeded or failed to achieve his fiscal goals 
during his six years as Chancellor. It is because Parliament’s control of the purse 
is the foundation stone of British democracy that this has serious constitutional 
implications. 
8 These figures are used to determine fiscal transfers between the EU member states 
and correspondingly have a quasi-legal status.
Figure 2 Ratios of UK general government expenditure and private 
expenditure to UK GDP at factor cost 1870–2015
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to the published figures for both the government accounts and 
national output, as will be described later. These changes, which 
were particularly marked in the British case, noticeably reduced 
the alleged UK tax and spending burdens and led to a retrospec-
tive payment to the EU. This is despite the fact that nothing can 
have changed in reality because the past is past.
once it has been agreed how to measure national income, in 
theory, measuring the sizes of the government and private sec-
tors might appear to be a simple matter. Conceptually, all that is 
required is agreed measures of national output and government 
spending. ‘Private’ (or ‘non-socialised’) spending can then be 
calculated as a residual item. Calculating the ratios of government 
spending and taxes to private GDP then becomes straightforward 
if it is thought that this is the best measure of the burden that the 
state is imposing on society (Figure 3). In practice, however, dis-
turbingly incompatible estimates of the spending and tax burdens 
are calculable depending on (1) the exact definitions employed 
and (2) the particular generation of official data used. Generally, 
there are two main reasons why competing measures of the public 
spending and tax burdens differ from each other in any given gen-
eration of official data. Each will be considered in turn.
Figure 3 Ratio of UK general government expenditure to private GDP and 
non-oil taxes to non-oil private GDP 1900–2015
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How do we define the public sector?
The first reason is that definitions of the public sector can vary 
widely, particularly once allowance is made for quasi-govern-
ment bodies and public corporations, such as the former nation-
alised industries, universities and the BBC. Since october 2008, 
such bodies have included the bailed-out banks, such as Lloyds/
HBoS, now being gradually returned to the private sector.9 More 
recently, housing associations were incorporated in the public 
sector figures in February 2016. Bringing housing associations 
into the definition of public corporations raised estimated public 
borrowing in 2014/15 by £3.6bn and added £59.8bn to the public 
sector debt stock.
The convention used by the organisation of Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (oECD) and similar international bod-
ies to ameliorate this ‘fuzzy-boundary’ problem is to employ the 
concept of ‘general government’. General government consists of 
central government and local authorities10 but excludes public 
corporations, such as the old nationalised industries, the bailed-
out banks and housing associations.
While the exclusion of public corporations is probably inevit-
able, if reasonably consistent definitions are to be maintained 
over time, it means that there is probably a downwards bias 
in some of the figures quoted later. However, any subsidies to 
loss-making public corporations are included in total general 
government expenditure. Arguably, public corporations that live 
off their own resources, and do not receive government finan-
cial assistance, are not a direct burden on the taxpayer, while 
 profit-making ones permit lower taxes or more spending than 
would have been possible otherwise. The main concern then 
9 The oNS publishes figures both cum and ex these financial institutions. Most 
people, including the oBR, prefer the figures excluding the state-owned banks and 
these are the figures used throughout this contribution.
10 And provinces, states, etc., in federal systems.
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becomes whether public corporations are efficient producers or 
whether, instead, they abuse their state-granted monopoly and 
overcharge customers. In which case, this overcharge has the 
properties of a covert indirect tax.11
Another potential source of downwards bias is that estimates 
of the tax and spending burdens provide no understanding of 
the regulatory costs that are increasingly imposed on private 
economic agents. Such regulations often appear to favour po-
litical goals and vested interests rather than society as a whole 
and can be used as a substitute for taxes.12 Tanzi (2008) has sug-
gested that one reason for increasing regulation has been that 
many Western states have run out of spare taxable resources. As 
a result, politicians have rewarded their client interest groups 
through regulations, which impose concealed losses on other 
citizens, because they cannot overtly expropriate any more from 
the taxpayer. This may reflect growing political resistance in ad-
dition to the economic limits on taxable capacity. Nevertheless, 
these chapters do not examine the burden of regulation.
While accepting that any chosen figure to represent public ex-
penditure has its drawbacks, it was argued in Smith (2006) that 
the ‘least-bad’ buys for practical purposes are: (1) to employ the 
oECD’s statistics for international comparisons, and (2) to use 
the UK office for National Statistics (oNS) measures of general 
government expenditure compiled by subsector and economic 
categories for Britain.
11 Paying for the ‘green agenda’ by means of increased electricity bills is an example. 
Another grey area is the issue of third-sector organisations that are essentially com-
missioned by government to deliver public/social services. These make up the bulk 
of the ‘Non-profit institutions serving households’ in the expenditure GDP figures 
in Table 5 and their funding appears in ‘other current grants’ in Table 3. The latter 
have been aggregated with ‘Government final current expenditure’ in Table 9 to 
maintain historical consistency.
12 Mr osborne’s imposition of the living wage is a possible example. In theory, it may 
prevent the bottom end of the labour market clearing – with potential adverse 
consequences for the employment of less productive employees – but helps reduce 
government payments to the low paid. 
Smith.indd   36 14-Oct-16   3:19:50 PM
HoW SHoU L D G oV E R N M E N T SPE N DI NG A N D TA x BU R DE NS BE M E A SU R E D? 
37
The latter are presented in Table 3 for the latest full fiscal 
year.13
How do we define national output?
The second major problem when measuring the government 
spending and tax burdens concerns the precise definition of na-
tional output with which public expenditure and tax revenues 
are compared. There are at least three plausible ways of meas-
uring money GDP, for example.14 The chosen option can make a 
noticeable difference to the ratios concerned.
Arguably, the worst measure is GDP at market prices, which 
is reported gross of indirect taxes and subsidies, and overstates 
national output as a result. If a tax is added to a product, it in-
creases the measured output of the economy at market prices 
totally artificially (and the opposite happens for a subsidy). Even 
so, it is the concept employed by the oECD and it is the officially 
preferred measure in Britain. This is partly for no better reason 
than that the figures are easier to compile, however. one draw-
back of market-price GDP is that the varying mixtures of direct 
and indirect taxes between countries mean that this measure 
distorts the relative rankings of the economies concerned.15 
13 Readers who want more detail might like to know that there is a monthly-updated 
Excel spreadsheet published by the oNS on its website the working day following 
the release of the oNS Public Sector Finances Statistical Bulletin. This contains de-
tailed quarterly data back to 1946 Q1, allowing both calendar and fiscal year data 
to be downloaded.
14 There is also a tradition of using net domestic product in some of the literature on 
‘tax-freedom’ day, which subtracts capital depreciation from GDP. Conceptually, 
this is correct but is not widely employed because the capital depreciation figures 
are notoriously unreliable. However, the use of gross domestic product clearly 
biases downwards estimates of the tax and spending burdens, particularly now 
that short-lived software development is included as gross capital formation in the 
official figures.
15 For example, the VAT-heavy EU economies are probably being flattered by the mar-
ket-price measure in comparison with, say, the US, where the overall tax burden is 
lower and possibly less reliant on indirect taxation.
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Another is that market-price GDP increases – and the reported 
public spending ratio declines – when there is a revenue-neu-
tral switch from direct to indirect taxation, even if underlying 
Table 3 General government transactions by subsector and economic 
category in fiscal 2015/16
£bn %
Ratio to GDP 
at market 
prices (%)
Ratio to GDP 
at factor 
cost (%)
 Current expenditure
Current consumption of goods 
and services 361.4 48.4 19.2 21.9
Subsidies 12.0 1.6 0.6 0.7
Net social benefits 230.8 30.9 12.3 14.0
Net current grants overseas 2.9 0.4 0.2 0.2
Other current grants 20.3 2.7 1.1 1.2
Debt interest 45.7 6.1 2.4 2.8
Payments to European Union 15.3 2.1 0.8 0.9
 Capital expenditure
Fixed investment 45.8 6.1 2.4 2.8
Stocks –0.1 –0.0 –0.0 –0.0
Capital grants 13.2 1.8 0.7 0.8
Total expenditure 747.3 100.0 39.8 45.3
 Receipts
Taxes on income and wealth 220.9 32.8 11.8 13.4
Taxes on production 242.4 36.0 12.9 14.7
Compulsory social contributions 113.4 16.9 6.0 6.9
Other taxes 46.4 6.9 2.5 2.8
Non-oil taxes 623.1 92.6 33.2 37.8
Rent, interest and dividends 49.7 7.4 2.6 3.0
Total receipts 672.8 100.0 35.8 40.8
Net borrowing 74.5 4.0 4.5
Source: UK Office for National Statistics Public Sector Finances (Table PSA10) and Quarterly National 
Accounts ‘Statistical Bulletins’ released in June 2016. Calculations used data rounded to nearest £m, 
not £bn. North Sea tax revenues were effectively zero (minus £25m) in 2015/16.
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national output has not changed – and this has happened in the 
UK over time.16
The alternative measure of GDP ‘at factor cost’ excludes all 
indirect taxes and subsidies. As a result, it is arguably the most 
appropriate yardstick and it was widely accepted as being the 
best measure before the 1970s. The factor-cost measure has been 
adopted for the long-term historical comparisons that follow 
because it is not distorted by changes in the indirect tax burden 
over time. As can be seen from Figure 4, this distortion is particu-
larly marked if comparisons are being made with the far lower 
tax and spending ratios that prevailed before World Wars I and II, 
for example. Figure 5 shows the percentage of national income 
by which the factor-cost measure of the government spending 
burden exceeds the one based on market price. It can be seen 
that this difference has increased over time and, as a result, the 
16 Both the Thatcher government in 1979 and the Coalition in 2010 sharply increased 
VAT, with the result that any apparent cuts in the burdens of spending and taxation 
partly resulted from a change in the denominator not the numerator. Exaggerating 
the severity of fiscal retrenchment was politically convenient for both the Conser-
vative and Labour parties, albeit for different reasons, on both occasions. 
Figure 4 Ratios of UK general government expenditure to GDP measured 
at both market prices and at factor cost 1870–2015
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official understating of the government spending burden has 
increased.
As far as the UK specifically is concerned, factor-cost GDP has 
been given less prominence in recent years than the ‘hybrid GDP’ 
at basic prices, which is often referred to as gross value added 
(GVA). Basic-price GDP is used to measure regional GDP, for ex-
ample, and excludes most, but not all, indirect taxes. Though this 
is not as satisfactory as GDP at factor cost, it is preferable to GDP 
at market prices. The trends in the government spending ratio 
using factor-cost and basic-price GDP are similar, because the 
two definitions are reasonably close. However, the government 
spending and tax burdens come out some 0.5–1.0 per cent lower 
using basic-price GDP as the denominator than when the better 
factor-cost GDP measure is used.
That the precise measure of national output used to quantify 
the burden of public spending is not just a trivial accounting 
point was revealed in the final two columns of Table 3 and is con-
firmed by Table 4, which shows that market-price GDP was near-
ly £229bn (13.9 per cent) higher than the factor-cost measure in 
2015/16, and that the share of total general government expend-
iture (GGE) in money GDP was 39.8 per cent if the market-price 
Figure 5 Differences between factor-cost and market-price measures of 
the UK spending burden 1870–2015
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measure is employed and 45.3 per cent using factor-cost GDP, 
representing a substantial difference of 5.5  percentage points. 
Thus, when we hear the government or the media quote govern-
ment spending ratios, they are dramatically understating the 
best estimates of the burden of government. Furthermore, the 
use of the market-price measure understates the increase in the 
ratio of government spending over time.
The national accounts revolution: ESA 2010
Something that has caused serious problems for all UK data users 
has been the scale of methodological changes to previous official 
statistics for the government sector and GDP in recent years, 
as the oNS has struggled to make Britain’s national accounts 
consistent with the latest EU standards. This rewriting of his-
tory reached a crescendo when the ESA 2010 national accounts 
Table 4 Alternative measures of the shares of government spending 
and taxes in UK national output in fiscal year 2015/16
Value 
(£bn)
Share of 
GGE in 
GDP (%)
Share of 
receipts 
in GDP 
(%)
Share of 
taxes and 
NICs in 
GDP (%)
General government expenditure (GGE) 747.3
Total receipts 672.8
Taxes and NICs 623.1
GDP at current market prices 1,879.3 39.8 35.8 33.2
GDP at basic prices 1,673.6 44.7 40.2 37.2
GDP at factor cost 1,650.5 45.3 40.8 37.8
Non-oil GDP at current market prices 1,855.0 40.3 36.3 33.6
Non-oil GDP at basic prices 1,649.3 45.3 40.8 37.8
Non-oil GDP at factor cost 1,626.2 46.0 41.4 38.3
Source: UK Office for National Statistics Public Sector Finances and Quarterly National Accounts 
‘Statistical Bulletins’ released in June 2016.
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were introduced in the autumn of 2014 and were described as a 
‘once-in-a-generation’ set of changes at the time. However, this 
statement did not prevent the oNS from implementing further 
major changes in September 2015 and again in June 2016. The 
extent of this rewriting of the past is illustrated by Table 5. This 
reveals the amendments to the official figures for the main ex-
penditure components of money GDP in the year of 2013 follow-
ing the switch to ESA 2010 in September 2014, the further meth-
odological changes introduced in September 2015, and the most 
recent changes in June 2016.17
The original introduction of ESA 2010 in September 2014 was 
accompanied by large changes to the previous oNS data for 
the government finances. General government net borrowing 
(GGNB) in 2000/01 was revised up by £22.6bn, for example, and 
the figure for 2012/13 by £42bn. These dramatic changes resulted 
from a retrospective change in the treatment of the receipts from 
the 3G wireless spectrum auction and the transfer of the Post 
office Pension Fund liabilities, respectively. In addition, there 
were revisions to a wide range of individual public spending and 
receipt items, sometimes going back over many decades.
These methodological innovations suggest that the Parlia-
mentary debate on tax and spend issues has often been based on 
subsequently invalidated fiscal statistics. However, much of this 
political debate was concerned with the share of government ex-
penditure and taxes in money GDP, which has itself been revised 
substantially. The cumulative increase of not far short of £127bn 
in money GDP between the ESA 1995 estimates published in June 
17 There is a mystery concerning the June 2016 national accounts. While the start and 
end points of 1948 and 2015 are not too dissimilar to their forerunner, the ratio 
of the new series to the old seems to peak in the mid 1980s, with the new figures 
some 8 or 9 percentage points higher than in the previous official estimates. This 
has caused substantial downwards changes (of up to 2.7 percentage points) to the 
calculated spending and tax ratios during the years of peak revisions. The reason 
appears to have been a revised treatment of imputed rents from the ownership of 
property. Hughes (2016) provides more details.
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2014 and the latest ESA  2010 figure18 would have reduced the 
reported share of government spending in GDP in the historic 
year of 2013/14 by between 3.1 and 4 percentage points on its own, 
depending on the GDP definition employed. However, this was 
partly offset because ESA 2010 also introduced a new £16bn item 
into the government spending identity ‘VAT and Gross National 
Income based EU contributions’ (see Table 3), which picked up 
money paid directly to Brussels. Such payments were previously 
ignored in the UK government accounts.
The net effect of all the changes introduced since the last 
ESA 1995 figures were published has been to raise total general 
government expenditure in the fiscal year 2013/14, for example, 
from £707.7bn on the old measure to £733.9bn on the latest of-
ficial figures (Table 6). However, the accompanying definitional 
increase in money GDP meant that the ratio of total spending 
to basic-price GDP, for example, dropped from 49.1 per cent to 
46.9 per cent, representing a fall of 2.2 percentage points. The 
cash value of total receipts in 2013/14 was raised from £611.6bn 
to £629.9bn as a result of all the revisions introduced since June 
2014. However, the ratio to basic-price GDP dropped from 42.5 per 
cent to 40.2 per cent because of the switch, representing a drop of 
2.3 percentage points.
More generally, Table 6 indicates that the introduction of 
ESA  2010 and subsequent revisions reduced the reported gov-
ernment spending share by some 1.6–2.3 percentage points, 
depending on the precise GDP definition employed, with an 
even larger downgrading observable in the case of tax receipts 
of 2.2–2.9  percentage points. The spending proposals of the 
three major parties in the 2015 election debate differed by triv-
ial amounts compared to the scale of these data amendments. 
18 Just over £100bn came in with the implementation of ESA 2010 in September 2014 
and the rest subsequently. It is possible to separate out the three stages of changes 
to the data using the figures given in Tables 5 and 6. However, it simplifies the text 
and tables if the three sets of changes are consolidated.
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These statistical changes also render it almost impossible to 
evaluate how far the former Chancellor, Mr osborne, achieved 
the goals he set out in 2010 without a major exercise in forensic 
accounting.
Table 5 Expenditure components of money GDP by value in 2013, as 
reported originally and as subsequently revised
 
Old 
ESA 1995 
figures
released 
30/6/14
(£bn)
ESA 2010 
figures 
released 
30/9/14
 (£bn)
Subsequent
ESA 2010 
data
released 
30/9/15
(£bn)
Latest 
data 
released 
30/6/2016
(£bn)
Difference 
between 
30/6/16
and 
ESA 1995 
figures
(£bn)
Difference
between 
30/6/16 
and 
ESA 1995 
figures
(%)
Household 
consumption 1,031.8 1,059.1 1,073.1 1,084.0 52.2 5.1
Non-profit 
institutions 39.1 51.7 55.0 54.5 15.4 39.4
Government 
consumption 343.2 346.8 348.2 349.6 6.4 1.9
Gross fixed capital 
formation 225.8 281.5 280.5 280.2 54.4 24.1
Change in 
inventories 7.9 8.8 7.2 5.1 –2.8 –35.4
Valuation changes 1.8 1.4 5.4 5.3 3.5 194.4
Exports 505.6 511.3 521.0 517.6 12.0 2.4
Gross final 
expenditure 2,155.2 2,260.6 2,290.2 2,296.4 141.2 6.6
Imports 534.1 543.4 555.3 556.8 22.7 4.3
Statistical 
discrepancy –8.4 –3.9 0.0 0.0 8.4 n/a
GDP at market 
prices 1,612.8 1,713.3 1734.9 1,739.6 126.8 7.9
Basic price 
adjustment 188.1 188.0 188.0 188.0 –0.1 –0.1
GDP at basic 
prices 1,424.7 1,525.3 1,546.9 1,551.6 126.9 8.9
Source: UK Office for National Statistics Quarterly National Accounts, June 2014, September 2014, 
September 2015 and June 2016. Gross final expenditure equals the sum of the rows above. Imports 
and the basic price adjustment are then subtracted to define GDP at market prices and at basic 
prices, respectively.
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Is there a best buy?
These statistical issues are important. They lead to material 
changes in our estimates of national income, government spend-
ing and taxation and in the ratios of any one of the variables 
Table 6 Comparison of UK government spending and tax ratios in fiscal 
2013/14 using four different generations of official data
 
Original
June 2014
ESA 1995 
measure
Revised
September 
2014
 ESA 2010 
measure
Further 
revised 
December 
2015
ESA 2010 
measure
Latest 
(June 2016)
estimate 
Cumulated
difference
June 2016 
less
 ESA 1995
measure
 £ billion   
GDP at market 
prices 1,631.4 1,732.4 1,755.9 1,757.2 125.8
GDP at factor cost 1,417.8 1,518.4 1,539.8 1,542.1 124.3
GDP at basic prices 1,440.1 1,541.1 1,564.5 1,565.8 125.7
Government 
spending 707.7 726.9 733.6 733.9 26.2
Non-oil taxes 568.9 571.0 574.1 574.3 5.4
Ratios to GDP at 
market prices (%)  
Government 
spending 43.4 42.0 41.8 41.8 –1.6
Non-oil taxes 34.9 33.0 32.7 32.7 –2.2
Ratios to GDP at 
factor cost (%)  
Government 
spending 49.9 47.9 47.6 47.6 –2.3
Non-oil taxes 40.1 37.6 37.3 37.2 –2.9
Ratios to GDP at 
basic prices (%)  
Government 
spending 49.1 47.2 46.9 46.9 –2.2
Non-oil taxes 39.5 37.1 36.7 36.7 –2.8
Source: UK Office for National Statistics Quarterly National Accounts, June 2014, September 2014, 
September 2015 and June 2016 and Public Sector Finances ‘Statistical Bulletins’, for corresponding 
dates.
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to the others. Making comparisons over time without properly 
understanding the data leads to widely misleading statements 
being made, such as that by the BBC journalist who described the 
2014 budget as taking us back to the land of The Road to Wigan 
Pier (in terms of the level of government spending in relation to 
GDP). However unreasonable that statement was, it should be 
noted that it was based on an equally misleading statement that 
came from a government body.
Crudely, we can say that there are two types of problem 
when examining national income and government spending 
statistics. Firstly, there are technical differences of the type 
discussed immediately above – for example, how we calculate 
imputed rent on property within GDP figures or whether the 
movement of pension liabilities onto the state balance sheet 
should constitute government spending. These will always be 
difficult to resolve and new information, improved measure-
ment techniques or a better understanding of the underlying 
theory may well lead to revisions. Secondly, there are conceptu-
al issues such as whether national income should be measured 
at factor cost or market prices – these questions have more 
objective answers. As has been noted above, the most appro-
priate ratios to use to measure the underlying tax burden are 
those that relate government spending (whether financed by 
current taxation or borrowing) to GDP at factor cost. GDP at 
basic prices, where factor-cost measures are not available, is a 
reasonable alternative.
When looking at how to determine the burden of taxation and 
government spending, there is a further question. Should we be 
concerned about the government/private spending ratio rather 
than just the share of government spending in GDP (irrespective 
of how GDP is defined)?
It was argued in Smith (2006) that, because it was conceptu-
ally impossible for the state to fund itself, more relevant meas-
ures of the tax and spending burdens were their ratios to the 
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non- socialised element of national output. Essentially, the argu-
ment was that, if a taxpayer carries one bureaucrat (or welfare 
recipient) on his or her back, the ratio is ‘one to one’,19 not ‘one to 
one plus one’, and that, if the taxpayer carries two bureaucrats, 
the ratio is ‘two to one’, not ‘two over three’, and so on.
Likewise, expressing fiscal deficits as a share of total GDP can 
give a misleading indication of fiscal irresponsibility. Because 
government cannot absorb its own debt – only the domestic 
private sector and overseas residents can do that – funding a 
budget deficit becomes increasingly difficult as the share of the 
private sector in GDP declines. The same applies to the stock of 
government debt, where it is the ratio to non-socialised GDP that 
is the crucial indicator of fiscal sustainability. Public choice the-
ory suggests that official data are produced by bureaucrats and 
politicians to put the best possible spin on their own activities, 
rather than to enlighten the citizenry.20 This is probably why poli-
ticians and officials seem to plump for definitions that reduce the 
reported tax and spending burdens, irrespective of the economic 
merits of the measures concerned.
19 This situation corresponds to the 100 per cent line in Figure 3.
20 The January–March 2012 issue of World Economics, Volume 13, Number 1, is largely 
devoted to The Dire State of Government Accounting Practices. The title of the contri-
bution by Ball and Pflugraph (2012), ‘Making Enron Look Good ’, conveys the flavour 
of the analysis.
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3 HISTORICAL TRENDS IN THE GOVERNMENT 
SPENDING AND TAX RATIOS
David B. Smith
The international experience
It was suggested earlier that the ‘least-bad’ estimates for inter-
national comparisons were those provided by the oECD, despite 
the fact that these used market-price GDP as the scaling factor. 
Nevertheless, the oECD figures have the advantages that they 
are reworked onto a consistent basis and the results are conven-
iently obtainable in the Annex tables to the oECD’s twice-yearly 
Economic Outlook from 1997 onwards, with longer back-runs 
available in the oECD’s data bank.
The author has published long-run figures for the share of 
general government spending in market-price GDP in the indus-
trialised economies on several previous occasions (e.g. Smith 
2006, 2014). In the past, the method employed was to update 
the historical figures that commenced in the late nineteenth 
century given in Table 1.1 of Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) using 
the latest available oECD figures.1 The most recent such update, 
which employs the June 2016 oECD Economic Outlook, appears 
in Table 7. Unfortunately, national accounting conventions have 
changed noticeably since Tanzi and Schuknecht performed their 
ground-breaking research sixteen years ago. As a consequence, 
there are serious discrepancies between the spending ratios that 
1 Tanzi did the same in Tanzi (2011).
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they provide for 1996 – the final year covered in their book – and 
the latest oECD figures.
At the extremes, the government spending ratio for New Zea-
land in 1996 has been revised up by 5.5 percentage points in the 
June 2016 oECD report and that for Austria by 4.4 percentage 
points, while the ratio for Switzerland has been cut by 5 per-
centage points. The latest US figure for the 1996 overlap year is 
4.1 percentage points higher in the current oECD report than in 
Tanzi and  Schuknecht, while the equivalent British figure has 
been revised down by 3.1 percentage points.
These discontinuities mean that the figures in Table 7 should 
be regarded as no better than rough-and-ready approximations as 
the figures up to and including 1960 are not consistent with those 
from 1980 onwards. Nevertheless, the broad picture is clear – there 
have been huge upwards shifts in the spending ratios since the late 
nineteenth century. Furthermore, and fortuitously, the changes to 
the figures after 1996 for the twelve countries for which continu-
ous data exist average out at reasonably close to zero (specifically, 
there is a relatively modest minus 0.8 percentage points adjust-
ment arising from the revisions because of offsetting breaks). This 
average suggests that the ‘typical’ industrialised state was spend-
ing slightly more than one tenth of national output before the 
1914–18 war – a period that can be regarded as the heyday of genu-
ine free-market capitalist economies – between a fifth and a third 
or so in the late 1930s, when Keynes published his General Theory, 
between one quarter and one third in 1960, and some 45 per cent 
in 2015 on a break-corrected basis.
The available figures for the aggregate oECD spending ratio 
started in 1960 and measured 30.3 per cent, although it then rose 
noticeably between the mid 1960s and mid 1970s – partly as a 
result of the Vietnam War and President Johnson’s Great Society 
welfare programmes in the US and the emergence of a new gener-
ation of big-spending politicians elsewhere in the West. However, 
the spending ratio subsequently increased more slowly to reach 
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39.4 per cent by 1980 (Figure 6). Following two decades of little net 
change, the oECD spending ratio increased from 38.7 per cent in 
2000 to a peak of 44.5 per cent in 2009 before easing to 41.2 per cent 
in 2015. This average conceals a huge divergence within the total, 
however, with Korea having a spending ratio of 32.9 per cent in 
2015 at the bottom end (with Switzerland and Australia at 34 per 
cent and 35.6 per cent, respectively) and Denmark and Finland 
having ratios of 55.7 per cent and 58.3 per cent at the top.
Table 7 Ratios of general government expenditure, including 
transfers, to money GDP at market prices (%)
1870 1913 1920 1937 1960 1980 2000 2010 2015
Australia 18.3 16.5 19.3 14.8 21.2 34.1 34.6 36.6 35.6
Austria 10.5 17.0 14.7 20.6 36.3 49.2 50.2 52.8 51.7
Belgium — 13.8 — 21.8 30.3 57.3 49.0 53.3 54.0
Canada — — 16.7 25.0 28.6 41.1 40.7 43.2 40.3
France 12.6 17.0 27.6 29.0 34.6 46.1 51.1 56.4 57.0
Germany 10.0 14.8 25.0 34.1 32.4 47.9 44.7 47.4 44.0
Italy 13.7 17.1 30.1 31.1 30.1 40.1 45.4 49.9 50.5
Ireland — — — - 28.0 48.9 30.9 65.7 35.2
Japan 08.8 08.3 14.8 25.4 17.5 33.1 38.8 40.7 41.3
Netherlands 09.1 09.0 13.5 19.0 33.7 53.4 41.8 48.2 44.9
New Zealand — — 24.6 25.3 26.9 38.1 37.5 47.8 41.9
Norway 05.9 09.3 16.0 11.8 29.9 45.6 42.0 45.0 48.6
Spain — 08.3 09.3 18.4 18.8 34.2 39.1 45.6 43.3
Sweden 05.7 10.4 10.9 16.5 31.0 57.7 53.6 51.3 50.4
Switzerland 16.5 14.0 17.0 24.1 17.2 32.8 34.2 32.9 34.0
UK 09.4 12.7 26.2 30.0 32.2 44.7 37.8 48.8 43.2
USA 07.3 07.5 12.1 19.4 30.0 35.3 33.9 43.2 37.8
OECD n/a n/a n/a n/a 30.3 39.4 38.7 44.0 41.2
Average for 12 countries with no missing figures:
10.7 12.8 19.9 23.0 28.8 43.3 42.3 46.1 44.9
Sources: Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), OECD Economic Outlook (June 2016, Annex Table 29), and 
OECD data bank.
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Despite the furore over the alleged spending cuts imple-
mented in Britain since 2010, the UK has been a consistently 
bigger spender than the oECD norm over much of the past five-
and-a-half decades, apart from between 1988 and 2001 (see Fig-
ure 7). This exceptional period possibly reflected Lady Thatcher’s 
reforms in the 1980s and the relatively cautious fiscal policies 
adopted in the first three years of the Blair Labour government.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain estimates of the tax 
burden as far back as the spending figures used in Table 7. Never-
theless, the conventional wisdom in favour of balanced budgets 
before the late 1950s suggests that the spending and tax burdens 
developed in parallel for much of that period, apart from during 
the two world wars and the Great Depression of the 1930s. Tanzi 
(2011: 92) has summarised the situation:
There had been significant increases in the levels of taxation 
during World War I (to finance part of the huge spending for 
the war), followed by slow growth until World War II when, as 
happened in the First World War, but in larger amounts, taxes 
Figure 6 Aggregate OECD government spending and revenues expressed 
as a share of GDP at market prices 1960–2015
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were increased to finance the new war. Tax levels for general 
government were only 11% of Gross National Product (GNP) in 
1925–29 in the United States; 20% in France in 1924–25; and less 
than 10% until 1930 and still below 20% up to 1950 in Sweden. 
They were about 25% of GNP in 1924–25 and around 30% of GNP 
in the 1960s in the United Kingdom. In the United States, they 
were around 28% of GNP in the 1960s, a large increase from the 
1920s. From the end of World War II until about 1960, there were 
relatively modest changes; tax levels remained low compared 
with the shares of GDP that they would reach in many other 
countries in later years. The fall of military spending after World 
War II accommodated some of the increase in civilian spending 
in some countries, including the United States.
The more recent period of rising tax burdens from 1965 on-
wards is well documented in the oECD’s annual Revenue Stat-
istics, which publishes figures for the ratio of general government 
tax receipts to market-price GDP for thirty-four oECD member 
countries. These figures appear in Table 8, which shows the same 
countries as Table 7. This reveals that the ratio of tax receipts 
to money GDP in the oECD area had increased from 24.8  per 
 
Figure 7 Gap between UK and average OECD spending ratios (at market 
prices) 1960–2015
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cent in 1965 to 34.4 per cent in 2014, which is the latest pub-
lished figure. The more timely figures for total receipts, which 
include the state’s income from rent, interest and dividends were 
28.5 per cent in 1965, 37.9 per cent in 2014 and 38.1 per cent in 
2015 (Figure 6). However, there are once again substantial vari-
ations between countries. In 2015, general government receipts 
ranged from around one third of market-price GDP in Korea, the 
US, Switzerland and Australia to 38.8 per cent in the UK and an 
eye-watering 53.5 per cent in France, 53.6 per cent in Denmark, 
54.4 per cent in Norway and 55.5 per cent in Finland.
Table 8 Ratios of total tax revenues to money GDP at market prices (%)
1965 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014
Australia 20.6 21.1 26.2 28.1 30.4 25.6 *27.5*
Austria 33.6 33.7 38.7 39.4 42.1 40.8 43.0
Belgium 30.6 33.3 40.6 41.2 43.6 42.4 44.7
Canada 25.3 30.3 30.5 35.3 34.9 30.4 30.8
France 33.6 33.6 39.4 41.0 43.1 41.6 45.2
Germany 31.6 31.5 36.4 34.8 36.2 35.0 36.1
Italy 24.7 24.8 28.7 36.4 40.6 41.5 43.6
Ireland 24.5 27.6 30.1 32.4 30.9 27.5 29.9
Japan 17.8 19.2 24.8 28.5 26.6 27.6 *30.3*
Netherlands 30.9 33.4 40.3 40.2 36.8 36.2 *36.7*
New Zealand 23.2 25.1 29.6 36.2 32.5 30.6 32.4
Norway 29.4 34.3 41.9 40.2 41.9 41.9 39.1
Spain 14.3 15.5 22.0 31.6 33.4 29.9 33.2
Sweden 31.4 35.7 43.7 49.5 49.0 43.2 42.7
Switzerland 16.6 18.2 23.3 23.6 27.6 26.5 26.6
UK 29.3 35.0 33.4 32.9 34.7 32.8 32.6
USA 23.5 25.7 25.5 25.9 28.2 23.2 26.0
OECD 24.8 26.7 30.1 32.1 34.3 32.8 34.4
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics, December 2015, and databank.
*2013 not 2014.
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However, the published tax ratios need to be treated with 
some caution because they do not necessarily provide a reliable 
indicator of the absolute or relative tax burdens being placed 
on an economy. one reason is that tax receipts tend to be more 
cyclical than economic activity, reflecting the fact that the pri-
vate-sector tax base is more cyclically volatile than total GDP 
and also the progressive nature of the tax system. This means 
that an apparent fall in the tax-to-GDP ratio may not reflect a 
reduction in the various rates of tax but, instead, either that the 
country is in recession or that an increased socialised sector has 
crowded out the private-sector tax base.
It has also been accepted in the public finance literature for 
well over a century that excessive marginal rates of particular 
taxes reduce receipts, even if there is slightly more debate as to 
whether this applies at an aggregated level to produce an adverse 
Laffer curve effect.2 In this situation, a decline in the tax ratio can 
reflect an excessive tax burden, not its easing. This also applies 
in reverse. The fiscal stabilisation literature (Smith 2006: 106–9) 
suggests that bold policies of tax cutting and supply side reform 
are frequently followed by an unexpected surge in receipts, which 
is more marked than the accompanying rise in activity.
A final health warning is that the aggregate oECD receipts 
ratios appear to have been revised downwards in recent years, 
presumably because of the new national accounting conventions 
described above and perhaps also because of the admission of 
new members to the organisation. This means that published 
2 By chance, the author has in his possession the 1917 edition of C. F. Bastable’s Pub-
lic Finance, the first edition of which appeared in 1892. This not only explains why 
higher rates of tax will reduce receipts beyond a certain point but also discusses 
whether this property applies in aggregate, i.e. whether there is a macro as well as a 
micro Laffer curve. Unfortunately, the forecasting methodology formerly employed 
by HM Treasury and currently by the office for Budget Responsibility seems to 
implicitly make the assumption that there is no impact of a change in tax rates on 
the private-sector tax base as, arguably, does some of the macroeconomic analysis 
carried out by the Institute for Fiscal Studies.
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empirical studies may not be a reliable guide to the sustainable 
share of taxes in GDP, for example. In particular, the latest fig-
ures for the oECD as a whole in 1970 and 1980 appear to be some 
2.5 percentage points lower than those published a few years ago.
The British experience 1870–2015
The UK is fortunate in that its national accounts have been well 
documented on a calendar year basis well before 1948, when the 
official oNS figures commence. These data exist because of the 
pioneering work of economic historians such as the late Charles 
Feinstein (1972). The Bank of England has mounted many of these 
data series on its website, in some cases back to the seventeenth 
century, making the data readily available.3 A major difficulty 
in compiling consistently defined back runs for the UK tax and 
spending ratios, therefore, is not a paucity of historic data but 
the instability of the recent oNS figures. The least bad solution, 
if consistently defined data series are required, is to link the 
historic pre-oNS data onto the current official definitions using 
chain-linking.4 However, this has the nonsensical consequence 
that the calculated public spending ratio in, say, 1913 or 1938 can 
change every year because the oNS has altered the way it assem-
bles the national accounts from 1948 onwards.5
3 See www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/threecenturies.aspx. For 
more information, see Hills et al. (2010).
4 To be precise, the author has used the Bank’s figures for all three measures of money 
GDP from 1870 to 1947 but scaled them where appropriate to be consistent with the 
oNS data from 1948 onwards. on previous occasions, the author has largely worked 
with Feinstein’s historic data, which were also employed by the Bank. ‘Chain link-
ing’ means multiplying the earlier data by the ratio of the revised data to the old 
series in the earliest common year; in this case, that was 1948.
5 The cumulated shifts over several years of redefinitions are noticeable and can 
amount to several percentage points. As noted above, the reworked national ac-
counts released on 30 June 2016 have led to substantial revisions to the spending 
and tax ratios in parts of the post-1948 period.
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Fortunately, the government accounts appear to be rather 
more robust than the GDP figures and government subsidies, 
national insurance contributions and direct tax receipts are 
all examples of where zero or only trivial scaling adjustments 
have been required. The most drastic data surgery that has 
been undertaken for Table 9 has been to aggregate general 
government current consumption of goods and services with 
‘other current grants’, which appear to be predominantly 
payments to non-profit institutions acting as agents for the 
government. This distinction was not present in the historical 
data.
Table 9 shows the ratios of the main categories of UK general 
government expenditure and non-oil taxes to factor-cost GDP 
back to 1900 for taxes and back to 1870 for spending at a series of 
selected benchmark dates. The underlying annual data were also 
used to plot Figures 1 –3 and Figures 8  and 9.
Table 9 reveals that the ratio of UK general government spend-
ing to factor-cost GDP had fluctuated between 10 and 15 per cent 
between 1870 and World War  I, apart from a brief spike that 
reached 17.2 per cent in 1901 caused by the Boer War. The spend-
ing ratio then peaked at 51.1 per cent in 1917, during World War I, 
before dropping to 22.9 per cent in 1920 as wartime expenditures 
were cut back. The UK spending burden then spent much of the 
interwar period fluctuating between 27.5 and 33.7  per cent, be-
fore hitting a record 75.6 per cent in 1944, when World War II was 
at its high point.
Government spending from Churchill to Thatcher
Spending then reached a post-war low point of 36.5 per cent of 
GDP in 1955, following the well-considered, and often overlooked, 
supply-side reforms implemented by the post-war Churchill ad-
ministration’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, R.  A. Butler (Smith 
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2012), which ushered in the post-war ‘Golden Age’.6 After that, the 
spending ratio started a steady upwards climb, firstly, under the 
paternalist Conservative administration of Harold Macmillan 
and subsequently during the 1964–70 Labour administration. 
The latter saw the spending ratio peak at 45.5 per cent in 1969 
when the UK had to be bailed out by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The government spending ratio fell to 40.5 per cent 
in 1973 during the Heath–Barber credit boom of the early 1970s, 
but then rose rapidly as a result of the big spending policies of the 
Labour government that took office in 1974. The spending ratio 
peaked at 44.4 per cent in 1976, at the end of which the UK again 
had to borrow from the IMF.
The Thatcher period and beyond
In 1979, Lady Thatcher inherited a spending ratio of 41.6 per cent. 
However, this rose to 47 per cent during the recession of 1981 be-
fore falling to 39 per cent by 1990, when she left office. Britain’s 
membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and the 
accompanying recession, saw the government spending ratio 
peak at 42.6 per cent in 1992, when sterling was ejected from 
the ERM, but the ratio was down to 39.2 per cent when New La-
bour took office in 1997. This figure declined to 38.5 per cent in 
2000, during Gordon Brown’s flirtation with ‘prudence’, but had 
already risen to 42.9 per cent in 2007, before the global financial 
crash. The subsequent recession, together with the costs of the 
bank bailouts, meant that the spending ratio had climbed to 
6 During the twelve years 1953–1964, UK economic growth averaged 3.6 per cent; 
real household consumption increased at an annual average of 3.7 per cent; retail 
price inflation averaged 3 per cent (the equivalent of just over 2 per cent on the 
modern CPI); claimant unemployment averaged 408,000 or 1.4 per cent; general 
government net borrowing averaged a modest 0.5 per cent of GDP; and the balance 
of payments current account was in surplus for all but three years.
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50.6 per cent at its peak in 2010, before falling to 45.4 per cent in 
2015 and 45 per cent in the four quarters ending in 2016 Q2.
The components of government spending
Looking more closely at the components of government spending, 
Figure 8 shows the share of national output absorbed by general 
government current expenditure from 1870 onwards. Current 
expenditure represents not quite one half of total general gov-
ernment expenditure, and contains two essential elements: the 
public sector salary bill and procurement of goods and services. 
It is expenditure on the latter that might be expected to have the 
strongest Keynesian multiplier effects. This is because it injects 
demand directly into the private economy, if it is not offset by 
higher taxes.
Figure 9 illustrates the long-term decline in debt interest pay-
ments from the peak observed after World War I together with 
the seemingly inexorable rise of welfare payments after 1960, 
from negligible before 1914 to 14 per cent of factor-cost GDP 
currently.
Figure 8 Ratio of UK general government current expenditure to GDP at 
factor cost 1870–2015
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Regional breakdown of UK government spending
Modern Britain possesses an economy in which there are marked 
differences between the regions. How to compile regional govern-
ment spending ratios was discussed in Chapter 5 of Smith (2006)7 
and that material will not be repeated here. However, Table 10 
shows the estimated ratios of government spending to all three 
measures of regional GDP in 2012/13. This is the latest year for 
which a regional spending breakdown is presently available.
Apart from being out of date, there are other caveats about the 
figures. one is that the regional GDP data now only seem to be 
available on a workforce basis, whereas formerly residence-based 
figures were also available.
An additional measurement complication is that the pub-
lished regional figures for GDP contain an ‘ex regio’ compo-
nent – which is regionally unallocated employment and capital 
7 More up-to-date figures for regional government spending ratios for 2009/10 were 
presented in Table 8 of Smith (2011: 57). However, these were based on the previous 
ESA 1995 national accounts conventions and cannot be compared with the current 
(June 2016) ESA 2010 figures.
Figure 9 Ratio of UK general government debt interest and welfare 
payments to UK GDP at factor cost 1870–2015
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incomes and amounted to £23.7bn in 2012 – while there is almost 
£169bn (i.e. 23.2 per cent) of government spending that cannot 
be allocated on a regional UK basis. In both cases, the individual 
regional figures have been scaled proportionately so that they 
sum to equal the corresponding national totals. Another caveat 
is that the regional GDP figures are measured at basic prices and 
on a calendar-year basis but the expenditure data are on a finan-
cial year basis. To get round this problem, the 2012 calendar year 
regional GDP data have been rescaled to total the UK figure for 
2012/13.
As discussed earlier, the basic-price and factor-cost ratios 
shown in Table 10 arguably provide the best measure of the 
socialisation of the various regions. However, the market-price 
measures in the fifth column can be compared with the inter-
national figures given in Table 7. This comparison needs to be 
treated with caution, however, because (1) the two sets of figures 
are not totally consistent, while (2) the UK-wide ratio fell by more 
than 3 percentage points between 2012/13 and 2015/16.
As it is, a comparison of the UK market-price figures for 
2012/13 with the oECD statistics for 2015 shows that the 41.4 per-
centage point gap between the spending ratio in London (26.9 per 
cent) and Northern Ireland (68.3 per cent) exceeds the 25.4 per-
centage point range observed within the oECD (that is, it is big-
ger than the gap between Korea at 32.9 per cent and Finland at 
58.3 per cent). If London were a country, it would have the lowest 
spending ratio in the oECD. The South East would then come in 
at number 3, after Korea, while the Greater South East8 at 31.8 per 
cent would still be 1.1 percentage points below Korea. At the other 
extreme, the North East (62.3 per cent) and Wales (66.4 per cent), 
as well as Northern Ireland, are all more socialised than any 
member country of the oECD. Scotland’s 53 per cent spending 
ratio would make it the sixth most socialised oECD member but 
8 London plus South Eastern and Eastern England.
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still below Belgium (54 per cent), Greece (55.5 per cent), Denmark 
(55.7 per cent), France (57 per cent) and Finland.
Given the near ‘iron-curtain’ spending ratios in some of the 
UK’s peripheral regions, it is ironical that their problems are still 
widely seen as a ‘failure of capitalism’ rather than as a ‘failure 
of socialism’ and that nobody challenges this myth. The under-
ground – or free market – sector apparently accounted for around 
one quarter of Soviet GDP in the 1970s and rather more in some 
of its Eastern European satellites, such as Hungry. Above-quota 
agricultural production, private housebuilding, small mom-and-
pop businesses and black-market activities existed to varying 
degrees in all the former Communist nations. If one assumes 
that the lower limit on the government spending ratio is 10 per 
cent, and the effective upper limit is 75 per cent, then it is pos-
sible to calculate how far along the spectrum from capitalism to 
socialism the various UK regions are using the market-price GDP 
measure. This calculation would put the Greater South East at 
33.5 per cent and Northern Ireland at 89.7 per cent, with England 
overall at 47 per cent, Scotland at 66.2 per cent and Wales at 
86.8 per cent.9
Deindustrialisation in a number of regions has been a major 
issue because it has led to a collapse in the demand for unskilled 
labour.10 These problems are likely to be exacerbated by the in-
troduction of Mr osborne’s living wage policy, which will have 
little bite in the Greater South East but could be devastatingly 
harmful in Wales or the North East, for example. Given their high 
spending ratios, a necessary condition for the regeneration of the 
9 The formula employed was: (Regional spending ratio (%) – 10%)/65%.
10 Deindustrialisation has not just been an ‘act of God’. Supply side theory suggests 
that the supply of goods and services that can be traded internationally – including 
manufactured products – will move from high tax to low tax economies over time. 
So, deindustrialisation is itself a symptom of an excessively large state, at least in 
relative terms. The coming on stream of South East Asian economies with spending 
ratios typically one half of those prevailing in the oECD has greatly exacerbated 
these effects.
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UK’s old industrial heartlands is almost certainly the sort of big-
bang market-liberalisation reforms implemented by the more 
successful former Communist countries (see Havrylyshyn et al. 
2016). Such reforms require more political courage than shunt-
ing large sums of taxpayers’ money from the Greater South East 
to the heavily subsidised areas and then regulating wages. The 
public choice pressures probably mean that the subsidies will 
continue and the necessary reforms will not take place.
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4 AND THEY CALL IT AUSTERITY1
Ryan Bourne
Introduction
Much political and economic discussion over the past five years 
has been focused on ‘cuts’ to government expenditure made by 
the coalition and Conservative governments. Since, in the long 
run, the government faces a hard budget constraint, government 
expenditure amounts to the true tax burden imposed on citizens 
of a country, since expenditure can only be financed by taxation 
directly, borrowing (deferred taxation) or through inflation (in 
effect, a tax on money holdings). For this reason, while there have 
been significant tax increases since 2010, the focus of this chap-
ter will be on government spending.
In an attempt to first eliminate the structural current budget 
deficit, then to get the debt-to-GDP ratio under control and then, 
more recently, to achieve a surplus by 2020, both the coalition 
and Conservative governments have sought to stem the growth 
1 For reasons outlined in previous chapters, as well as revisions to spending and 
tax totals arising from changing economic circumstances, the true recorded 
state of the public finances is ever-changing. Indeed, by the time this is published, 
the figures presented here are likely to be out of date, particularly if post-Brexit 
uncertainty leads to a slowing of economic growth. Unless otherwise stated, this 
chapter uses three sources to assess trends in public spending based around the 
most recent public figures as of July 2016. Those sources are the most recent spend-
ing totals published at a major fiscal event (Budget 2016), the most up-to-date GDP 
deflator (from the oNS in July 2016) and the most recent Public Expenditure Stat-
istical Analyses (again, July 2016).
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of government spending. This, in common parlance, has been 
referred to as ‘austerity’.
As previous chapters of this book have shown, in historical 
terms overall government spending is still extraordinarily high, 
but it is certainly true that the coalition and Conservative gov-
ernments have slightly reduced government spending in real 
terms since 2010/11 – a largely unprecedented achievement since 
the mid 1970s.
yet there are many misconceptions about what has happened 
to government spending since the start of the last parliament. 
Public debate often exaggerates the scale of the overall cuts and 
a myth about the path of government spending over the past five 
years has taken hold.
The exaggeration of the scale of spending reductions arises 
largely as a result of people using what has happened to some 
components of public expenditure as a proxy for discussing what 
has happened to overall spending. overall real spending only fell 
slightly in the last parliament between 2010/11 and 2014/15 (by 
2.1 per cent), but this masks significant changes in the compo-
sition of spending which have seen some areas cut significantly, 
while other areas saw spending increases. This is due both to the 
government’s decisions to ring-fence significant areas of spend-
ing and unforeseen changes to ‘demand driven’ areas of spend-
ing. Still, what has happened overall to government spending 
hardly warrants the term ‘savage’, which is often the word used 
to describe the small cuts that have occurred.
There is also a myth that the previous coalition government 
loosened public expenditure in the midst of weaker than ex-
pected economic growth in the last parliament, thus resorting 
to what became known as ‘plan B’ – that is, a Keynesian fiscal 
stimulus as demanded by their opponents. In fact, though the 
coalition government borrowed more than expected and the 
composition of spending was different due to weak productivity 
growth, the extra borrowing primarily arose due to tax revenues 
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being much lower than expected. The government’s spending 
ambitions in terms of the aggregate totals were largely achieved, 
though perhaps not in the way they were expecting.
This chapter aims to provide a simple overview of, first, what 
happened to government spending under the coalition govern-
ment and, second, what is projected to happen to government 
spending under the current Conservative administration. The ap-
proach taken is to provide a number of simple metrics for a range 
of measures of expenditure: nominal terms; real terms; spending 
as a proportion of GDP; and real terms per capita spending. It 
will then analyse some of the compositional changes in expendi-
ture that have been seen and that we expect in the future. Where 
possible, it will focus on changes in resources allocated to broad 
functions of governments, rather than to departments. This is a 
more meaningful economic approach given that many functions 
of government, such as education, are spread across a range of 
departments in Whitehall.
Government spending under the coalition
Overall spending versus plans
In its emergency 2010 budget, the incoming coalition government 
set out plans to increase public expenditure in cash terms be-
tween 2010/11 and 2014/15 from £696.8 billion to £737.5 billion (a 
nominal increase of 5.8 per cent).2 Given expected inflation at the 
time, this plan projected a real-terms cut in public expenditure 
of 3.6 per cent over four years and a fall in government spend-
ing as a proportion of GDP from 47.3 per cent to 40.9 per cent for 
2014/15, given the growth forecast for that period.3
2 HMT (2010: Table C13, p. 102).
3 HMT (2010)
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However, things did not turn out as planned. Table 11 pro-
vides a comparison of planned spending changes in nominal and 
real terms and as a proportion of GDP, for the last parliament, 
with actual outturns.
Government spending as a proportion of GDP is calculated 
using market prices which, as has been explained, tends to artifi-
cially reduce the government spending ratio.
A number of things become clear when one compares plans 
with outturns. Firstly, once the upward revision to nominal 
spending in the year 2010/11 is taken into account, the actual 
growth in nominal spending between 2010/11 and 2014/15 was 
lower than expected at 4.6 per cent. However, given the inaccur-
acy of forecasts for inflation in 2010/11 (inflation being lower over 
the parliament than expected), the real cut in spending over the 
period to 2014/15 was lower at 2.1 per cent than the 3.6 per cent 
cut envisaged by the Chancellor in the July 2010 Budget. In other 
words, real spending was cut less than planned.
It is well documented that GDP growth (both real and nominal) 
was significantly lower over the last parliament than expected. It 
therefore might be surprising to see that the outturn for govern-
ment spending as a proportion of GDP in 2014/15 was very similar 
to that which the government had planned in 2010/11 for that year.
Table 11 Overall total managed expenditure plans versus outcomes
Nominal (£ billion) Real (2015/16 £ billion)
2010/11 02014/15 Change 2010/11 2014/15 Change
Plan 696.8 737.5 5.8% 786.0 757.4 –3.6%
Outturn 714.0 746.7 4.6% 763.7 747.3 –2.1%
% of GDP
2010/11 02014/15
Plan 47.3 40.9
Outturn 45.3 40.8
Source: HMT (2010), including projected GDP deflator series; OBR (2016); ONS (2016).
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This paradoxical result is a statistical rather than a real phe-
nomenon. In Q2 2014 there was a change in the way GDP was 
measured which was then backdated across the whole period 
(as discussed in earlier chapters). This caused an upward shift in 
measured GDP across the whole period. At times this shift was 
between 5 and 7 per cent.4 of course, actual national income was 
not higher; it is just that the measurement conventions changed. 
This explains why the outturn for spending as a proportion of 
GDP was lower in 2010/11 than the planned level – measured GDP 
was revised upwards. What is important in looking at the extent 
of spending ‘reductions’ is that the fall in spending as a propor-
tion of GDP was significantly less than planned when compared 
on a like-for-like basis. This was partly as a result of cuts in real 
spending being less than planned and partly as a result of lower 
than expected growth in GDP.
Despite the impression the media have given, over the last 
parliament real cuts to government spending were very modest 
at just 2.1 per cent over the whole period from 2010/11 to 2014/15.
Real spending per capita
While, ultimately, the headline amounts of spending are impor-
tant in considering the long-term effective tax burden on the UK 
population, these headline figures can sometimes be misleading.
For example, over the period 2010/11 to 2014/15, there was sig-
nificant population growth in the UK. Real spending per capita 
has therefore fallen proportionately to a much greater extent 
than overall spending. Table 12 outlines this clearly. It shows that 
real total managed expenditure (TME) per capita has fallen from 
4 To see this clearly, one can observe the oNS’s GDP Revisions Triangles and Real Time 
Database (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/specific/ec 
onomy/national-accounts/gdp-revisions-triangles-and-real-time-database/real 
-time-database-for-gross-domestic-product-at-market-prices--current-prices.xls) 
and how the figures change in Q2 2014.
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£12,168 per person in 2010/11 to £11,569 per person in 2014/15 (a 
fall of 4.9 per cent).
Composition of spending cuts: types of spending, functions 
and departments
It is useful to drill down into the composition of spending. When 
the government sets out its spending plans, it splits spending into 
two broad types: annually managed expenditure (AME) and de-
partmental expenditure limits (DEL). DELs are spending limits 
for departments that tend to relate to public services, with the 
headline figures determined in spending reviews. AME incor-
porates other types of spending such as debt interest payments, 
social security payments and other spending areas which tend 
to fluctuate more broadly. The term ‘managed’ for this type of 
expenditure can be confusing because many of the components 
cannot easily be managed in the short term.
These two components of spending saw very different trends 
over the course of the last parliament, as shown in Table 13. AME 
(around 60 per cent of which is made up of social security spend-
ing) actually increased by 6.5 per cent in real terms. Departmental 
spending, on the other hand, was cut by 10.2 per cent in real terms.
Table 12 Real spending per capita (2015/16 prices), 2010/11 to 2014/15
2010/11 02011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Real spending (£ billion) 764 755 744 747 747
Change in real spending 
since 2010/11 –1.2% –2.5% –2.2% –2.1%
Real spending per capita (£) 12,168 11,923 11,682 11,654 11,569
Change in real spending per 
capita since 2010/11 –2.0% –4.0% –4.2% –4.9%
Source: OBR (2016), ONS (2016).
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These figures are made somewhat more complicated by the 
fact that there have been various redefinitions of types of ex-
penditure between DEL and AME over this period. To compare 
the figures accurately over time, numerous adjustments have 
to be made (as outlined by Crawford and Keynes (2015)). For 
the purposes of this chapter though, which is concerned with 
the path of overall spending, these changes in distinctions are 
not particularly important. The raw figures highlight the main 
story – departmental expenditure has fallen fairly significantly 
as spending on annual managed expenditure has risen.
To show more clearly how the components of spending evolved 
over the last parliament, one can examine data on government 
spending ‘by function’ from the Public Expenditure Statistical 
Analyses (HMT 2016a). Splitting spending into broad functions 
is probably the most economically meaningful classification of 
government activity, given that many departments contain ac-
tivities that span more than one broad area. Most obviously, the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has, for example, 
been responsible for ‘higher education’, which falls under the 
‘education’ function of government. Figure 10 examines what has 
happened to spending in each of the major functions of govern-
ment since 2010/11.
As can be seen, different ‘functions’ of government have fared 
very differently in terms of how spending evolved. International 
Table 13 Government spending 2010/11 to 2014/15
£ billion, 2015/16 prices
Average 
annual real 
growth
Cumulative 
real growth
2010/11 2014/15 2010/11 to 2014/15
Total managed expenditure £763.7 £747.3 –0.5% –2.1%
AME £367.8 £391.7 –1.6% –6.5%
DEL £395.8 £355.5 –2.6% –10.2%1
Source: author’s calculations from OBR (2016), ONS (2016).
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services (26 per cent), health (4.7 per cent) and social protection 
(6.0 per cent) all saw real terms increases in expenditure. other 
functions of government saw significant real-terms cuts. Hous-
ing and community amenities (28.2 per cent), public order and 
safety (16.3 per cent) and, perhaps more surprisingly, education 
(12.4 per cent) were all functions of government which saw signif-
icant overall reductions.
These are largely a reflection of a deliberate prioritisation of 
spending determined by government policy as outlined in the 
Spending Reviews of 2010 and 2013. The coalition government 
pledged to increase spending in real terms on the NHS, to in-
crease spending significantly on international development aid 
and to institute significant increases in the state pension as a 
Figure 10 Real changes in government spending by function 2010/11 to 2014/15
Source: HMT (2016a).
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result of its ‘triple-lock’ (the state pension is the largest single 
component of the social protection budget). Non-investment 
spending on schools was also protected, but the changes to the 
way that higher education is financed and the significant cuts to 
the schools’ capital budget meant that overall education spend-
ing fell.
The fact that the social protection budget has seen such an 
increase in spending and that it is the single largest function 
of government as measured by spending inevitably means that 
other areas of government spending have faced greater restraint. 
To see this, stripping out debt interest and social protection 
spending from overall expenditure shows that residual spending 
has actually fallen by 4.8 per cent in real terms.
In other words, the ring-fencing of large areas of government 
activity has meant that some major functions of government 
have faced very significant real spending cuts even though cuts 
overall have been much lower than widely reported. This is the 
result of a deliberate policy decision by the government. What 
is perhaps especially interesting is that the long-term trend 
noted in earlier chapters has continued. Spending on the night 
watchman functions of the state and spending on capital items 
has decreased, whereas spending on certain welfare items has 
increased. In other words, there has been a move towards the 
more damaging areas of government spending and away from 
those that are most likely to increase growth.
Although measuring government spending by function gives 
a more representative picture than comparing departments, we 
can also see how spending changes have been far from uniform 
by showing spending broken down into government depart-
ments (Figure 11).
The Department for Communities and Local Government 
has faced the tightest settlement with its Local Government 
budget (grants to local authorities) falling by 47.5 per cent in real 
terms and its Communities budget falling by 41.7 per cent. Local 
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authorities, as they have other sources of revenue, have not seen 
spending cut to this extent, but have faced relatively tough set-
tlements. other departments have all made fairly significant sav-
ings (with the exception of the departments for Health, Energy 
and Climate Change and International Development), though 
focusing on DEL spending of course ignores the huge social pro-
tection spending budget outlined above.
As Crawford and Keynes (2015) outlined, not all of these 
changes in government departmental spending were as antic-
ipated from the 2010 spending review. Since then the Depart-
ments of Health, Education, Business, Innovation and Skills, and 
Transport have benefited from unexpectedly low inflation or a 
Figure 11 Real changes in DEL by government department 2010/11 to 2014/15
Source: HMT (2016) and GDP deflator from ONS (2016).
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loosening of spending whereas the Home office and the Minis-
try of Justice have faced tighter than expected outturns. But the 
broad picture has been that the protection of certain areas and 
expanding of social protection spending has led to quite signif-
icant restraint in some departmental budgets and a significant 
redistribution of government spending between functions.
Government spending under the Conservative 
government
Overall spending and the Spending Review
The Conservative Party won the general election promising to 
restrain government spending further. This included a promise 
to deliver a budget surplus by the end of the parliament. At the 
time of the election, the chancellor George osborne claimed that 
no further net tax rises would be necessary to close the deficit 
and that the remainder of discretionary deficit reduction would 
occur through spending cuts alone. Following the election vic-
tory, the July 2015 budget announced the scope for a ‘Spending 
Review’, to be published alongside the 2015 Autumn Statement, 
which would detail where savings would be made from govern-
ment departments.
As in the previous parliament, the scope of this review of ex-
penditure was far from comprehensive. Given the growth and tax 
revenue forecasts, as well as the expected path of interest rates 
and debt interest payments, the government estimated that 
£37 billion of fiscal consolidation was necessary over the course 
of the parliament to deliver their planned surplus. The July 2015 
budget set out how to achieve £17 billion of that sum by 2019/20 
(£12 billion by 2019/20 from the working-age welfare budget and 
£5 billion by 2019/20 from clamping down on tax avoidance and 
evasion). The remainder of the savings would need to be found 
from reductions to departmental expenditure – the subject of 
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the spending review. But this talk of ‘cuts’ always masked the fact 
that, in real terms, overall government spending was planned 
to remain fairly constant overall between 2015/16 and 2019/20. 
once again, however, different functions were to be treated very 
differently.
As in the previous parliament, the effective ring-fencing 
(both explicit and implicit) of the vast majority of government 
expenditure means that any planned spending restraint is heav-
ily concentrated in a limited number of areas. Not only is all 
pensioner spending effectively exempt from cuts, but, in depart-
mental terms, the government committed to increasing English 
NHS funding by £10 billion by 2020/21, to raising the Ministry of 
Defence budget by 0.5 per cent a year in real terms, to spending 
0.7 per cent of the UK’s gross national income on overseas devel-
opment aid, and to protecting per pupil schools funding in real 
terms.
As it happens, when the Autumn Statement and Spending 
Review were delivered, the government announced that oBR 
revisions to tax revenue forecasts and lower-than-previously- 
expected forecasts for debt interest payments over this parlia-
ment had led to a forecast structural £27 billion improvement in 
the public finances. In response, the government did not decide 
to reduce the deficit more quickly than planned, but, instead, to 
alleviate some of the planned spending cuts (such as the planned 
cuts to tax credits and to the police budget). The government also 
raised taxes, meaning that future spending levels are now fore-
cast to be much higher than originally planned back in July 2015.
The 2016 March Budget showed a significant deterioration 
in the government’s finances. In reaction, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer proposed some further cuts to departmental expend-
iture for much later in the parliament, which as yet are unspec-
ified. It would be reasonable to suppose that he was hoping that 
they would never have to be implemented, perhaps if economic 
growth turned out higher than expected.
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These developments are shown in Table 14. overall spending 
is projected to be higher throughout the period now than it was 
forecast to be in July 2015 in real terms. But expenditure between 
2015/16 and 2019/20 is expected to be broadly flat. Within the 
total, AME expenditure will rise by much less than planned (not 
least due to the downward revision in debt interest payments), 
but the planned real-terms cuts to departmental expenditure 
have also been reduced overall since the first budget after the 
election. Real-terms departmental expenditure is now planned 
to fall by just 2.2 per cent over the course of this parliament, 
rather than the 3.5 per cent planned in July 2015.
Since the Budget, we have of course had the unexpected ref-
erendum result in favour of UK exit from the European Union. It 
is widely acknowledged that this is likely to depress economic 
activity somewhat relative to the expectations on which the fore-
casts were based that were used to determine the 2016 Budget’s 
Table 14 Comparison of real government spending forecasts from 
July Budget 2015, November Autumn Statement 2015 and 
March Budget 2016 (2015/16 prices)
2015/16 2019/20 Change
July Budget 2015
TME 742.3 746.8 0.6%
DEL 351.4 339.0 –3.5%–
AME 390.9 407.8 4.3%
Autumn Statement 2015
TME 755.7 762.2 0.9%
DEL 351.5 346.2 –1.5%–
AME 404.2 416.0 2.9%
March Budget 2016
TME 753.9 753.9 0.0%
DEL 352.1 344.5 –2.2%–
AME 401.9 409.4 1.9%
Source: OBR (2016).
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spending totals. Already, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Philip Hammond, has said that the government will relax plans 
to achieve a budget surplus by 2020 – though it is unclear whether 
this reflects an expectation of an economic slowdown over that 
period (and thus higher spending and lower tax revenues) or 
whether the government is set to increase discretionary spend-
ing. Either way, it seems that spending by the end of this parlia-
ment is likely to be higher than outlined above, so that overall 
real spending will probably rise over this parliament.
Departmental expenditure
The government has set out departmental expenditure plans in 
its most recent spending review, which allows us to examine the 
planned changes to real-terms spending by department between 
2015/16 and 2019/20. This process is made somewhat more com-
plicated by the fact the new prime minister, Theresa May, has 
recently reconfigured departments, including abolishing the De-
partment for Energy and Climate Change and rolling its functions 
into a new department combining it with many of the functions 
of the old Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Two 
other new departments, one for leaving the European Union and 
another for international trade, have also been established. At the 
forthcoming Autumn Statement we are expecting the government 
to update its projections for departmental spending to account 
for these developments. To get an idea of the broad trends prior to 
these changes, however, Figure 12 presents projected departmen-
tal spending from the most recent Public Expenditure Statistical 
Analyses based on the old department structure.
This breakdown reflects the political priorities outlined above. 
With the exception of transport, the other departments which 
will see projected increases in real spending or minor cuts to real 
spending are those where major areas of activity within the de-
partment have been protected. Local government funding from 
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central government will be cut hard, but this partly reflects the 
large transfer of business rate revenue collection to local author-
ities. But other departments, such as Business, Innovation and 
Skills (17.9 per cent), Culture, Media and Sport (9.2 per cent) and 
Justice (18.9 per cent) will see large cuts to their budgets, though 
these three departments accounted for just 3.3 per cent of overall 
government spending in 2015/16.
The reckoning up: government spending 2010/11 to 
2019/20
Given that the Conservative Party has been in government for 
the last two parliaments, and its political priorities in terms 
Figure 12 Real changes in DEL by government department 2015/16 to 
2019/20
Source: HMT (2016a).
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of spending have been largely constant across that period, it is 
worth reflecting on what has happened to spending across the 
whole period between 2010/11 and 2014/15 combined with the 
projections through to 2019/20.
on the latest projections, overall government spending will 
have risen in nominal terms from £714.0 billion in 2010/11 to 
£810.4 billion in 2019/20. In real terms this reflects a cut in overall 
expenditure of just 1.3 per cent – from £763.7 billion to £753.9 bil-
lion in 2015/16 prices. Given the forecasts for growth in the 2016 
Budget (which, it must be said, are highly uncertain), this would 
mean that total government expenditure as a proportion of GDP 
will have fallen from 45.3 per cent in 2010/11 to 37.0 per cent by 
2019/20 (see Figure 13). As noted above, the spending ratios as 
a proportion of national income at factor cost would be of the 
order of five percentage points higher.
Figure 13 Nominal and real expenditure (£ billion; real expenditure in 
2015/16 prices) and spending as a proportion of GDP
Source: OBR (2016).
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Given population growth over the period, real spending 
per head will have fallen further than suggested through the 
headline spending figures. In 2015/16 prices, real spending will 
fall from £12,168 per person in 2010/11 to £11,264 per person in 
2019/20, a drop of 7.4 per cent over that period.
As was noted before, however, examining headline total gov-
ernment spending figures hides information on how the com-
position of spending has changed. over the two parliaments, for 
example, real spending on departmental expenditure will have 
fallen from £395.8 billion in 2010/11 to £344.5 billion in 2019/20 
(a cut of 13 per cent), while annual managed expenditure, which 
includes debt interest payments and the state pension, will have 
risen from £367.8 billion to £409.4 billion (an increase of 11.3 per 
cent). In other words, the small overall cut to expenditure masks 
large changes to spending on particular activities.
of course, all of these forward-looking projections of spend-
ing are subject to change. But evidence from the last parliament 
suggests that, by and large, Spending Review decisions tend to 
stick. Between the election and the Spending Review, however, 
projected government spending has increased above the orig-
inally expected levels. This higher spending is expected to be 
financed initially by higher tax revenues and lower debt interest 
payments. However, now that the forecasts have worsened, there 
are projected to be further increases in taxation and some as-yet 
unspecified cuts to departmental budgets.
Despite all the talk of austerity and spending cuts, we can 
draw some important overall conclusions. Real spending is only 
expected to have fallen very slightly over the period 2010/11 to 
2019/20. But, significant forecast GDP growth over the decade 
means that, as a proportion of GDP, the overall size of the state 
measured by government spending will have fallen substantially 
(if the forecasts prove correct), though to still high levels. Gov-
ernment spending will be approximately the same proportion 
of GDP at market prices as it was in 2000 and five percentage 
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points higher than in 1960. However, the overall spending totals 
mask a significant increase in spending in some areas, not least 
social protection, while departmental expenditure has been cut 
significantly. Even within departmental spending, significant 
ring-fencing of certain budgets (often undertaken for political 
reasons) has meant that some departments have seen very deep 
cuts while others have been insulated from restraint.
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ANNEX TO CHAPTER 4
David B. Smith
A misleading political myth in the austerity debate
The political debate ahead of the May 2015 general election fea-
tured some serious misrepresentations concerning the subject 
of this chapter, which were never properly exposed at the time. 
one such myth was that Mr osborne’s December 2014 Autumn 
Statement implied that the Chancellor was planning to cut gov-
ernment spending back to the level of the 1930s. This claim was a 
pure canard (Smith 2015).
The Road to Wigan Pier?
In fact, Table 9 reveals that the aggregate spending ratio was 
33.1 per cent of factor-cost GDP in 1938, well below the 46.4 per 
cent recorded in 2014. The subsequent methodological changes 
to the data, discussed earlier, mean that old Autumn Statement 
projections need to be handled with caution. However, Mr os-
borne’s plans set out in the December 2014 Autumn Statement 
envisaged a general government spending ratio of 39.8 per cent of 
factor-cost GDP by 2019/20 using the definitions of the time. This 
would have represented the lowest ratio since 1964, not 1938, and 
was only some 1 per cent below Labour’s ‘prudence’ era spend-
ing in 2000. In the event, the target for 2019/20 was revised up to 
41.1 per cent in the 2015 Autumn Statement, and to 41.9 per cent 
in the March 2016 Budget, although both of these figures were 
ANNEX TO 
CHAPTER 4
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calculated using different accounting conventions. However, it 
would take a brave individual to bet that even the March 2016 
Budget figures will not be further overshot, given subsequent 
political events.
In addition, the composition of government spending was 
quite different in the 1930s. A far higher share was going on debt 
interest payments, which had peaked at 9.6 per cent of GDP in 
1926 and were still 6 per cent in 1938 (see Figure 9). So-called ‘pri-
mary’ spending – i.e. total spending less debt interest – averaged 
21.6 per cent of factor-cost GDP between 1920 and 1938, com-
pared with 45% since 2010 and 39.8 per cent under the 1997–2010 
Labour government (Figure 14). The other special factor in the 
1930s was the increased expenditure on defence in the run up 
to World War II. Defence spending had increased from some 
2.6 per cent of factor-cost GDP in the early 1930s to 6.8 per cent 
by 1938, compared with the 2 per cent now being targeted by the 
present government. Spending on non-defence and non-debt in-
terest was around 20.3 per cent of factor-cost GDP in 1938 com-
pared with the 34.1 per cent of GDP projected for such items in 
2019/20 in the 2014 Autumn Statement. In other words, the sort 
Figure 14 Ratio of UK government ‘primary’ expenditure (i.e. excluding 
debt interest) to UK GDP at factor cost 1870–2015
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of public services on which the left likes to see money spent (the 
non-nightwatchmen functions of the state) was 13.8 percentage 
points more – or 1.7 times as much – as a proportion of GDP in 
the 2014 Autumn Statement projection for 2019/20 than was 
being spent just before World War II.
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5 SPENDING, TAX AND ECONOMIC WELFARE
David B. Smith
Government expenditure by function
In contrast to Table 3, which focuses on the national accounts defi-
nitions of government spending and taxation, Table 15 uses the 
presentation preferred by HM Treasury for monitoring and control 
purposes, as set out in the March 2016 Budget for fiscal year 2016/17. 
This presentation provides more detail on individual spending 
programmes and tax revenues. However, it also includes public cor-
porations, unlike the general government definition of government 
spending used until now. It was the Total Managed Expenditure 
(TME) measure which was involved in the BBC’s claim that Mr os-
borne was planning to take the government spending ratio back to 
the 1930s. Rather belatedly, this claim was officially disproved in 
Chart 4.14 of the oBR’s July 2015 Summer Budget report. However, 
as we have shown, the claim was based in any case on the misunder-
standing of the government spending ratio.
on the receipts side, a striking feature of Table 15 is the con-
tribution made by income tax and national insurance to the 
government’s revenues: they have a joint contribution of almost 
42.4 per cent. However, VAT still delivers a substantial 19.8 per 
cent of receipts, with excise duties providing another 7 per cent. 
This does not mean that other taxes that raise less revenue can-
not have deleterious second-round effects on activity and em-
ployment, however, if marginal rates are high or the tax bears 
little relation to the ability to pay.
SPENDING, TAX 
AND ECONOMIC 
WELFARE
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Table 15 March 2016 Budget forecasts for UK public spending by 
function and government receipts in 2016/17
Total 
spending 
on function 
£bn
% of total 
managed 
expenditure/ 
receipts
Ratio to 
GDP at 
market 
prices (%)
Ratio to 
GDP at 
factor cost 
(%) 
Total Managed Expenditure (TME)
Social protection 240 31.1 12.4 14.1
Personal social services 30 3.9 1.5 1.8
Health 145 18.8 7.5 8.5
Transport 29 3.8 1.5 1.7
Education 102 13.2 5.3 6.0
Defence 46 6.0 2.4 2.7
Debt interest 39 5.1 2.0 2.3
Industry, agriculture and 
employment 24 3.1 1.2 1.4
Public order and safety 34 4.4 1.8 2.0
Housing and environment 34 4.4 1.8 2.0
Other 49 6.3 2.5 2.9
TME 772 100 39.7 45.3
Government receipts
Income tax 182 25.5 9.4 10.7
National insurance 126 17.6 6.5 7.4
Excise duties 48 6.7 2.5 2.8
Corporation tax 43 6.0 2.2 2.5
VAT 138 19.3 7.1 8.1
Business rates 28 3.9 1.4 1.6
Council tax 30 4.2 1.5 1.8
Other (taxes) 69 9.7 3.6 4.0
Other (non-taxes) 51 7.1 2.6 3.0
Total receipts 715 100 36.8 41.9
Source: HM Treasury Budget 2016, 16 March 2016, Pie Charts 1 and 2, pp. 5–6. Unlike in Table 9, 
this table uses the published Budget forecasts for money GDP, not rescaled figures to allow for the 
amendments published in June 2016.
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Looking at the expenditure side, Table 15 reveals that only 
10.4 per cent of government expenditure is accounted for by the 
two ‘primary’ government functions of external defence and the 
maintenance of law and order. Even adding in debt interest only 
brings that total to 15.5 per cent of government spending or 7 per 
cent of factor-cost GDP. This contrasts with the three big items 
of social protection (14.1 per cent of factor-cost GDP), health 
(8.5 per cent) and education (6 per cent).
Divergent consequences of the different forms of 
government spending
Both the macroeconomic and microeconomic consequences of 
different types of government expenditure differ from each other. 
The international growth literature (oECD 2003) suggests that 
public investment in infrastructure, such as transport links or 
primary and secondary education, can add to a country’s growth 
potential, and are known as ‘productive expenditures’. However, 
these should only be undertaken if the marginal rate of return 
exceeds the opportunity cost of allocating the same resources 
elsewhere, including to output-stimulating tax cuts.1
However, increased governmental consumption appears to 
reduce national output. This is likely to be because the resources 
diverted to supply such expenditures would be better employed 
in the private sector. In particular, the evidence from internation-
al cross-section and panel-data studies suggests that almost all 
increases in the share of governmental expenditure in GDP lead 
to a near one-for-one reduction in the share allocated to private 
1 This is why political vanity projects such as the HS2 rail link should not be under-
taken, even if they are treated as an investment in the national accounts. HS2 may 
raise growth (very slightly in aggregate terms), but the additional benefits from 
growth are unlikely to be greater than the costs – in other words, spending the 
money elsewhere (or not taking it away in taxation) would have been likely to add 
more value to the economy.
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capital formation. This under-capitalisation takes the economy 
onto a lower, but parallel, growth path according to ‘neo-classi-
cal’ growth models but leads to an additional permanent reduc-
tion in the growth rate in the context of a ‘post-neo-classical en-
dogenous-growth’ model (see Sinclair (2012: 82–84) for a tabular 
summary of the empirical research since 1975).
Transfer payments are likely to reduce economic growth in 
various ways, not least because of the supply-side effects of the 
taxes necessary to finance them. Unlike with government invest-
ment, there is unlikely to be any offsetting effect on growth. These 
have grown rapidly over the last century (see Figure 15). Trans-
fers in the form of pensions and other payments to people at older 
ages are likely to reduce saving in the private sector and fixed 
capital formation. However, the most potentially counter-pro-
ductive public expenditure appears to be paying means-tested 
welfare benefits to the population of working age. These reduce 
potential GDP because of their impact in reducing the supply of 
labour to the private sector, which exacerbates the effect of the 
taxes necessary to finance them.
of course, some welfare schemes are better designed than 
others. For example, one of the intentions behind in-work tax 
credits (which will evolve into universal credit) was to increase 
the supply of labour by encouraging people to undertake low-paid 
employment rather than solely relying on state benefits. It has 
had that effect, but it also seems to have encouraged people to 
undertake the bare minimum of work required to qualify for tax 
credits (16 hours) but then not to climb the ladder of opportunity 
by taking on additional hours or extra responsibilities. The aver-
age part-time employee worked for 16.1 hours in February/April 
2016, according to the oNS Labour Market Statistics for June 2016. 
This is not surprising given the very high withdrawal rates for tax 
credits as earnings increase. However, it is debatable whether tax 
credits have raised the total number of hours worked in the British 
economy (and, hence, national output), or reduced them.
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The oECD has suggested that only around one fifth of govern-
ment spending falls into the ‘productive’ category. This means 
that most other expenditure items are ‘non-productive’ and may 
be primarily intended to ‘bribe’ voters (that is, finance transfers 
or services that are desired by particular voter groups), buy off 
vested interest groups or, in some countries, reward political cro-
nies, along the lines suggested by public choice theory.2
Just as transfer payments have risen, government investment 
has fallen as a percentage of GDP (despite the rise in overall ex-
penditure). Again, public choice considerations may explain this 
as the benefits of investment spending are longer term whereas 
the costs are short term (see Figure 16).
In summary, there has been a big increase in government 
spending over the last 100 years. However, within the government 
spending envelope, there has been a particularly large increase 
in those items that damage the economy most while those items 
that tend to have a beneficial effect on growth or which damage 
the economy least have been reduced.
2 The public choice literature is discussed in Tullock et al. (2000).
Figure 15 Ratios of welfare payments and social security taxes to UK GDP 
at factor cost 1900–2015
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Economic growth and the financing of 
government spending
When it comes to the impact of how government spending is fi-
nanced on growth, perhaps the main macroeconomic distinction 
is that between increases in indirect taxes, where the first-round 
impact is likely to be inflationary and direct taxes which have fewer 
initial inflationary consequences but can lead to a withdrawal of 
labour supply that may be voluntary (for example, income tax) or 
involuntary (for example, increased employers’ national insurance 
contributions that price people out of work). Ultimately, however, 
a rise in indirect taxes will raise the price level (thus reducing real 
wages and leading to an impact on labour supply) if the central 
bank is willing to tolerate this development. It is possible that a 
central bank that is following an inflation target may respond to 
the rise in the price level caused by a rise in indirect taxes by tight-
ening monetary policy. The long-run effects must be the same in 
the end and will involve a squeeze on real wages while the price 
level moves in accordance with expectations.
Figure 16 Ratio of UK general government investment to UK GDP at factor 
cost 1946–2015
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In the long run, when it is the post-tax real incentives to sup-
ply goods and services that dominate the decisions of private 
economic agents, it is likely that the effects of any flat-rate tax 
hike will tend to have similar results from a macroeconomic per-
spective. However, increases in indirect taxes are less likely to af-
fect saving detrimentally than increases in direct taxes, because 
indirect taxes are only charged on consumption and are thus not 
charged on that part of income that is saved.
More generally, the author has previously reported stat-
istical evidence that suggests that the negative effects of higher 
taxes and budget deficits on private activity are identical in the 
long run and quite similar in the short term (see Sinclair 2012: 
108–11). This confirms that the primary issue is the size of state 
spending compared with national output and that the choice 
between tax and bond finance is a secondary consideration. 
Ultimately, government spending is financed either by taxes 
levied now or deferred taxes. If it is financed by borrowing – or 
deferred taxation – there are supply-side effects of government 
borrowing crowding out private sector activity as a result of 
pressures on capital markets or the inflow of capital from over-
seas raising the exchange rate. Furthermore, consumers might 
reduce expenditure in anticipation of a higher tax burden in 
the future.3
As far as microeconomic considerations are concerned, there 
is a long-established public finance literature which examines 
the consequences of taxation and remains intellectually valid 
(see Smith (2006) and Sinclair (2012), for example, as well as the 
discussion later in this book). Unfortunately, it also tends to be 
largely ignored by politicians who, public choice considerations 
suggest, want to maximise their share of the vote in marginal 
3 The possibility that the government might renege on its debt or inflate debt away 
does not change the argument: it simply imposes the burden on a different group of 
people.
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seats and not general economic welfare. This perhaps explains 
why the UK has such a long and complex tax code.4
In fact, the microeconomic effects of tax structure are ex-
tremely important. High marginal rates of tax can be extremely 
damaging to hours worked, enterprise and risk taking, capital 
formation and the supply of goods and services (see later chap-
ters), as well as being unjust to the individual taxpayers con-
cerned. Furthermore, distortions in the tax system whereby 
some activities are taxed more than others can be very damag-
ing (again see below and Chapter 1).
The size of government: maximising growth and 
welfare
Given the macro- and microeconomic effects of government 
spending and taxation on growth and welfare, as well as the 
fact that the provision of certain public goods can be regarded 
as welfare enhancing, it is reasonable to ask whether there are 
‘growth-maximising’ or ‘welfare-maximising’ levels of govern-
ment expenditure. There is a third statistic of interest, which 
is the revenue-maximising level of taxation and spending – if 
the government is spending beyond this level, it means that a 
reduction in tax rates will increase growth sufficiently that tax 
revenues will increase. A government spending beyond this level 
is totally destructive of economic welfare.
Clearly, there are growth and welfare maximising levels of 
government spending in theory, but, in practice, it is much more 
difficult to identify those levels. Indeed, the growth-maximising 
and welfare-maximising levels of government spending will 
4 There are so many examples of tax measures that have been introduced for political 
rather than economic reasons, even since 2010, that an exhaustive list would be 
impossible. However, an obvious example is the additional tax on buy-to-let land-
lords (both additional stamp duty and also the limitation of the deductibility for tax 
purposes of interest costs).
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depend on a number of time- and context-specific factors (for 
example, how mobile labour and capital are – if they are more 
mobile, tax is more likely to be damaging to growth; how effi-
ciently government provides services; and the shape of the tax 
system).5 Despite the practical difficulties, we can make some 
generalisations and, during this debate, certain rules of thumb – 
that were based on older national accounts definitions, however 
– have tended to become accepted by people who have worked in 
this area (Smith 2006). These included:
• The growth-maximising share of government spending in 
GDP was some 20–25 per cent of GDP. This was based on the 
fact that ratios in this range were typical of the fast growing 
South East Asian ‘Tiger’ economies, countries such as Japan 
and Korea in their high growth phases, and even Australia, 
Canada and Spain in the 1950s. This indicative range should 
probably be revised down to some 18.5–23.5 per cent, using 
current (June 2016) UK definitions.
• The welfare-maximising share of government spending 
in GDP6 was less than some 30–35 per cent of GDP. This 
conclusion was based on the work of Tanzi and Schuknecht 
(2000) and Tanzi (2008), who examined the effects of state 
spending on a range of objective measures of human 
wellbeing. They concluded that there was no sign of 
improved outcomes for welfare measures once spending had 
exceeded these limits.7 Subsequent methodological changes 
5 There will be more discussion of tax and growth in later chapters.
6 The social welfare maximising point can be defined as the share of national output 
at which the discounted net present value of the diminishing marginal social util-
ity derived from extra government spending equals the rising opportunity cost in 
terms of the net present value of the foregone economic output, and also personal 
liberty, of the need to pay for it.
7 If this seems rather low to modern eyes, almost all the countries summarised in 
Table 7 were in this range in 1960, as are contemporary Switzerland and Korea, the 
‘Greater South East’ of England, and Britain overall in the mid 1950s. In almost every 
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to the data suggest that 26.5–32.5 per cent would be the 
corresponding range in today’s terms.
• The upper limit on taxable capacity was around 38 per 
cent, implying that the public finances eventually became 
unsustainable if general government expenditure was 
allowed to increase much beyond 40 per cent of GDP.8 On 
current definitions, the upper limit on taxable capacity 
in Britain seems to be around 37.5 per cent of factor-cost 
GDP (Figure 1), or 33 per cent on the market-price measure, 
suggesting that spending only becomes sustainable when it 
falls into the 37–38 per cent range.
The ratios calculated using the factor-cost measure of national 
income would be higher. However, it is not difficult to convert 
from one basis to another, using the GDP figures in Table 4. It is 
also worth noting that Mr osborne’s March 2016 Budget target 
that government spending should be down to 37.2 per cent of 
market-price GDP by 2020/21 looks at the upper margin of what 
is reasonable if the aim is long-term fiscal sustainability, but not, 
of course, if the aim is welfare maximisation. Certainly, there 
seems little scope for the new Chancellor, Mr Hammond, to relax 
his predecessor’s spending targets.
case, the economic performance of the countries involved would be regarded as 
highly satisfactory by current (post-2008) standards.
8 It might be asked why the maximum level of government spending is not 33 per cent 
of national income. Firstly, the British government possesses non-tax incomes of 
some 2–3 per cent of national output. Also, assuming that the definition of govern-
ment spending includes debt interest, it could, arguably, run a permanent budget 
deficit of, say, 1 or 2 per cent of GDP without adverse consequences. Given that over-
runs of government spending as a proportion of national income in bad times tend 
to be bigger than undershoots, the government should be operating well within the 
37–38 per cent constraint in normal times. Though, as noted above, governments 
should not seek simply to operate at the point of maximum taxable capacity in any 
case, as this will be above the welfare-maximising level of taxation.
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Conclusions
Because government has almost no resources of its own, all gov-
ernment expenditure usually implies higher taxes either in the 
present or in the future. Thus, when measuring the burden of 
government on the private sector, we should look at government 
spending (rather than taxation) and its relationship with nation-
al income.
Measurement of the ratio of government spending to national 
income is fiendishly difficult. There are several reasons for this, 
just one of which is that there are several different measures of 
national output. The measure chosen can make a difference of 
5.5 percentage points, or more, to the calculated spending bur-
den. The most appropriate measure is government spending as 
a proportion of national income measured at factor cost. Com-
monly, the generally lower ratio of government spending to GDP 
measured at market prices measure is used.
There are substantial differences in the shares of government 
spending and taxes in national income within the thirty-four 
oECD member countries. There are also huge differences be-
tween the UK regions. The under 32 per cent spending ratio in 
the UK’s ‘Greater South East’ would represent the lowest spend-
ing ratio in the oECD, while the North East, Wales and Northern 
Ireland are all noticeably more heavily socialised than any indi-
vidual oECD member.
The average share of state spending in the twelve countries 
for which there is continuous data has risen from just over 10 per 
cent in the late nineteenth century to around 45 per cent at pres-
ent. over the last 100 years, there has been a movement towards 
those categories of government spending that tend to be more 
damaging (relatively less investment which can raise economic 
growth; more provision of government-funded services; and 
more transfers).
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Despite the impression given to the contrary, there has been 
very little ‘austerity’ in the UK. Real government spending has 
decreased slightly since 2010, and there are plans to reduce 
the proportion of government spending in national income 
further. However, progress has been painfully slow. The March 
2016 Budget forecasts indicate that the ratio of UK government 
spending to GDP will only just dip inside its sustainable range 
by 2020/21, even if there is no policy relaxation under the new 
Chancellor.
This long-term increase in the size of the government sector 
gives rise to the question of at what point do advocates of higher 
government spending say enough is enough? Current interna-
tional spending levels are not only well beyond what might be 
thought of as the welfare-maximising level of government spend-
ing, they are pushing (and may, indeed, be beyond) the capacity 
of most countries to levy taxation. The upper limit to sustainable 
government spending is probably around 37–38 per cent of na-
tional income as presently defined.
Finally, making a success of Brexit will require a sharp im-
provement in the microeconomic supply-side flexibility of the UK 
economy as resources have to be shifted from supplying Continen-
tal markets to the wider world outside. This supply-side flexibility 
is unlikely to be achievable while the government sector is absorb-
ing over 45 per cent of the factor-cost measure of UK GDP and the 
private sector is hamstrung by an excessive regulatory burden, 
some (but, by no means, all) of which results from having been 
part of the European Union. If Mrs May’s administration lacks the 
political stomach for major government spending reforms, then a 
1950s R. A. Butler–style ‘bonfire of controls’, together with ex ante 
revenue-neutral tax simplification and reform, should be two of 
the overriding economic aims of the new administration.
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6 TAX AND GROWTH: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
Patrick Minford
Introduction
If only one could drink from the elixir of growth, surely many 
problems would be solved. As a result of growth extra resources 
can be deployed to deal with any issue in hand. For those con-
cerned about the environmental effects of growth, it is important 
to realise that growth is ideally defined as net of such effects: so, 
if these outweigh the extra resources, then that is not growth. 
of course, in practice, growth is measured in terms of national 
income per capita; but we need to bear in mind that if policies 
creating growth, as measured this way, generate damaging 
side-effects, then the cost of such effects need to be deducted.
For many years economists have sought to create theories of 
growth – that is, to understand its causes. Initially, all they could 
come up with was that generating more of the factors of produc-
tion that create output (namely, labour and capital) would gener-
ate extra output and so growth. This rather obvious process was 
generally thought of as ‘exogenous’ (outside our powers to con-
trol) given that the amount of labour and capital are respectively 
the result of net births and saving, both of which seem largely 
outside the control of policymakers. In any case a higher popu-
lation may lower (or at least dilute) output per head, which is the 
measure we care about.
TAX AND GROWTH: 
THEORIES AND 
EVIDENCE
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This analysis left us with the role of technology, which could 
be thought of as the factor of production not directly measured 
as labour and capital. The effect of technology could be meas-
ured via the ‘gap’ or residual between the measured effect of la-
bour and capital and total output produced. This ‘Solow residual’, 
named after Robert Solow, one of the early pioneers of growth 
theory (Solow 1956), was at first also thought of as exogenous: 
a sort of manna from heaven that rained down on production, 
courtesy of natural human ingenuity.1
More recently, economists have come up with theories of 
how this residual’s behaviour could be affected by government 
policies or, more broadly, by man-made institutions. When they 
posit that the permanent growth rate of a country can be affected 
by such human intervention, these are known as ‘endogenous 
growth’ theories; when they posit that growth can be temporar-
ily affected over a significant period of time, in a ‘growth episode’ 
causing a once-for-all leap in a country’s output level, they are 
known as ‘semi-endogenous growth’ theories.
The economics literature on these theories is now very exten-
sive and some is reviewed in L. Minford (2015a) in detail. one 
strand concerns the way labour becomes more productive by 
simply performing tasks repeatedly (‘learning by doing’). Such 
ideas have led some to redefine capital more broadly to include 
human capital (the knowledge embodied in workers). We can 
then add in complementarities that lead to increasing returns 
when each worker is more productive when surrounded by other 
highly skilled workers. Another strand draws on the public good 
aspects of ‘ideas’ which ‘spill over’ from their inventors to the 
broader economy. This strand models how firms generate ideas 
systematically by purposeful, profit-motivated investments in 
research and development (R&D) when there are full or par-
tial intellectual property rights. Knowledge acquisition can be 
1 For an intuitive overview of modern growth theory, see Solow (1994).
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helped along by ‘agglomeration’, whereby people engaged in cer-
tain activities gather together in the same place and share their 
insights informally and where production processes of different 
firms tend to be complementary to each other (the City of Lon-
don being an obvious example). Another strand emphasises that, 
as workforces become more educated, the sectors that hire bet-
ter-educated workers expand, while others contract, this process 
leading to a rise in economy-wide productivity through ‘struc-
tural transformation’. A final aspect of the literature stresses that 
entrepreneurs set up innovative firms which ‘disrupt’ existing 
ways of doing business, leading to efficiency gains that cannot be 
achieved by the R&D of incumbent firms alone.
Among policymakers of developed countries, the Washington 
Consensus emerged in the 1990s, according to which countries 
should execute reforms to liberalise markets under the rule of law 
to create an environment favourable to growth. This consensus 
is apparently supported by the success of certain countries that 
have turned to such policies in improving their growth prospects. 
Examples of successful liberalisation are China under Deng xiao 
Ping and India after Rajiv Gandhi broke with the Nehru planning 
model; while failed states such as parts of the ex–Soviet Union, 
Cuba and the Sudan provide many examples of the opposite. 
However, this evidence can be thought of as gathered from un-
controlled policy experiments, where many elements in the eco-
nomic environment have been varied at the same time and so it 
is impossible to distinguish the role of each in the experiment. 
These experiments do tell us that, to avoid disaster, many elem-
ents have to change together and that, in achieving success, there 
are many factors at work. But there are also instances where 
these policies have been tried in some combination with other 
policies and have failed in important respects. What we need is 
further evidence of what the effect is of varying some element to 
some extent, within a generally successful economy; or, similarly, 
which reforms should be the first to be ‘sequenced’ in a generally 
Smith.indd   107 14-Oct-16   3:20:02 PM
TA x AT IoN, G oV E R N M E N T SPE N DI NG A N D ECoNoM IC GRoW T H
108
disastrous economy; or, again, which elements are strictly neces-
sary for success. For this we need somehow to isolate the effects 
of particular policies.
It is in this context that the chapters in this part of the book 
will examine the influence of taxation and some regulatory in-
terventions on growth. We know the general conditions that can 
promote growth and the general conditions that lead to econom-
ic failure. We will try to isolate the specific impact of taxation 
and regulation on economic growth.
There is a considerable amount of empirical microeconomic 
research on these topics. And there are very good theoretical rea-
sons to assume that taxes and regulation affect growth because 
they affect the processes discussed above: the incentives to sup-
ply labour and capital; the incentives to innovate and adopt new 
technology; the incentives to ensure that labour and capital are 
employed efficiently; and so on.
The association between tax and growth: 
growth regressions
Various macroeconomic empirical studies have examined the 
different government policies and institutions that contribute to 
overall growth through one or other of the channels described 
above. It is at this macroeconomic level that some have suggested 
that theory is well ahead of empirical work because of the difficul-
ties in assessing in practice which policies work and which do not.
The standard empirical study of growth policies involves what 
is known as a panel data regression. A panel data set in this case 
covers many countries’ individual behaviour over time – in other 
words, it is like a combination of time-series and cross-section 
data. It might involve, for example, thirty countries over twenty 
years divided into four five-year averages. on the left-hand side 
of the regression is growth (the variable we are trying to explain). 
on the right-hand side is a set of control variables, supposed 
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to operate on all countries at all times and which are possible 
variables that explain growth. Examples of these variables are 
the rate of investment as a share of GDP (to capture the direct 
effect of capital on output through the production function); the 
initial level of output relative to the richest countries (to capture 
‘catch-up’ by the poor countries by simple technology imitation 
or absorption); and the growth of the labour force (again a di-
rect production input). Then, in addition to these variables, the 
researcher can add the indicator of the relevant policy being in-
vestigated. There have been a large number of such studies and 
the results suggest that there is a strong association between low 
taxes and economic growth.
Surveys of growth regressions
An important set of work that became known as the ‘Barro 
growth regressions’ has been widely used to investigate policy 
impacts since Barro (1991). These take the form of a regression of 
either GDP growth or productivity growth on initial income (to 
control for convergence or ‘catch-up’), some factors to account 
for other influences, and a variable measuring the policy factor 
under investigation. Models of this type are often estimated in 
a panel of cross-country and time-series data with observations 
averaged over five-year periods to smooth out the impact of the 
business cycle. Barro (1991) uses data for 98 countries between 
1960 and 1985.
There are two surveys, Leach (2003) and oECD (Leibfritz et al. 
1997), which document the empirical literature on the effects of 
taxation on growth and output levels. Table 16 sets out a selec-
tion of the major studies, noting their data set, the explanatory 
variables used and the main effects of tax on growth that are 
found. All control for various factors other than taxation (usually 
different variables across different studies). Some of these studies 
use tax as the explanatory variable and others use government 
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spending. In theory, the latter is preferable because government 
spending measures the total claim on the economic resources of 
government.
Barro (1991) does, in fact, consider that some government 
spending, in theory at least, might have a positive impact 
on growth. He believes that there may be a positive effect of 
Table 16 The negative impact of taxation on economic growth
Author Data coverage
Main explanatory 
variables Comment
Barro (1991)
98 countries 
in the period 
1960–85
Human capital, 
government 
consumption, political 
instability indicator, 
price distortion
1% point increase in 
tax-to-GDP ratio lowers 
output per worker by 
0.12%
Koester and 
Kormendi 
(1989)
63 countries for 
which at least 
five years of 
continuous 
data exists for 
the 1970s
Marginal tax rates, 
average tax rate, mean 
growth in labour force 
and population
10% decrease in marginal 
tax rates would increase 
per capita income in 
an average industrial 
country by more than 
7%
Hansson and 
Henrekson 
(1994)
Industry-level 
data for 
14 OECD 
countries
Government transfers, 
consumption, total 
outlays; education 
expenditure; 
government investment
Government transfers, 
consumption and total 
outlays have a negative 
impact on growth whilst 
government investment 
is not significant
Cashin (1995)
23 OECD 
countries over 
the 1971–88 
period
Ratio of public 
investment to GDP, 
ratio of current taxation 
revenue to GDP, ratio 
of expenditure on 
transfers to GDP
1% point increase in 
tax-to-GDP ratio lowers 
output per worker by 
2%
Engen and 
Skinner 
(1996)
US modelling 
together with 
a sample 
of OECD 
countries
Marginal tax rates, human 
capital, investment
2.5% point increase 
in tax-to-GDP ratio 
reduces GDP growth by 
0.2–0.3%
OECD: 
Leibfritz et 
al. (1997) 
OECD countries 
over the 
1965–95 
period
Tax-to-GDP ratio, 
physical and human 
capital formation and 
labour supply
10% point increase 
in tax-to-GDP ratio 
reduces GDP growth by 
0.5–1.0%
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education spending on human capital formation and therefore 
on growth and takes that into account. As such, he examines the 
impact of real government consumption net of spending on both 
education and defence as a per cent of real GDP over the period 
1970–85 on both real economic growth (averaged over the period 
1960–85) and on private investment. He finds a negative correla-
tion between net government spending (so defined) and growth.
Koester and Kormendi (1989) examine the effect of measures 
of the marginal and average tax rates, as well as population and 
labour force growth on economic growth. In a cross-country 
analysis for the 1970s, they find a significant negative effect of 
marginal tax rates on the level of real GDP per capita, but not 
on the rate of growth when this is controlled for the initial level 
Continued
Author Data coverage
Main explanatory 
variables Comment
Alesina et al. 
(2002)
18 OECD 
countries over 
the 1960–96 
period
Primary spending, 
transfers, labour taxes, 
taxes on business, 
indirect taxes, 
government wage 
consumption (all in 
share of GDP)
1% increase in 
government spending 
relative to GDP lowers 
the investment-to-GDP 
ratio of 0.15% and a 
cumulative fall of 0.74% 
after five years
Bleaney et al. 
(2000) 
17 OECD 
countries over 
the 1970–94 
period
Distortionary tax, 
productive expenditure, 
net lending, labour 
force growth, 
investment ratio
1% point increase in 
distortionary tax 
revenue reduces GDP 
growth by 0.4% points
Folster and 
Henrekson 
(2000) 
Sample of 
rich OECD/
non-OECD 
countries over 
the 1970–95 
period
Tax-to-GDP, government 
expenditure-to-GDP, 
investment-to-GDP, 
labour force growth, 
human capital growth
10% point increase in tax-
to-GDP ratio reduces 
GDP growth by 1%
Bassanini and 
Scarpetta 
(2001) 
21 OECD 
countries over 
the 1971–98 
period
Indicators of 
government size and 
financing, physical 
capital, human capital, 
population growth
1% point increase in tax-
to-GDP ratio reduces 
per capita output levels 
by 0.3–0.6%
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of income. They suggest that, holding average tax rates constant, 
a 10  percentage point decrease in marginal tax rates would in-
crease per capita income in an average industrial country by 
more than 7 per cent (and in an average developing country by 
more than 15 per cent). Thus, a revenue-neutral tax reform which 
reduces tax progressivity would raise incomes.
Alesina et al. (2002) focus on the extent of government spend-
ing of various sorts on the investment-to-GDP ratio (and hence 
by implication on growth). They concluded that, via the effect of 
raising private sector labour costs, a 1 percentage point increase 
in government spending relative to GDP resulted in a decrease 
in the investment-to-GDP ratio of 0.15 percentage points and a 
cumulative fall of 0.74 percentage points after five years.
In general these studies, with their varying methodologies, 
find that there is a measurable negative effect of higher tax 
rates on growth. The order of magnitude of this effect is around 
0.5–1.0 per cent for a 10 per cent rise in the ratio of taxation (or 
government spending) to GDP.
The oECD’s own conclusion from its survey was that:
A number of studies, influenced by the new growth theories, 
have taken a top-down approach to assess the impact of taxes 
on per capita income and growth at the macro level. Several of 
them purport to demonstrate a significant negative relation-
ship between the level of the tax/GDP ratio (or the government 
expenditure ratio) and the growth rate of GDP per capita, imply-
ing that high tax rates reduce economic growth … our estimates 
[using a top-down cross country regression] suggest that the in-
crease in the average (weighted) tax rate of about 10 percentage 
points over the past 35 years, may have reduced oECD annual 
growth rates by about 0.5 percentage points.
The oECD suggests that a 10 percentage point cut in the 
tax-to-GDP ratio could increase economic growth by 0.5–1.0 
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percentage points. Thus they also say that ‘up to one third of 
the growth deceleration in the oECD [over the 1965–95 period] 
would be explained by higher taxes. In some European countries, 
tax burdens increased much more dramatically than the oECD 
average, which would imply correspondingly larger effects on 
their growth rates’ (Leibfritz et al. 1997). A summary of a number 
of the main studies is shown in Table 16.
Later studies show similar associations. For example,  Afonso 
and Furceri (2008)2 examine a number of EU and other oECD 
countries over the period 1970–2004. As well as several compo-
nents of government expenditure and taxation, they include vari-
ables such as initial output, population growth, investment ratio, 
human capital and openness. Their finding is that a 1 percentage 
point point rise in the government spending to GDP ratio cuts 
growth in the oECD by 0.12 per cent and in the EU by 0.13 per 
cent. Larger effects can be found for individual expenditure and 
tax components with indirect taxes and social contributions 
appearing to be the most damaging for growth and worse than 
income tax. Subsidies and government current expenditure have 
the worst negative effects on growth on the spending side.
overall, the tax (or government spending) and growth studies, 
indicate a strong association between the two variables. As a rule 
of thumb, it would appear that a 10 percentage point fall in the 
share of national income taken in tax would lead to slightly more 
than a 1 percentage point increase in the growth rate – results of 
this order of magnitude occur over and over again.
This does not mean that the UK can automatically expect to 
increase its growth rate by 1 percentage point if the government 
reduces the proportion of national income it spends from (say) 
45 per cent to (say) 35 per cent. Firstly, there is the issue of causality. 
For example, does high government spending lead to low growth 
2 Reported in the Taxpayers’ Alliance, Single Income Tax Report: http://2020tax 
.org/2020tc.pdf.
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or the other way round? This is discussed in more detail in Box 3. 
Secondly, the results are averages using data taken from a wide 
variety of situations. Thirdly, the effects are likely to be non-linear. 
The impact of a 1 percentage point change in government spending 
Box 3 Problems with traditional growth regressions
The problems with traditional growth regressions will be dis-
cussed in Chapter 7. However, it is useful to highlight one or 
two of the main points from that chapter here.
Association does not demonstrate causality
Although there is clearly a strong association between tax 
and growth, this does not mean that low taxes cause high 
growth. It is perhaps easier to illustrate the ‘association does 
not mean causation’ problem by looking at a different policy 
variable – the rule of law.
Suppose a researcher wishes to determine the impact of 
the rule of law on growth and that the rule of law coefficient 
is found to be statistically significant and positive. We now 
come to the question of interpretation. The researcher implic-
itly believes that this result tests his hypothesis that the rule of 
law increases growth. However, it could also be the case that 
growth encourages the rule of law, through a process whereby 
a more dynamic business environment creates more demand 
for dispute resolution or leads to pressure on government for 
better court services. Or it could be that some other process 
that we cannot directly observe (perhaps culture or history) 
encourages both growth and the rule of law. This is known as 
the problem of identification: we do not have any means to 
identify which theory is at work in the data because several 
could account for what we observe.
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relative to national income cannot simply be multiplied by 10 to 
find the impact for a 10 percentage point change. Intuitively, it is 
likely that the gains in terms of extra growth at the margin will 
reduce as the tax burden falls and rise as the tax burden increases.
This set of problems is well known among researchers 
and policy analysts. Yet it has had little impact on empirical 
research, which continues to look for such associations as if 
they do show causation, on the ground that other interpre-
tations are not credible. Unfortunately, theories abound sup-
porting these alternative interpretations. What is more, many 
of the features of societies that are supposed to enhance their 
economic growth are features that are found in many wealthy 
societies all at the same time, making it impossible to distin-
guish which is causing which.
Other technical problems of growth regressions
There are other problems, discussed in detail later in this book 
in a wider context that make it difficult to interpret the results 
of growth regressions. They include:
• Such regressions capture average effects that might 
not be applicable in particular countries or in particular 
periods.
• Generally, it is marginal tax rates that affect growth but 
growth regressions tend to rely on average tax rates 
because the data are easier to collect and interpret.
• Some types of government spending may improve 
growth, though others may not. To some extent, there-
fore, whether increased taxes reduce growth may depend 
on how the government spends the money (see Part 1).
• Outliers can mean that the results of growth regressions 
are not applicable to the wider range of countries.
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Nevertheless, the rule of thumb may be a starting point for 
discussion and further investigation though there is a need to 
develop more robust models in this area of economics as is dis-
cussed in the next chapter.
Modelling growth, taxation and investment 
incentives
Some work has been undertaken that goes beyond growth re-
gressions and, instead, tests competing theories against each 
other. As has been noted, it is not universally accepted that lower 
taxes and government spending will lead to higher growth. Some 
argue that higher government spending leads to the provision of 
investment incentives, research and development, education and 
various public goods that might be conducive to growth. Indeed, 
some argue that a larger role for government in the economy 
might involve more government direction of investment and, if 
this is successful, higher growth. Such an interventionist, or ac-
tivist approach, is exemplified by Aghion and Howitt (1998). For 
them, growth is seen as depending on government subsidies to 
investment and to research and development specifically.
Work published in Minford and Wang (2011)3 examines the 
interventionist versus incentives model. To approximate the 
investment subsidy the authors took the difference between the 
world real interest rate and the national real interest rate. While 
this difference will be cyclical, as the real interest differential 
and the expected real exchange rate respond to shocks, over the 
decadal averages used in the modelling, such effects should be 
minimal, leaving the systematic effect of government policy in 
protecting industry against world real capital costs. The mech-
anism by which real interest rates are held down is through 
government subsidy for investment which increases the capital 
3 From which this section is adapted.
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intensity of an economy (unless it substitutes for private sector 
investment). This, in turn, reduces the marginal rate of return to 
capital, which will reduce the national real interest rate below 
the international real interest rate. While data on subsidies to 
research and development (R&D) are not readily available, there 
are data on the amount of government spending on R&D and 
this is used as a measure of the subsidy to R&D (of course, gov-
ernment R&D spending is not charged for and can be considered 
100 per cent subsidised).
The impact of tax on growth is easier to model. Here the rela-
tionship between the growth rate of GDP per capita, the tax rate, 
a dummy variable specific to each time period, and a dummy 
variable specific to each country is modelled. Panel data were 
used that were averaged over consecutive decades from 1970 
to 2000 for 100 countries. Data on the growth rate in real GDP 
per capita and tax rate originate from the Penn World Table Ver-
sion 6.1 (Heston et al. 2002).
overall, the modelling found an overwhelmingly strong neg-
ative relationship between tax and growth, with some models 
showing a stronger relationship than others. Specifically, in the 
preferred model there is an elasticity of growth to tax of approx-
imately –1.4 at the mean of the growth rate (1.6 per cent). The 
effects are not expected to be linear as the tax rate changes, but, 
if they were, then a fall in the tax rate by 25 per cent of its existing 
value (from about 40 per cent to about 30 per cent of national in-
come in the UK) would lead to a rise in the growth rate to 2.7 per 
cent if the initial growth rate were 2 per cent.
This is roughly in line with the growth regression results dis-
cussed above – the impact is a little below the ‘rule of thumb’ of 
a 1 percentage point increase in growth from a 10 percentage 
points cut in the tax-to-GDP ratio, but it is of the same order of 
magnitude.
When the model was tested further, it was found that the 
basic results are not greatly dependent on initial GDP per capita 
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(which should control for a country’s potential to ‘catch up’: the 
lower the starting level of GDP, the greater the growth); human 
capital; physical capital stock; and the ratio of investment to 
GDP.
In looking at the activist approach, the relationship between 
the growth rate and government subsidies to investment and to 
R&D (as defined above) were examined. It was found that there 
was no statistically significant relationship between R&D and 
growth. Indeed, insofar as there is any relationship at all, it was 
a negative relationship between growth and both investment in-
centives and R&D, which would appear to deny the proposition of 
Aghion and Howitt (1998) that the growth rate depends positively 
upon investment and R&D subsidies. It is not, however, the nega-
tive relationship but the absence of a positive relationship which 
is most interesting. Again control variables were added to test for 
sensitivity, but do not change the results.
These results add to the body of evidence in two ways. First-
ly, they provide another test of the idea that taxes affect growth. 
Secondly, they seem to cast a great deal of doubt on the ability of 
government intervention of the sort modelled, financed through 
taxes, to help growth. This is particularly interesting given that 
the spending being modelled is that form of government spend-
ing that is most likely to have a positive effect on growth.
Tax and growth modelling: a new approach
It was to solve the problems with traditional growth regressions 
that researchers at Cardiff University built an alternative testing 
procedure for theories of growth. A model of the UK economy 
was built in which growth depends on tax and regulation policy 
(L. Minford 2015b). In order to provide an up-to-date summary 
of the empirical work on taxation and growth, the model is de-
scribed and the results are briefly reported here. They are dis-
cussed in much greater detail in Chapters 7 and 8.
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The model was simulated many times to generate parallel 
samples of how history could have turned out. An approach 
known as ‘indirect inference’ was used which was originally 
proposed as a method for estimating non-linear macroeconomic 
models by Tony Smith (1993).
This procedure has a remarkably high power to reject false 
models, because false models generally simulate quite different 
sorts of behaviour from each other in the face of shocks.4 If the 
model effectively replicates history, then there is a high probabil-
ity that the model represents reality well. Traditional modelling 
techniques, on the other hand, can come close to ‘data-mining’ 
(in other words, the computer can find a good fit to various, not 
necessarily correct, models).
When this method is applied to growth, we are able to see 
whether the particular model of growth we have proposed sim-
ulates behaviour like the behaviour in the actual data sample. If 
our test does not reject the model we can have quite a lot of confi-
dence that it is close to the truth because the test has such a high 
rejection rate for false models – including of course models with 
reverse causation (growth causing changes in taxes) or third-fac-
tor causation (growth and taxes not affecting each other but both 
being driven by a third variable).
The research reported in Chapters 7 and 8 (L. Minford 2015a,b) 
tests a model for the UK from the 1970s where tax and regulation 
affect growth through the incentives for entrepreneurs to innovate.
Understanding model error
In many modelling situations, when looking at the ‘accuracy’ of a 
model, we consider the ‘standard error’ of an estimated effect of 
some policy change. If we have estimated a relationship in which, 
4 As Tolstoy put it, just as ‘every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way’, incorrect 
models of the economy are incorrect in different ways and therefore produce out-
comes that vary from each other and vary from the history.
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say, a 1 percentage point change in the tax rate lowers output by 
0.5 per cent, then there are standard statistical formulae that tell 
us with some degree of statistical confidence the upper and lower 
bounds of that effect. However, this is not really what we want 
to know when we have a full model of the economy in which the 
policy change creates many ramifications. In this situation we 
want to know how ‘totally wrong’ we could be about the effect. 
The unforeseen consequences about which economists often 
write are not generally differences in the magnitude of the effect 
of a policy change on some economic variable but differences in 
the direction of the effect. Whether the model is likely to produce 
an answer that is totally wrong is related to the power of the tests 
used on the models: that is, how frequently the test rejects false 
models.
There are many ways in which models can be false and, if a 
model is ‘false’ it is difficult to know what part of it is false or the 
extent to which different parts are false – for example, is it the tax 
parameter or another parameter or both? However, this new ap-
proach to tax and growth modelling will reject false models with 
a high probability regardless of the source of the ‘inaccuracy’.
The results of tax and growth modelling
As already noted, further results will be discussed in Chapters 7 
and 8. At this stage, the most important finding is the order of 
magnitude of the impact of tax and regulation on growth. In this 
model, the combination of tax with regulation has at least two 
justifications. The first is that the effects can be similar – they 
both impose costs on businesses and, indirectly at least, employ-
ees. The second is that they can be substitutes: governments may 
choose to achieve a particular objective by increasing taxes or 
by regulating. For example, laws enforcing union powers and 
rises in income tax rates each redistribute resources but also in 
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different ways reduce the return to entrepreneurial innovation 
and so damage growth.
The magnitude of the effect of tax and regulation on growth 
from this model was close to the Minford and Wang results dis-
cussed above and slightly below those that tend to be found from 
growth regressions.
In Part 1, it was suggested that, as far as Britain is con-
cerned, the growth-maximising average spending ratio to is 
17.5–22.5 per cent of national income and the welfare-maximis-
ing point is 27.5–32.5 per cent of national income. Broadly, the 
model suggests that a cut in government spending to the wel-
fare-maximising point from current levels might imply a rise in 
the economic growth rate by around 1 percentage point; and a 
cut to the growth-maximising point would imply a rise in the 
economic growth rate by a further 0.8 percentage points. These 
are clearly orders of magnitude and the effects of cutting govern-
ment spending are unlikely to be a simple linear function of the 
extent of the cut. However, there is a lot of evidence from differ-
ent sources that points towards figures of this order.
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7 TAX, REGULATION AND GROWTH: 
UNDERSTANDING THE RESEARCH
Lucy Minford
There is a huge empirical literature on growth and its causes. 
Chapter 6 examined some of the results of that literature spe-
cifically in relation to how taxes affect growth. However, one 
of the problems of that literature is that it is very difficult to 
ascertain cause and effect or which factors are the real driv-
ers of growth. In this chapter, therefore, the economic work on 
the causes of growth is examined more closely. There is fuller 
discussion, including a review of the theoretical literature, in 
L. Minford (2015a).
The new work presented in Chapter 8 overcomes many of the 
problems in the earlier literature. It also includes the important 
issue of entrepreneurship and the effect of tax and regulation on 
growth through this channel. This chapter therefore also exam-
ines the problems in the early work on these topics.
The effect of tax on growth: further analysis of the 
growth regression approach
Empirical work on the macroeconomic causes of growth has 
been dominated by the Barro growth regression (Barro 1991), as 
mentioned in the preceding chapter. This involves panel analysis, 
using data observed for many countries (a cross-section) over 
time.
TAX, REGULATION 
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A cross-section is used in order to obtain counterfactual var-
iation (what would have happened to growth had the policy ex-
perience been different?), and a larger set of countries may offer 
a wider variety of policy profiles, particularly for reasonably long 
time series. However, there is a problem in assuming that the 
effects of the factors are the same across a large set of countries 
with very different characteristics. Many of the characteristics 
that affect growth in different countries will be unmeasured and 
the effect of these factors will show up in the error term.1 Fur-
thermore, the sample may not be random if more of one ‘type’ of 
country with unmeasured characteristics that affect growth is 
included than others (Levine and Zervos 1993). There are meth-
ods used to overcome this problem. For example, more variables 
could be included. However, if more variables are included, there 
may be insufficient data to obtain robust results if the time series 
is short.
Another potential problem with growth regressions is that 
variables may be inconsistently measured across countries. This 
will make any cross-country policy–growth relationships even 
less stable or more difficult to find. Such problems have been ad-
dressed by looking at groups of ‘similar’ countries, for instance, 
an oECD sample. However, this reduces the sample size.
Even for more similar countries, many variables have been 
found to be correlated with growth and the temptation is to 
include them all in a regression. However, the variables may be 
highly correlated with each other. The more they are correlated 
with each other, the more difficult it is to distinguish the indi-
vidual effects of the different variables (Loayza and Soto 2002; 
Brock and Durlauf 2001). on the other hand, if fewer variables 
are included, how do we choose which variables can reasonably 
be excluded?
1 If relevant country characteristics are fixed over time this is easy to deal with – it is 
when they change over time that it becomes problematic.
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It has also often been found that a variable that is significant 
in one regression then loses its significance when included along-
side additional or different regressors (Levine and Renelt 1992). 
This problem is often addressed by using an approach called 
‘extreme bounds analysis’ (Leamer 1983), which checks whether 
the significance and magnitude of the coefficient of interest is 
robust when further variables are added. When such analysis is 
conducted, it is often found that the relationship between growth 
and most variables is fragile.2
A separate problem is so-called ‘reverse causality’. What hap-
pens if the relevant variable is dependent on growth rather than 
growth dependent on the variable? Simple regressions might not 
be able to find a causal relationship from simple associations. For 
example, better rule of law might lead to more growth. However, 
more growth might lead to better capacity to run an effective 
and efficient legal system. Which causes which? Does the rule of 
law improve growth or does growth improve the rule of law? or 
does the association run both ways? Similar mechanisms can be 
envisaged with tax and growth. For example, higher growth may 
give the government more space to reduce the tax burden as a 
proportion of national income and a reduced tax burden might 
increase growth. This ambiguity over the direction of causation 
fundamentally undermines the policy conclusions of a growth 
regression. If the goal is to investigate the scope for growth policy 
levers, Barro-type regressions may well not get us there.
When regressors are endogenous (that is, when a variable, such 
as tax, both affects and is affected by growth or is affected by some 
other variable that also affects growth) an approach known as 
an ‘instrumental variable strategy’ should be used. Many recent 
growth regressions take this approach. This is a complex but a 
widely used technique in econometrics. A variable must be found 
2 Some argue that this is not an appropriate test, e.g. Sala-i-Martin (1994). See also 
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) for a different approach to selecting independent vari-
ables in growth regressions.
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(an instrument) that is strongly correlated with the policy variable 
under investigation (for example, the tax rate) but which is other-
wise unrelated to growth. If this variable is found to affect growth, 
then that effect, it is argued, must come through the influence of 
tax on growth – the argument has to be made theoretically.
This technique is best explained by example; the following is 
from Leigh and Schembri (2004), who investigate the relation-
ship between smoking and health. In this context it might be 
very difficult to work out whether it really is smoking or some 
other variable that is affecting health (because smokers might be 
unhealthy in other respects or, if a time series is being used, there 
will be other things happening as the level of smoking changes 
that will also affect health). However, we could, instead, investi-
gate the relationship between tobacco taxes and health. It seems 
implausible that tobacco taxes could affect health other than 
through their impact on smoking and so, if we find a relationship, 
the underlying driver of the relationship is probably changes in 
smoking.
It goes without saying that it is extremely difficult to apply 
this technique in the case of growth regressions.
More recent studies address the problem of the difficulty of 
disentangling cause from effect by using an approach called a 
‘dynamic generalised method of moments’ (GMM) or GMM sys-
tem approach (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998). 
Even this complex approach has not proven satisfactory. Angrist 
and Krueger (2001) dub such identification strategies ‘mechanical 
and naïve’, relying as they do on ‘atheoretical and hard-to-assess 
assumptions about dynamic relationships’ (p. 76). Murray refers 
to a ‘dark cloud of invalidity’ hanging over the instrumental vari-
able approach that ‘never entirely goes away’ (Murray 2006: 114).
When it comes to the traditional growth regression approach 
discussed earlier, it may not be entirely fair to conclude that ‘ul-
timately this line of research is a dead end, if the aim is to under-
stand what causes growth so that we can improve the situation’ 
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(Myles 2009b: 16). But we can certainly agree with Easterly that, 
where growth policy is concerned, ‘Regressions can be danger-
ous!’ (Easterly 2008). They may provide useful information. But 
they must be treated with care. It is for this reason that the ap-
proach taken in Chapter 8 really does add something new to the 
debate on tax and growth.
The effect of tax on growth: further considerations
For the reasons discussed above, it is difficult to disentangle the 
historical relationships between tax and growth. Growth re-
gressions certainly provide evidence of an association between 
various economic and political economy variables and growth 
but little can be concluded from them with regard to causality. 
There are, though, some other issues that specifically relate to the 
modelling of tax on growth that deserve further comment.
Marginal or average tax rates?
Many cross-country growth regressions include the overall 
share of tax revenue in GDP as an explanatory variable (i.e. as 
a variable that explains growth).3 This measures the national 
average tax rate, but theory suggests that it is marginal tax rates 
that distort individual incentives so as to reduce investment and 
other important variables that affect growth. The impact of total 
tax revenue on growth is ambiguous. For example, tax revenues 
may be used to finance public goods which are productive inputs 
and help growth. This may indirectly imply a positive relation-
ship between average tax rates and growth – at least when tax 
rates are low. As tax rates become higher, we would expect the 
total tax take to affect growth negatively and, eventually, taxes 
will affect growth to such an extent that the tax take is lowered 
3 Much of this discussion follows Myles (2009a).
Smith.indd   126 14-Oct-16   3:20:04 PM
TA x , R EGU L AT IoN A N D GRoW T H : U N DE R STA N DI NG T H E R E SE A RC H 
127
and government spending has to be reduced (the so-called Laffer 
curve effect). However, overall, theory cannot unambiguously 
identify whether there would be a negative or positive relation-
ship between average tax rates and growth – it will depend on 
the level tax rates have reached.
Negative growth effects arise in theory not from the aver-
age tax rate but from the marginal tax rate (the proportion of 
income earned through an additional unit of some activity or 
investment that will be confiscated). Generally, for oECD econ-
omies the average and marginal tax rates are not the same, due 
to progressivity in the tax schedule: for a progressive tax system, 
the marginal tax rate is above the average rate at every income 
level. Since the marginal rate changes at the threshold between 
different income brackets, calculating the appropriate national 
level of the marginal rate for personal income taxes is difficult 
and this is made more so by exemptions or special rates for dif-
ferent types of income. For corporation tax, the picture is further 
complicated by accelerated depreciation allowances for different 
types of capital spending and other tax breaks, such as research 
and development tax credits. Some studies (Koester and Kor-
mendi 1989; Easterly and Rebelo 1993) attempt to calculate an ‘ef-
fective’ marginal tax rate at the economy level, but whether these 
capture cross-country differences in tax design consistently is 
controversial.
Due to the inherent difficulties in measuring marginal tax 
rates the average tax rate is still widely used in studies on tax 
and growth. However, below, some studies are discussed which 
examine the impact of marginal tax rates on entrepreneurship.
Tax and growth: a two-way relationship
Many earlier studies in the tax-growth literature do not account 
for endogeneity bias in their estimates (Engen and Skinner 1996) 
– in other words, do changes in the tax burden cause growth or 
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does growth cause a change in the tax burden? This is, of course, 
just a specific example of the cause-and-effect issue discussed 
above. The relationship between tax and growth can also be 
affected by the political system. Tax is a highly politicised area 
and rates certainly respond to political pressures, which in turn 
can be caused by the state of the economy.
Slemrod (1995) notes that government expenditure responds 
to country-level political preferences, and that the income elas-
ticity of demand for government spending is above one (Wagner’s 
law) – i.e. demand for goods and services funded by the gov-
ernment increases with development. This implies that higher 
growth will lead to higher levels of taxes (note, not lower levels 
of taxes – the positive sign of the effect contrasts with the nega-
tive relationship feeding from tax to growth which is sometimes 
supposed). Regressions of tax and growth that do not take this 
into account lead to estimates that are very difficult to interpret.
Entrepreneurship and growth
Given the problems discussed above with the tax and growth 
literature, one approach is to try to specify a more robust theo-
retical model – that is, to try to better understand the channels 
through which tax can affect growth. one of the main channels 
through which tax levels affect growth is through their impact 
on entrepreneurship. Thus, in tying together the issues of growth 
and tax, we also need to consider the relationship between entre-
preneurship and growth and then examine more closely the im-
pact of tax – together with other factors such as regulation – on 
entrepreneurship. Unfortunately, the work on the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and growth suffers from similar fail-
ings to that on the relationship between tax and growth with the 
additional problem that entrepreneurship is difficult to define.
Carree et al. (2002) look at the relationship between per 
capita GDP and business ownership in 23 oECD countries for 
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the period 1976 to 1996. Business ownership is defined as the 
number of business owners in all sectors (except agriculture) 
as a proportion of the labour force, and therefore measures the 
stock of self- employed businesses rather than new business 
creation. The authors argue that the business ownership rate 
is a reasonable, though imperfect, proxy for entrepreneurship.4 
They argue that it is not so much the level of entrepreneurship 
(defined in this way) that leads to growth but that a deviation 
from the equilibrium level of self-employment that is problem-
atic – in either direction. Having a large number of business 
owners is not necessarily good or bad; the problem arises when 
we have an economic system that leads to a higher or lower 
number of business owners than would exist in a world free of 
undesirable interventions (for example, if self-employment and 
small business ownership is encouraged by employment regu-
lations on medium-sized and large businesses).
The authors put great emphasis on potential policy implications 
of the results, drawing on the comment from Kirzner that ‘govern-
ment regulation of market activity is likely to obstruct and frustrate 
the spontaneous, corrective forces of entrepreneurial adjustments’ 
(Kirzner 1997: 81). In other words, free entry, and exit from the mar-
ket free of stigma and financial burdens, are essential for entrepre-
neurship rates to be allowed to find their equilibrium in the face of 
shocks, and hence for economic growth to reach its potential.
Audretsch and Thurik (2001) look at the same set of 23 oECD 
countries within the same setup for 1974–98. They also find that 
any deviation from the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurship 
reduces growth; this holds when entrepreneurship is measured 
both by the self-employment rate and by the share of small firms 
in economic activity.
4 Across countries the definition of business owners differs in breadth (regarding 
businesses that are not legally incorporated, for instance), so they adjust the oECD 
statistics to correct for this. However, they note that issues remain for comparing 
these rates across countries.
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There are a number of other studies conducted using different 
methods, for example that by Erken et al. (2008). The conclusion 
appears to be that, when a number of variables are included (for 
example, human capital and various R&D measures, as well as 
catch-up growth variables and labour participation rates), entre-
preneurship is an additional factor in the productivity process 
alongside human capital accumulation and R&D. Acs et al. 
(2012) use a Barro-style regression approach as described above 
for 18 oECD countries. They use a range of techniques to deal 
with the difficulty of distinguishing between cause and effect 
and, even after controlling for R&D, find that entrepreneurship 
has a positive and significant effect on growth. The estimates for 
the impact of entrepreneurship are robust in different samples 
across different date ranges (1981–98 and 1990–98).
Both entrepreneurship and export orientation are investi-
gated by Hessels and van Stel (2011) in a group of 34 countries 
from 2002 to 2008. They find that export orientation has a pos-
itive and significant additional impact on growth above the im-
pact found for entrepreneurship, though this result is only found 
for high-income countries. Entrepreneurship appears as a signif-
icant cause of growth across all specifications and for all levels 
of income, with the magnitude slightly larger for less developed 
countries in the sample. The authors acknowledge that there is a 
small sample size used in the study.
As with the tax and growth literature, interpreting the work 
in this field is problematic. However, there would appear to be 
some indication (as we would expect) that entrepreneurship is 
important for growth, though we should be very careful how we 
measure entrepreneurship.
Linking tax to entrepreneurship in theory
There is evidence to substantiate the view that taxation reduces 
entrepreneurship through incentive effects – though some 
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studies do reject this link. The impact of marginal tax rates on 
the aggregate level of entrepreneurship is actually ambiguous, 
depending on the risk attitudes of potential entrepreneurs (Gen-
try and Hubbard 2000). Risk-averse individuals may be more 
inclined to undertake uncertain entrepreneurial ventures when 
tax schedules are more progressive, since a more redistributive 
tax regime acts as insurance against failure. This would imply a 
positive relationship between marginal tax rates (or tax progres-
sivity) and entrepreneurship (Domar and Musgrave 1944). While 
this is counter-intuitive to many people, essentially what is hap-
pening here is that, though success is taxed, failure is subsidised. 
However, for a risk-neutral entrepreneur higher marginal rates 
will reduce entry (Gentry and Hubbard 2000). of course, the pre-
cise effect will depend on the exact shape of the tax system – the 
extent to which successes are taxed and the extent to which fail-
ures are cushioned.
Another channel through which tax rates on businesses (or 
the interaction between business taxes and other taxes) might 
lead to higher entrepreneurship as measured by self-employ-
ment rates is that of tax avoidance. If tax rates on business profits 
are lower than on wage income, individuals will move into self- 
employment. Though some studies use self-employment as a 
proxy for entrepreneurship, self-employment simply motivated 
by tax avoidance is often a substitute for employment rather 
than being an example of genuine entrepreneurship and so it is 
worth stressing once again that we have to be careful how we 
define entrepreneurship.
There is also work that looks at how specific tax policies or 
‘tax instruments’ affect entrepreneurship levels through their 
effects on risk-taking (for references, see Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Garello 2014: 171). For example, tax instruments are often used to 
affect access to finance for start-ups (Gompers and Lerner 1999; 
Bruce and Mohsin 2006). The consensus from the evidence is that 
higher tax rates lead to lower venture capital funding. Asoni and 
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Sanandaji (2009) also propose a theoretical model in which pro-
gressive taxes reduce the average quality of firms even though 
entrepreneurial entry rates increase.
Marginal tax rates and entrepreneurship
As has been noted, it cannot be taken for granted that low taxes 
necessarily lead to more entrepreneurship. What does the empir-
ical evidence say? Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello (2014) provide a 
table summarising the samples, tax regressors and qualitative 
results of recent empirical work on entrepreneurship and taxes 
for oECD countries (2014: Table 1, p. 169). They find that the sign 
and magnitude of the estimated effects differs both across coun-
tries and within countries or groups of countries in different 
studies. Two time series studies for the UK illustrate this: Parker 
(1996) finds a positive impact of marginal tax rates on growth, 
while Robson (1998) finds no effect.
Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello find that tax progressivity for 
above the average income brackets reduces estimated measures 
of nascent entrepreneurship in a study of 15 oECD countries be-
tween 2000 and 2008.5 They note that there is a potential for two-
way causality between entrepreneurship and the tax variables, 
since tax reforms may be a policy response to poor observed 
entrepreneurship outcomes.6
The authors of this study derive two progressivity variables. 
The first is the difference between the marginal tax rate applying 
at 100 per cent of average earnings and the marginal rate apply-
ing at 67 per cent of average earnings. The second is the difference 
5 Nascent entrepreneurship as measured by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor is 
the percentage of 18–64 population actively involved in setting up a business they 
own or co-own.
6 They use difference generalised method of moments, a statistical technique, to try 
to control for this.
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between the marginal tax rates at 167 per cent and 100 per cent 
of average earnings. The authors find that the second of these 
variables is significantly negatively related to entrepreneurship, 
across all specifications.7 In other words, as the tax system be-
comes more progressive above average earnings, entrepreneur-
ship is reduced.
Their findings are therefore consistent with Gentry and Hub-
bard’s micro-analysis on US data (2000, 2004). Those authors 
show that tax progressivity decreases nascent entrepreneurship 
for those who start with higher incomes. The policy implication 
is that reducing tax progressivity for the income bracket between 
100 and 167 per cent of average earnings stimulates nascent 
entrepreneurship.
They note that the impact of this reform depends in practice 
on reforms to other factors in the entrepreneurship decision, 
such as regulatory costs. The entrepreneur responds to the tax 
schedule ‘in its entirety’ (their emphasis) and this includes regula-
tory costs which have the same effect as taxes. Deriving the effec-
tive tax rate including regulatory costs is extremely challenging. 
In their concluding remarks they speculate: ‘it is not clear that 
governments should take the opposite direction and engage in 
positive discrimination in favour of start-ups or new businesses. 
It is possible that the best strategy would involve more fiscal 
neutrality. Low progressivity, or even a flat tax, might be part of 
such a strategy but it is also important to reduce the global fiscal 
burden and start-up costs’ (p. 185).
overall, then, this work suggests that high marginal tax rates 
at higher incomes reduce entrepreneurship. However, tax rates 
cannot be seen in isolation from other costs on business forma-
tion such as regulatory costs.
7 This result is robust to the use of average rather than marginal rates in calculating 
the progressivity indicator; the first progressivity indicator is not significant in all 
specifications. 
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Corporate taxes and entrepreneurship
We might also expect taxes on corporations to be linked to 
entrepreneurial incentives. Djankov et al. (2010) derive compar-
able effective corporate tax rates for 85 countries of different 
income levels in 2004. They look at how investment and entre-
preneurship vary with these tax rates across countries. Entre-
preneurship is measured by cross-country indicators of busi-
ness density and formal entry, developed from the World Bank’s 
Entrepreneurship Survey, which gathers data on business reg-
istration.8 They recognise that these measures exclude informal 
entrepreneurship, while including businesses that go through 
the administrative incorporation process at a time different 
from when they started up. Across a variety of specifications 
they find a significant, negative effect of effective corporate 
tax rates for the top income band on both business density and 
entry rates, as well as on fixed capital formation in manufac-
turing (though not in services) and foreign direct investment: 
‘in these new data, corporate taxes matter a lot, and in ways 
consistent with basic economic theory’ (p. 59).
Da Rin et al. (2011) look at the impact of lagged average effec-
tive corporate tax rates for 17 EU countries, from 1997 to 2004, 
on formal incorporation rates at the country–industry level. 
The authors acknowledge that incorporation rates could affect 
taxes, just as taxes could affect incorporation rates, and they use 
techniques to try to overcome this problem. They conclude that 
higher corporate tax rates reduce entry rates, though only when 
8 Business density is the total number of registered limited liability corporations per 
100 members of the working population in 2004. The rate of new business registra-
tion is new registrations as a proportion of total registrations averaged between 
2000 and 2004. The data exclude sole proprietorships, i.e. 15.1 million businesses 
in the US as of 2010; however, their tax regime is different so their inclusion would 
inappropriate.
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tax rates are below a threshold level. This holds across a range of 
models.
overall, the work on corporate taxes seems unambiguous. 
In most situations, higher corporate taxes are associated with 
lower business formation. While it is worth reiterating that these 
studies are subject to limitations discussed earlier in the chapter 
– specifically that they do not demonstrate causation from tax to 
business formation – it would be reasonable to hypothesise that 
this is a channel through which taxes could reduce entrepreneur-
ship and economic growth. The work in Chapter 8 investigates 
that hypothesis.
Concluding remarks on taxation and entrepreneurship
overall, in the earlier literature, there is no robust empirical 
evidence that economic growth is causally related to the level 
of aggregate taxation. Although that avenue of research seemed 
promising, it runs into the many problems that have been dis-
cussed above. of course, that does not mean that the aggregate 
tax burden is not causally related to growth, but the estimation 
techniques that have been used are not sufficiently robust to un-
cover such a relationship with certainty.
It would seem plausible that growth is responsive to the level 
of taxation – especially starting at current levels – for reasons 
discussed in Chapter 1. We would particularly expect growth to 
be sensitive to high marginal tax rates. For example, corporation 
tax may well affect growth through the channels of investment 
and entrepreneurship. The same may well apply to the higher 
marginal rates of income tax. However, there are alternative the-
ories that might suggest that higher taxes can promote growth 
via various channels, at least up to a point.
Further work is needed to obtain more persuasive evidence 
that a reduction in taxes can lead to higher growth. The results 
presented in Chapter 8 provides such evidence. 
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Labour market regulation and growth
The importance of labour market regulation
Labour market regulation can be thought of as the laws and in-
stitutions intended to protect the interests of workers.9 In addi-
tion to certain civil rights protections, it includes employment 
law, collective relations law and social security provisions. Every 
oECD country intervenes in labour markets. Such interventions 
can improve welfare and also improve growth where they re-
solve genuine market failures. However, they may also introduce 
frictions. The focus of this section is on those frictions and their 
potential growth effects.
The practical impact of labour market regulation on market 
outcomes depends not just on the laws and regulations them-
selves but on how legislation, contracts and agreements are in-
terpreted and enforced by the authorities responsible, as well as 
on how compliance is monitored. This enforcement factor is not 
static over time. Unfortunately, no measures exist of regulatory 
enforcement quality over time for oECD countries (certainly not 
for the UK over the period from 1970 to 2009) so this dimension of 
the problem cannot easily be examined empirically.
The theoretical direction of the growth effect of labour mar-
ket regulation is ambiguous. It may be that some employment 
protection legislation (EPL) increases investment in skills due to 
increased job tenure, leading to higher productivity growth via 
human capital accumulation (Damiani and Pompei 2010; Belot 
et al. 2007). on the other hand, higher regulation raises the costs 
of labour adjustment leading to labour market inefficiency (e.g. 
Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993), 
and may pose a barrier to the adoption of new technology re-
quiring new skillsets. Labour market regulation may also reduce 
9 Botero et al. (2004: 1339). of course, whether they do actually protect the interests 
of workers is a different point.
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productivity by affecting a firm’s choice of projects – by increas-
ing anticipated costs of labour adjustment, high hiring and firing 
costs may lead to the selection of lower-risk, lower-productivity 
projects as opposed to more radical innovations with higher 
associated risk (Saint-Paul 2002; Bartelsman et al. 2004).10 An-
other productivity dampening effect of employment protection 
legislation is the potential for workers to increase absenteeism or 
reduce work effort due to the lower threat of dismissal.11
Labour market regulation is relevant to a broad discussion of 
tax and growth. In many cases, labour market regulation may 
have the same effects as a tax – it increases the cost of employ-
ment. Also, labour market regulation can act as a substitute for 
tax. For example, the government might try to achieve by reg-
ulation goals that it might otherwise have sought to achieve by 
taxation and the provision of subsidies. Indeed, the proponents 
of recent increases in the minimum wage in the UK have directly 
employed that argument.
Empirical evidence on labour market regulation
As with many of the other determinants of growth that have been 
discussed, when it comes to labour market regulation, there is 
the potential for reverse causality. In other words, though it is 
true that labour market regulation might affect growth, the level 
of national income may well help determine the extent of labour 
market regulation.12 This might happen through various channels. 
Notwithstanding this, various studies suggest that labour market 
10 For cross-country evidence that EPL hampers the adjustment process of product-
ivity and employment after shocks, see Burgess et al. (2000) and Caballero et al. 
(2004).
11 For more discussion of the theoretical literature on how regulation may affect la-
bour market outcomes and hence productivity, see Bassanini et al. (2009: 358–61).
12 Indeed, the influential paper by Botero et al. (2004) investigates how income deter-
mines EPL rather than the reverse.
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regulation is negatively associated with workforce participation 
and youth unemployment. Cause and effect are not, however, dis-
tinguished effectively in much of the work on these issues.
In general, the empirical literature does not offer a firm con-
sensus one way or another on the direction of impact of LMR on 
economic growth or on employment (Frontier Economics 2012). 
Whether it affects particular types of employment (for example, 
youth employment or long-term unemployment) is a different 
matter and not one considered here. DeFreitas and Marshall 
(1998) conduct an industry-level study (limited to manufactur-
ing) for a sample of Latin American and Asian countries, and 
find that increasing the stringency of employment protection 
legislation reduces labour productivity growth. However, studies 
of oECD countries by Nickell and Layard (1999) and Koeniger 
(2005) point to a weak but positive effect of raising the stringency 
of EPL on both total factor productivity (TFP) growth and R&D 
intensity. Though, of course, overall growth is determined by 
productivity and the level of employment (among other things) 
and it might be the case that labour market regulation increases 
productivity by excluding the least productive members of the 
labour force.
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) examine the impact of sur-
vey-based indices of hiring and firing regulations on labour mar-
ket outcomes for 21 oECD countries between 1984 and 1990. The 
regulatory indicators are based on the Global Competitiveness 
Report (published by the World Economic Forum), which surveys 
groups of business managers on the labour market conditions they 
face. They find that higher labour market flexibility is positively 
associated with the employment rate and with labour force partic-
ipation. Their estimates suggest that the difference in employment 
rates between France and the US would decrease by 14 per cent if 
France were to reduce regulatory strictness in the labour market 
to the US level. These results are in line with the earlier conclusions 
of Lazear (1990), who found in a panel of 22 developed countries 
Smith.indd   138 14-Oct-16   3:20:06 PM
TA x , R EGU L AT IoN A N D GRoW T H : U N DE R STA N DI NG T H E R E SE A RC H 
139
that severance pay and required notice periods were positively re-
lated to unemployment rates. The implication of that study is that 
the strictness of such regulations (or perceptions of it) do affect the 
hiring and firing decisions of firms.
Bassanini et al. (2009) use country-level data on EPL and 
industry-level productivity data for 11 oECD countries and 19 
industries, 1982–2003, arguing that the impact of EPL is likely 
to vary for different industries within the same country.13 They 
argue that the impact of reforms on productivity will be greater 
in industries where, in the absence of regulations, firms rely on 
layoffs to make staffing changes, rather than in industries where 
internal labour markets or voluntary turnover are more impor-
tant. Their estimates suggest that mandatory dismissal regula-
tions in oECD countries reduce TFP growth in industries with 
a high ‘natural’ rate of dismissal (as proxied by the US rate), to a 
disproportionate degree. This result is robust to sensitivity ana-
lysis surrounding the indicators and control variables.
However, they also note the importance of various political 
economy arguments that suggest that changes in TFP might af-
fect the extent of regulation. For example, there may be political 
pressure to protect jobs during a downturn, so that poorer eco-
nomic performance leads to more employment protection legis-
lation. Alternatively, some suggest that liberalising reforms are 
more frequently and easily implemented during economic crises 
(Drazen and Easterly 2001). Equally, reforms may be more likely 
to be implemented when the labour market is buoyant because 
the impact of reforms would be reduced. Through both channels, 
there might be a causal relationship between economic growth 
and labour market regulation. These features of the political 
process will make it difficult to distinguish cause from effect. 
13 The data used for industry-level TFP are taken from Inklaar and Timmer (2008), 
and indicators of EPL are the oECD indicators (oECD 2004): index of dismissal for 
regular employment, index for temporary contracts, and index on additional legis-
lation for concerning collective dismissals.
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Bassanini et al. (2009) do use various techniques to try to over-
come these problems and, overall, their evidence would seem 
to be robust.14 Their estimates imply that a 1 percentage point 
reduction in the stringency of employment protection legislation 
related to regular employment contracts will raise aggregate la-
bour productivity growth by 0.14 percentage points.
While Bassanini et al. (2009) look at the productivity effects 
of employment protection legislation, they do not distinguish 
between new and incumbent or small and larger firms. Millan 
et al. (2013) look at the impact of EPL on the smallest firms in 
a microeconometric study of individual-level data for the EU-15 
countries over the period 1994–2001. They find that EPL strin-
gency negatively affects the hiring and firing decisions of firms 
with one to four employees (i.e. the probabilities of employing 
new workers and dismissing current workers are both reduced), 
thus reducing labour flexibility for this class of firm. They em-
phasise the scale disadvantage applying to small firms in com-
plying with EPL, since hiring and firing costs constitute a bigger 
proportion of overall labour costs, and there is less potential to 
redirect underperforming workers into different roles within the 
firm.
Van Stel and Thurik (2007) look at the impact of regulation on 
nascent entrepreneurship (the proportion of the adult population 
actively involved in starting a new venture) and on the conver-
sion of nascent entrepreneurship into young entrepreneurship 
(the proportion of owner/managers of a business that is under 
42 months old) using data from 39 countries for 2002–5. The 
regulatory indicators are from the World Bank Doing Business 
Indicators. They find that employment protection legislation has 
a negative and significant impact on entrepreneurship rates.
14 The authors note that the robustness of these results depends on whether they have 
chosen good instruments; again we are at the mercy of Murray’s ‘dark cloud’ of in-
strument invalidity.
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Conclusion
There is a great deal of work on the impact of tax and regulation 
on economic growth and entrepreneurship. This work should 
be regarded as indicative rather than definitive. There are a 
number of problems inherent in this research, one of the most 
important being that it fails to distinguish between cause and 
effect.
Better statistical techniques have been used, but they have 
their own problems. It is for this reason that further modelling 
has been undertaken (see Chapter 8). This modelling requires a 
more rounded understanding of the channels by which tax and 
other variables affect growth. It seems clear that an important 
channel is that of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is difficult 
to measure and model, but the work that has been done suggests 
that high marginal tax rates at high incomes affect entrepre-
neurship. Furthermore, regulation that promotes either more or 
less self-employment or firm formation than would take place in 
a market without intervention tends to affect growth. Regulation 
of the labour market – which is often a substitute for taxes – also 
seems to affect growth.
The key is to tie these processes together in an analysis which 
unambiguously models the impact of entrepreneurship and 
the factors that affect it on growth, within a full account of the 
macroeconomy.
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8 TAX, REGULATION, INCENTIVES AND GROWTH: 
NEW MODELLING FOR THE UK
Lucy Minford
Entrepreneurship involves implementing new ideas in markets. 
If policy creates large frictions in this process, then a propor-
tion of innovative ideas will fail to be translated into product-
ivity growth. Further, the contention in this chapter is that for 
entrepreneurship to drive productivity growth, markets must 
be competitive. An uncompetitive market offers little reward for 
entrants to implement new ideas or to exploit perceived oppor-
tunities, so entrepreneurship and competition go hand-in-hand. 
If regulation acts as a barrier to entry, it will reduce both compe-
tition and entrepreneurship. If the entrepreneur cannot keep the 
rewards from implementing ideas because they are taken in tax 
or compliance costs, this will also discourage entrepreneurship.
In some new economic growth literature, entrepreneurs play a 
prominent role, particularly in the knowledge spillover theory of 
entrepreneurship. This characterises the entrepreneur as the con-
duit through which spillovers from established firms’ research and 
development raise economy-wide productivity (Acs et al. 2009). 
This theory recommends the removal of policy-induced ‘barriers 
to entrepreneurship’, including regulatory obstacles, excessive 
bureaucracy, taxes and labour market rigidities, all of which in-
crease operational costs and uncertainty for the entrepreneur.
Although we can point this out, determining the magni-
tude of the effects of changing tax rates and regulation on 
TAX, REGULATION, 
INCENTIVES AND 
GROWTH: NEW 
MODELLING FOR THE UK
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entrepreneurship and growth is not straightforward for the rea-
sons discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter a model is 
presented that will better isolate the effect of barriers to entre-
preneurship on growth. This model is subjected to a powerful 
test. The technique used tends to reject false models very firmly. 
Therefore, if its assumptions about the role of barriers to entre-
preneurship in growth are not right, the model will be rejected. 
The model is also effective at distinguishing cause from effect.
A model with productivity driven by policy
The model used here is known as an ‘open economy real business 
cycle model’ – see Meenagh et al. (2010) – with the addition of 
an endogenous growth process along the lines of Meenagh et al. 
(2007). This is explained more fully in L. Minford (2015a,b). What 
are these models in plain English and how do we test them?
Recent work in macroeconomics has followed the approach 
known as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) mod-
elling and tended to use the approach to testing originally due to 
Milton Friedman (1953). In this approach the model used is kept 
as simple as possible, so that its workings can be easily under-
stood. It is then confronted with the data to see if the model can 
explain the data. It is not the realism of the model that is neces-
sarily important but whether it explains the data.
This approach can follow two main paths. one is to ask 
whether the model could closely ‘forecast the past’: this is a famil-
iar method which relies on the size of the forecasting errors over 
the past and hence their likelihood. We do not use it here because 
such tests tend not to be as difficult to pass when the model has 
first been estimated on a small sample of data.
Another more recent method allows a tougher and more dis-
criminating test to be used. This involves seeing how the data 
behave according to some descriptive equations which relates 
the variables under consideration to their past values. This is 
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known as a vector autoregressive (VAR) model; it is used simply 
to summarise the data’s behaviour and is not based on any theory.
Assumptions about household behaviour
In this model it is assumed that there is a typical household and 
also a typical firm. The household determines its optimal con-
sumption and labour supply behaviour to maximise utility; the 
firm determines how much labour to hire from the household and 
its investment plans in order to maximise profits. Investment is 
financed by the firm borrowing from the household. Whatever 
profits the firm makes are transferred back to their owners as div-
idends. of course, those owners are also households. The economy 
consists of a lot of these typical household–firm pairs. To obtain 
the aggregate behaviour of the economy we simply multiply the 
behaviour of a typical pair by the numbers of them in the economy. 
The economy is assumed to be open to trade and also to foreign 
capital flows (in both directions). The growth process consists 
of the typical household (that owns its firm) spending time in 
an entrepreneurial role innovating, instead of as a worker hired 
for production. When it spends this time innovating it generates 
productivity growth for its firm.1 It chooses how much time to 
spend on innovation according to the trade-off between the higher 
expected return from this productivity growth coming via higher 
dividends and the sacrifice of ordinary labour income.
From these maximising decisions come a series of equations 
for consumer and producer behaviour which can be summarised 
as follows:
• Consumption increases if real interest rates fall and if future 
income rises.
1 Note, productivity is not treated as a public good in this model and so there is no 
spillover.
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• Investment increases if real interest rates fall and if expected 
future productivity increases.
• Innovation falls if tax and regulation rise because they lower 
its expected net return.
• Domestic real interest rates are driven to be equal to 
foreign real interest rates plus expected real exchange rate 
depreciation.
• Consumption of domestic relative to foreign products by 
home and foreign households rises if there is a fall in the 
relative price of domestic products, i.e. a fall in the real 
exchange rate.
These equations form the model. In addition, the model assumes 
that expectations are formed ‘rationally’, which means that they 
are consistent with the model’s forecasts.2 There are shocks to the 
model every period, generated by what are known as ‘error pro-
cesses’. These are the gap between what each model equation says 
and what the actual data implies. We can think of these gaps as the 
implied aspects omitted from the model that drive the economy.
How is the model tested?
When it comes to the variables that drive the model, they are as-
sumed to follow what are known as ‘auto-regressive’ processes 
that we observe from their past behaviour. By this we mean that 
the behaviour of each variable depends on its own past behav-
iour. When one of these variables, changes (for example, if there 
is an unexpected rise in consumption) we tend to observe that 
the effect of this shock continues into the following periods but 
to a reduced extent.
2 To emphasise, it is not the intention to have a model which is ‘realistic’ at a detailed 
level, but one which is a good approximation to the average behaviour in the econ-
omy – ‘good’ in the sense that such a model can generate behaviour that is close to 
that which is actually observed.
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The resulting model consists of a complete account of the 
economy. Different models will include different equations and 
variables, with the forecast errors implicitly representing the be-
haviour of those economic factors outside the model. Different 
models therefore, when simulated, generate quite different ver-
sions of what might happen in an economy (conditional on that 
model being correct). The implications of each distinct model 
can then be compared with the actual data in a formal test – at 
its best, this process allows us to choose between models accord-
ing to their test performance.
In the ‘indirect inference’ test procedure, we compare the be-
haviour of the model with the actual data and, if the probability 
of observing the actual data is low according to the model, we 
reject the model. This indirect inference test is an extremely pow-
erful test which tends to be effective in rejecting false models.
This model has been chosen as an appropriate backdrop 
against which to examine the relationship in the UK data between 
certain government policies and macroeconomic aggregates. 
The growth process is similar to Lucas (1990), in that productiv-
ity growth depends on investments of time in innovative activity. 
While growth in Lucas (1990) is driven by human capital accu-
mulation, here the growth mechanism is less specifically defined 
and is characterised ultimately by incentives. Temporary shocks 
relating to the policy variable are assumed to have highly persis-
tent effects so that there can be medium-run increases above or 
decreases below trend growth, even though the long-run rate of 
productivity growth is unchanged. This means that policy has 
transitional and reasonably long-lasting effects on growth, as 
well as permanent effects on the level of output through these 
shocks to growth.
We examine whether the model we have just described can ac-
commodate the behaviour of productivity and output in the UK 
between 1970 and 2009. Though a shorter sample would offer a 
richer set of potential indicators of the policy environment faced 
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by entrepreneurs, a longer time series dataset captures greater 
variation in policy behaviour within the UK. The 1970s reflect a 
policy regime in the UK in sharp contrast to the supply-side re-
forms of the 1980s and 1990s, and its inclusion adds significantly 
to the variation in the sample data which can be used to estimate 
and test the model.
The policy variables driving productivity
According to the model, government policy is a systematic driver 
of the level of productivity via the entrepreneurial activities 
which it either stimulates or discourages. In theory, it might be 
possible to construct a general variable which represents a set 
of policies that can disincentivise entrepreneurial activities. This 
variable could embrace any policy-related factor that reduces 
the expected return to entrepreneurial activities, or that raises 
the uncertainty attached to returns from entrepreneurship. We 
can also think of this policy variable as reflecting the extent to 
which the returns from higher productivity resulting from entre-
preneurial activity are not appropriated by the entrepreneur re-
sponsible for generating them. There are many possible variables, 
but we only model tax and regulation, the main issues discussed 
in Chapter 7.
Entrepreneurship is loosely defined following the synthesis of 
the entrepreneurship literature in Wennekers and Thurik (1999: 
46–47) as the ‘ability and willingness […] to perceive and create 
new economic opportunities […] and to introduce their ideas in 
the market, in the face of uncertainty and other obstacles […] it 
implies participation in the competitive process’. Clearly, this 
embraces diverse activities for which the policy- related incen-
tives are numerous and interact in complex ways (for example, 
it might include the complexity of the tax system for micro-busi-
nesses which itself might depend on the general level of regula-
tion in the economy and the level of taxes). Rich time series data 
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on business environments, such as the World Bank’s Doing Busi-
ness indicators, have only been systematically collected in recent 
years. Where pre-1990s’ data exist on the regulatory burdens 
surrounding business activities, they are patchy.
There is a distinction between productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship (Baumol 1990). Excessive regulatory or tax 
burdens can lead to unproductive entrepreneurship as indi-
viduals divert energy to avoidance or evasion, or to lobbying for 
the removal of regulation and tax burdens. Hence, the removal 
of such burdens should stimulate productivity growth. on the 
other hand, the introduction of subsidy programmes explicitly 
designed to incentivise entrepreneurship may lead to business 
start-ups that are not innovative and make no contribution to 
productivity growth, though they may reduce unemployment. 
For this reason, measures of new business creation or self-em-
ployment rates could be poor proxies for entrepreneurship as 
they group together both innovative and non-innovative start-
ups or small businesses together, while only a subset of these 
generate productivity growth. Thus, the chosen policy variables 
should capture only those aspects of the policy environment that 
lead to innovative business activity.
For example, we would want to exclude from the policy vari-
able the incentive, noted by Crawford and Freedman (2010), for 
an employee to become self-employed or for a self-employed 
person to incorporate purely for tax arbitrage purposes – since 
the activity undertaken is unchanged, there is no impact on 
productivity from changes in the incentives around its formal 
categorisation.
In practice, some policy measures which enhance produc-
tive entrepreneurship in some individuals may simultaneously 
encourage unproductive entrepreneurship in others. At the ag-
gregate level the focus is on the net impact of such policies on 
growth. If the net effect of cuts in the regulatory and tax burdens 
identified is to persuade people into entrepreneurial activities 
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which are less innovative or more risky, then we will find a neg-
ative relationship between the policy variable and entrepreneur-
ship, and this model, which suggests a positive relationship, will 
be rejected by the data.
Data for the policy variable
The underlying assumption in the model is that incentives affect 
growth through entrepreneurship. Those incentives are deter-
mined broadly by the tax and regulatory environment, which is 
multifaceted. However, if we try to incorporate too many of these 
aspects of the policy environment in one index, we risk obscur-
ing the policy conclusions, since various aspects could offset one 
another within the index. For these reasons, the model uses a sin-
gle policy index variable, made up of just a few key components 
suspected to affect entrepreneurship.
Measuring regulation
The UK index for the policy variable falls into two parts: regu-
lation and tax. on regulation, the focus (due to data range and 
availability) is on the labour market. Two components from the 
labour market subsection of the Economic Freedom of the World 
(EFW) indicators compiled by the Fraser Institute were used: 
the Centralized Collective Bargaining (CCB) index and the Man-
dated Cost of Hiring (MCH) index.3 of the labour market meas-
ures, these two components span the longest time frame: each is 
measured from 1970. The original data source for the CCB index 
is the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
(various issues), where survey participants answer the follow-
ing question: ‘Wages in your country are set by a centralized 
3 The EFW indicators are widely used in peer-reviewed empirical research; we have 
also conducted sensitivity tests around the indicators described in this section, 
and the conclusions are robust.
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bargaining process (= 1) or up to each individual company (= 7).’4 
The Fraser Institute converts these scores onto a [0,10] interval.
The MCH index is based on data from the World Bank’s Doing 
Business project, and reflects ‘the cost of all social security and 
payroll taxes and the cost of other mandated benefits including 
those for retirement, sickness, healthcare, maternity leave, fam-
ily allowance, and paid vacations and holidays associated with 
hiring an employee’ (Fraser Institute 2009). These costs are also 
converted to a [0,10] interval. These [0,10] scores are scaled to a 
[0,1] interval in our study.5
The information from the CCB and MCH indicators is used to 
create an index of labour market inefficiency, which is high when 
labour markets are inflexible: we label this the ‘Labour Market 
Regulation’ indicator (LMR).6 (See Figure 17.)
other types of regulation are not incorporated into the policy 
indicator. Not only are good quality measures largely unavailable 
spanning the full period under analysis but, as stated earlier, the 
inclusion of too many distinct series within the variable makes 
the policy interpretations of the test less clear. However, it is 
interesting to note that the correlation between the Fraser Insti-
tute measures of CCB and MCH and the oECD indicator of Prod-
uct Market Regulation (PMR) is of the order of 0.8 or above. This 
suggests that the LMR indicator ‘moves together’ with product 
market entry regulation during the sample period. However, we 
4 The precise wording of this question has differed slightly for different years.
5 The data from the Fraser Institute are also adjusted using information obtained 
from data on UK trade union membership (TUM) in order to provide more reliable 
data at greater frequency.
6 A full measure of regulatory burden in labour markets would also reflect all areas 
of employment protection legislation including costs of firing (see, for example, 
Botero et al. 2004), but data availability is a constraint. Correlations of our LMR 
indicators with oECD measures of EPL from 1985 for the UK are actually negative; 
our indicators do not fully capture the increases in dismissal regulation over the 
period and thus may slightly overstate the extent to which the UK labour market is 
‘deregulated’; however, the strong decline of collective bargaining and union power 
over the period represents the removal of significant labour market frictions.
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should not overstate the power of the LMR indicator to repre-
sent the regulatory landscape as a whole. For example, environ-
mental regulation and planning regulations are excluded, as is 
the impact of regulatory enforcement. Planning regulations in 
particular are thought to pose a serious barrier to UK businesses 
and one that has not been reduced significantly over the sam-
ple period (Crafts 2006; Frontier Economics 2012). Nevertheless, 
this regulatory indicator captures the general trend in UK policy, 
which has been to lower some important regulatory barriers to 
entrepreneurship relative to their 1970 level.
Measuring taxation
The second part of the barriers-to-entrepreneurship variable re-
flects the tax environment faced by the would-be entrepreneur. 
This environment is highly complex at the microeconomic level, 
depending on the inter-relationships between numerous individ-
ual tax and subsidy instruments, many of which were not in force 
throughout the full sample period. In the absence of a compre-
hensive measure of the ‘effective’ tax rate on the entrepreneur for 
the period from 1970 to 2009, the top marginal income tax rate 
is used as a proxy for the extent to which the proceeds of entre-
preneurial endeavour are not appropriable by the individual 
entrepreneur. This approach is taken by others such as Lee and 
Gordon (2005). The top marginal rate is measured as the tax rate 
incurred on an additional unit of income at the threshold of the 
top band, however the top band is defined in each period.7 This 
is not to say that every entrepreneur gets into the top income tax 
bracket; many entrepreneurial ventures fail or make little profit, 
and the expected return to entrepreneurship is generally small. 
However, the top marginal tax rate is intended as a proxy for the 
7 Since the level of progressivity in the income tax schedule changes considerably 
over the sample period, the definition of the top band varies and that variation is 
not captured in this measure.
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profit motive that is central to the notion of entrepreneurship, 
as we have defined it. other empirical work suggests that this is 
appropriate.8
There may be an argument for including the SME rate of cor-
poration tax in the index, on the basis that reductions in this rate 
lower the costs of running a new business. An argument against 
assuming that lower corporation tax might enhance productive 
entrepreneurship is that, as mentioned above, reducing corpo-
ration tax relative to other forms of taxation (employee or self- 
employed labour income) distorts incentives to incorporate at 
the small end of the business size distribution in a way that has 
nothing to do with productivity growth. This seems to have hap-
pened in the UK when the SME corporation tax rate and starting 
8 Note the result in Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello (2014) that a reduction in marginal 
tax rates at the top of the income distribution relative to the marginal tax rate at 
average earnings increases entrepreneurship.
Figure 17 Labour market regulation, top marginal income tax and 
corporation tax rates
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rate on profits under £10,000 were repeatedly cut between 1997 
and 2002 (Crawford and Freedman 2010). Therefore the corpora-
tion tax rate has not been included in the main policy variable 
index. However, an alternative policy variable constructed from 
the labour market indicator and the corporation tax rate (in 
place of the top marginal income tax rate) has been used to check 
the robustness of the results.
The top marginal income tax rate is measured annually. Be-
tween measurement points it is constant until policy changes. 
The series falls consistently over the sample period until 2009 
with the introduction of the 50p tax rate on income over £150,000.
The behaviour of the tax and regulatory variables
The tax and regulatory components of the policy variable indices 
are plotted in Figure 17. The correlations between top marginal 
income tax rates, the corporation tax rate and the two labour 
market regulation indicators are shown in Table 17.
The high positive correlation between the series support the 
decision to combine the labour market regulation indicator and 
the top marginal income tax rate in a simple average. This equal-
ly weighted combination is the main index that proxies barriers 
to entrepreneurship in the empirical work below. The main index 
is plotted in Figure 18.
The index that combines the regulatory variable with the in-
come tax rate falls over most of the sample period. It does not 
fall smoothly, largely because any changes in tax rates occur at 
irregular intervals and can often be quite substantial. From the 
point of view of investigating the effect of tax and regulation on 
growth, the important point is that there is a lot of movement 
around the general trend and this helps us to produce a viable 
model to examine the effect of changes in the tax and regulation 
variable. The key issue is whether such movements actually cause 
changes in productivity growth.
Smith.indd   153 14-Oct-16   3:20:08 PM
TA x AT IoN, G oV E R N M E N T SPE N DI NG A N D ECoNoM IC GRoW T H
154
Tests of the model
In order to test the model, as well as the main index discussed 
above, results were calculated for two other measures of the tax 
and regulatory variable. As such, the first variable used is an 
equally weighted average of the labour market regulation index 
and the top marginal tax rate on personal income (the main 
index). The focus of our discussion will be on the results using 
this variable. The other two variables are used as tests of robust-
ness. The second variable that is used is a combination of the 
labour market regulation index and the small company tax rate 
on corporate profits. And the third variable is the labour market 
regulation index alone.
The model test results suggest a high degree of confidence that 
the model is a good approximation of the underlying reality. The 
results from estimating the model led to a comfortable non-rejec-
tion9 for the UK output and TFP behaviour. As well as being effec-
tive at explaining growth and productivity, the model performed 
well when assessed for its ability to match the behaviour of a var-
iety of variables – not just productivity and output but also real 
interest rate and real exchange rate behaviour, as well as physical 
capital, labour supply and consumption in various combinations.
9 It is common to talk about ‘non-rejection’ rather than ‘acceptance’. There might be 
other models that describe the behaviour of the economy too. The point is that, in 
statistical terms, the evidence suggests that this model cannot be rejected.
Table 17 Correlation coefficients for tax and regulatory components of 
composite index
Centralised
collective bargaining
Mandated cost of 
hiring
Top marginal income tax rates 0.786 0.623
Corporate tax (SME rate) 0.868 0.700
Note: (1 = measures are perfectly correlated, 0 = uncorrelated and negative value means that an 
increase in one of the variables tends to be associated with a decrease in the other).
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There is further discussion of these issues in L. Minford 
(2015a,b). Further checks on the robustness of the results show 
that non-rejection of the model is not sensitive to the composi-
tion of the policy index.10 However, the inclusion of the top mar-
ginal income tax rate, with its large step changes, does get the 
model closer to the data.
Results: the impact of regulation and tax on growth
What interests us most about tax and regulatory policy in the UK 
growth model is what will happen when there is (for example) a 
10 percentage point fall in the measured tax/regulation rate rela-
tive to the trend change in the variable. The model suggests that the 
effect of a 10 percentage point fall in the de-trended tax–regulation 
variable in a given quarter dies out over around ten years. In other 
words, the change that is modelled is not a permanent change. In 
line with what tends to happen in practice in a country governed 
by a democracy, the model examines what will happen to growth if 
10 Further sensitivity tests were also done around the construction and interpolation 
of the labour market index components.
Figure 18 The overall barriers to entrepreneurship measure
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a government reduces taxes or regulation, but where the tax level 
goes back to its long-run trend over ten years.
Such a 10 percentage point reduction in the index of tax and 
regulation produces a rise in output over about thirty years of 
24 per cent. This is equivalent to a higher growth rate over a 
 thirty-year ‘growth episode’ following the cut of about 0.8 per-
centage points per annum (an ‘elasticity’ of 0.16). The reason 
that the consequence of the change is spread over such a long 
period is likely to be that capital accumulation and the effects 
of capital accumulation take a long time to react fully to the 
rise in total factor productivity produced by the tax change. In 
other words, the impact of the tax change is substantial and 
long lasting.
It is not possible, formally, to separate out the effects of the 
tax component and the regulatory component of the barriers 
to entrepreneurship index because the model was only fully 
estimated for the combined index – tax might be more impor-
tant in affecting growth than regulation or it may be the other 
way round: it is impossible to tell. However, when we look at 
the barriers to entrepreneurship index itself, changes in the tax 
rate are driving most of the change in the index. As such, and 
given other tests that have been done on the model, it would not 
be unreasonable to conclude that the impact of the tax–regula-
tion index that we see here is driven to a substantial degree by 
changes in tax rates.11
11 It is important to note that the change in the tax-regulation index is a change in 
addition to the change which is already occurring due to downward trend in the 
index. The 10 percentage point reduction in the policy index is a shock on top of the 
systematic (or ‘deterministic’) reduction which tends to happen each period in the 
sample. Therefore, for a policymaker to obtain the simulated impact of a 10 percent-
age points shock on the growth rate, they would need to reduce the tax–regulatory 
policy variable in absolute terms by more than 10 percentage points given that 
the trend is downwards. In other words, the model is testing what will happen to 
growth if policymakers do something over and above the natural trends that are 
happening in policy anyway.
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What can we say about the effect of tax alone? Technical-
ly, nothing of a quantitative nature. In this model, growth is 
driven by barriers to entrepreneurship, and both tax and 
regulation form such barriers. However, given that changes 
in the tax–regulation index are driven to a substantial degree 
by changes in tax rates, it is highly likely that an unexpected 
change in top marginal tax rates would affect growth. For the 
barriers to entrepreneurship index to be so strongly related 
to growth and yet for the main variable driving change in the 
index not to be related to growth is implausible. The index is a 
proxy for barriers to entrepreneurship and tax is one of those 
barriers.
But, given the use of regulation as an alternative to or com-
plement to tax policies, there is a strong case for modelling both 
together as has been done here.
of less importance is the estimated immediate marginal im-
pact of the tax–regulation policy variable on the change in prod-
uctivity. This was found to be –0.12, implying that a 1 percentage 
point reduction in the tax–regulation variable increases product-
ivity growth in the next quarter by 0.12 percentage points. This is 
a very considerable effect. However, it is the longer-run effect on 
economic growth that is more important.
Conclusion
In this chapter, a model of the economy has been developed in 
which productivity growth is partly driven by temporary move-
ments in tax and regulatory policy around a long-run trend. The 
impact on productivity growth arises from incentive effects on 
innovative entrepreneurial activity. The model has been tested 
over the period from 1970 to 2009 (L. Minford 2015b). The tax and 
regulatory policy environment for this period is proxied by an 
equally weighted combination of the top marginal rate of person-
al income tax and a labour market regulation index. The latter is a 
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combination of a survey-based centralised collective bargaining 
indicator and an index of the mandated cost of hiring calculated 
by the World Bank. This tax and regulation index, which can be 
regarded as a proxy for ‘barriers to entrepreneurship’, does have 
an effect on growth. This is not a controversial finding in the con-
text of the literature – much empirical work on oECD samples 
has reached similar conclusions – but the methodology used 
here renders these results less open to the criticisms commonly 
levelled at existing work in this area, since it cannot be argued 
that reverse causality is at work.
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9 THE PRINCIPLES OF A ‘GOOD’ TAX SYSTEM
Rory Meakin
L’art de l’ imposition consiste à plumer l’oie pour obtenir le plus 
possible de plumes avec le moins possible de cris1
Jean-Baptiste Colbert, 
finance minister to the French king, Louis xIV
Classical maxims of taxation
Jean-Baptiste Colbert probably meant his famous seven-
teenth-century maxim on the art of taxation to mean that a tax 
system ought to raise as much money as possible without people 
noticing. That is certainly not how a good tax system should op-
erate. But while a good tax system should not attempt to evade 
taxpayers’ notice, it should try to do its job of confiscating money 
with as little pain as possible for taxpayers and the wider econ-
omy. A century later, in 1776, Adam Smith listed four maxims of 
tax systems which have largely stood the test of time: proportion-
ality, certainty, convenience and efficiency.
Proportionality Subjects should ‘contribute towards the sup-
port of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to 
1 In English, ‘the art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the 
largest possible amount of feathers with the smallest possible amount of hissing.’
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their respective abilities: that is, in proportion to the revenue 
which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state’ 
(Smith 1776: 639).
Certainty Tax should be ‘certain, and not arbitrary. The time of 
payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought 
all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other 
person.’ Smith was careful to note the risks involved with giv-
ing inspectors discretion and his warning about the dangers of 
uncertainty chime presciently with recent public disquiet about 
taxes due and payable, especially under Britain’s complex corpo-
rate tax code.
Convenience Tax should be ‘levied at the time, or in the manner, 
in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to 
pay it.’ For example, he suggests that tax on rents should be pay-
able ‘at the same term at which such rents are usually paid, is 
levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for the 
contributor to pay; or, when he is most likely to have wherewithal 
to pay’ (Smith 1776: 640).
Efficiency Tax should be ‘so contrived as both to take out and to 
keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and 
above what it brings into the public treasury of the state’ (Smith 
1776: 640). Smith lists four reasons why taxes can be inefficient: 
administration, tax wedge, costs associated with evasion and 
compliance burdens.
Bringing Adam Smith up to date
As Mirrlees et al. (2011) noted in Tax by Design, these four 
maxims are almost truisms, not least because they ‘may com-
mand near-universal support’ (p. 22). It is hard to imagine many 
objecting to the latter three, but many do reject proportionate 
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tax in favour of progressive tax rates. Some objections to pro-
portionality rest on a theoretical basis that, because the utility 
of income falls as income rises, a bigger proportional monetary 
sacrifice by a richer person might involve the same sacrifice of 
utility.
In the context of a progressive system, Mirrlees et al. assumed 
that the particular distributional outcomes were given and sug-
gested four objectives insofar as other aspects of the tax system 
were concerned:
• To minimise negative effects on welfare and economic 
efficiency.
• To minimise administration and compliance costs.
• To maximise fairness other than in a distributional sense 
(that is, fairness of procedure, avoidance of discrimination 
and meeting legitimate expectations).
• To maximise transparency: an understandable system is 
preferable to one that taxes by ‘stealth’.
To achieve these objectives, they suggest that simple, neutral 
and stable systems will perform more effectively than complex, 
biased and fickle ones.
Mankiw et al. (2009) expanded on Smith’s maxims, proposing 
eight additional principles from the optimal taxation economics 
literature. Some of the more important ones are listed below.
Optimal margin distributions
Higher marginal rates are less damaging when the rise in mar-
ginal rates affects fewer people at the margin and more people 
infra-marginally. For example, the 40 per cent tax rate is now 
the marginal rate paid by about 4.5 million people, more than 
doubling from the 2.1 million who paid the 40 per cent tax rate 
in 1997. This is more damaging than, for example, a tax system 
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where a smaller number paid 40 per cent tax at the margin but 
which had the same average tax take (for example, because of 
higher rates further down the income scale).
Optimal marginal rates could decline at high incomes
Mankiw et al. summarise the argument from Mirrlees by using 
the following example: ‘Suppose there is a positive marginal tax 
rate on the individual earning the top income in an economy, 
and suppose that income is y. The positive marginal tax rate has 
a discouraging effect on the individual’s effort, generating an 
efficiency cost. If the marginal tax rate on that earner was re-
duced to zero for any income beyond y, then the same amount 
of revenue would be collected and the efficiency costs would be 
avoided. Thus, a positive marginal tax on the top earner can-
not be optimal’ (Mankiw et al. 2009: 7). Given this, it is highly 
likely that optimal rates (in terms of the trade-off they generate 
between loss of economic welfare and the tax take) will actually 
decline with income.
A flat rate tax plus a lump sum transfer could be optimal
The theoretical ideas behind this are complex. However, progres-
sivity could be achieved by having a lump sum transfer to all 
people (which would be progressive because it would be a big-
ger proportion of income for the poor) and a flat tax rate (which 
would avoid the problem of rising marginal rates).
Only final goods should be taxed, and uniformly so
With some exceptions, such as where so-called Pigovian taxes 
are used to reflect the negative spillover effects of certain eco-
nomic activities, taxes should not distort consumption patterns. 
As such, goods and services should be taxed uniformly. We 
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should not try to help the poor by exempting from tax items pre-
dominantly bought by the poor because transfer payments and 
progressive income tax schedules are much more effective and 
economically efficient ways to help the poor.
Capital income should be untaxed
Because the supply of capital is highly elastic, especially in an 
open economy, capital taxes discourage investment dispropor-
tionately and, consequently, reduce productivity. Furthermore, 
taxes on capital income tax intermediate inputs (capital) into 
future outputs, the production and consumption of which are 
themselves taxed.
Sophistication and redistribution
Additionally, the authors concluded that taxes should be more 
sophisticated, with separate schedules by age cycles and tags for 
a range of personal characteristics. They also suggested that op-
timal redistribution rises with increased income inequality.
Practical impediments to achieving the best 
tax systems
Clearly, devising an economically ‘perfect’ tax system is an im-
possible task, even if the principles can be agreed upon. Many of 
the principles identified in the literature conflict with others. For 
example, satisfying the objective of minimising administration 
and compliance costs would involve a simpler system, partly to 
ensure that it is more widely understood and therefore reduces 
welfare losses associated with economic activity discouraged 
by tax uncertainty. However, more sophisticated systems that 
adjust marginal rates in order to minimise losses due to the dis-
couragement of work and productivity would make the system 
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more complicated and less simple. It is not clear where the bal-
ance should lie between the different principles.
Furthermore, the economic principles enunciated above 
might conflict with political and ethical principles which might 
make reform both unpopular and also potentially ineffective. 
This is especially true if reforms to tax systems effect long-term 
behavioural changes which are beyond the scope of economic 
modelling. For example, a reformed tax system which creates 
a less distortive incentive framework might also be perceived 
as unfair by enough people to undermine its legitimacy, which 
could in turn lead to a broader acceptance of avoidance and eva-
sion. This matters because it would mean governments would 
have to place a heavier burden on compliant taxpayers to raise 
a given amount of revenue, increasing distortions arising from 
avoidance and evasion and also increasing the costs of compli-
ance and administration.
A fundamental problem with tax reform is that any reform at all 
conflicts with the principle of stability. This problem is amplified 
by a potential conflict with certain measures of fairness when a 
reform involves an increase in liabilities or an increase in tax rates 
for particular activities and it is difficult for people engaged in such 
activities to transfer out of them. So, when a liability is increased, 
it can impose an effectively retrospective burden on the taxpayer, 
even if the tax is only due on future activity. For example, a tax-
payer may have invested time, effort and money in education, the 
acquisition of skills or the creation of a business, the fruits of which 
were only ever expected to be reaped in the future. Even if a reform 
corrects an existing unfairness, it may create a new one in this way.
More specifically, many tax reform proposals which are based 
on sound optimal taxation theory appear weaker when they 
are translated into practical policy recommendations, predom-
inantly due to administrative difficulties in implementation or 
critiques of the modelling. For example, proposals to reform 
property taxation by replacing existing taxes with a land value 
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tax are based on strong neutrality and efficiency principles but 
suffer from substantial practical administrative difficulties. 
The efficiency rationale supporting a land value tax rests on the 
exceptionally low level of distortion its implementation should 
cause. The reason for this is that it should be wholly levied on the 
economic rent of land ownership, which ought to have a minimal 
or no impact on landowner incentives to add value by improv-
ing property. What can efficiently be taxed is only the value of 
the land’s wilderness state and any potential arising from its 
proximity to external amenities. In other words, a plot’s residual 
value after any improvements have been subtracted. one prob-
lem is designing a system which can value only this component 
of a property’s value without those valuations being affected by 
improvements that might range from forest-clearing to build-
ings. Another problem with a land value tax is that it effectively 
represents a confiscation of an asset class that was lawfully and 
properly acquired at a price that was based on the assumption 
that there would be no land value tax levied.
Proposals for a redesign of the tax system
The most significant tax policy reviews have sought to change 
the tax system so that it more closely adheres to the principles 
set out in Smith, Mirrlees et al. and Mankiw et al. as discussed 
above. The two recent significant reviews of the whole UK tax 
system are those from the TaxPayers’ Alliance and the Institute 
of Directors (The Single Income Tax) and the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (Tax by Design).
In The Single Income Tax, Heath et al. (2012) summarised a wide 
range of justifications for limits on the scope of taxation, offered a 
rigorous critique of the UK system and then proposed a major re-
form programme based on ethical constraints, popular opinion and 
technical efficiency. Relevant literature (from ethics and scripture 
to polling data and economic theory) was extensively reviewed and 
Smith.indd   175 14-Oct-16   3:20:10 PM
TA x AT IoN, G oV E R N M E N T SPE N DI NG A N D ECoNoM IC GRoW T H
176
reforms to strengthen radically the neutrality and transparency of 
the system were justified on the grounds of maximising economic 
welfare, fairness and public legitimacy and confidence in the sys-
tem through substantial simplification. The question of how these 
aims might be reconciled when they conflict with each other, how-
ever, was not directly addressed, at least theoretically.
Two decisions by Heath et al. reveal the principles behind 
their proposals. The first, to recommend that tax as a share of 
national income was reduced to one third, which matched the 
mean average response in then-recent polling on the desired size 
of the state, illustrates the importance of public opinion and pop-
ular legitimacy of the tax system. Secondly, their rejection of the 
case to extend the standard rate of VAT to zero and reduced-rate 
items despite acknowledging its economic efficiency, reveals a 
scepticism about the net efficiency gains once the cost of ame-
liorating benefit changes have been accounted for, and also an 
assessment that the welfare costs arising from direct taxes are a 
more pressing concern than those from indirect taxes.
Heath et al. recommended a single income tax charged at 
30 per cent (hence abolishing national insurance, capital gains 
tax and corporation tax); devolving tax-raising powers to local 
authorities; and abolishing stamp duty land tax, stamp duty on 
shares, inheritance tax and air passenger duty. No significant 
changes were proposed for other consumption taxes.
The authors did, however, propose substantial changes to 
local taxation. They recommended devolving more responsibility 
for tax-raising to local authorities and proposed increasing the 
share of local government spending in total government spend-
ing from its then current level of around a quarter to at least 
half. They proposed fully devolving business rates, permitting a 
local sales tax and devolving six percentage points of income tax 
receipts (from income to labour only) to local authorities. They 
rejected devolving VAT and income and other taxes on capital 
income for administrative reasons.
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Mirrlees et al. (2011) also proposed substantial reform but 
said little about the overall burden of tax. They too proposed 
merging income tax with national insurance and abolishing 
the £100,000 personal allowance limit, which they described as 
‘pointless complexities’. They also proposed abolishing stamp 
duties. However, their approach to addressing the debt–equity 
bias in corporate finance was to recommend an allowance for 
corporate equity, an approach also favoured by Keable-Elliott 
and Papworth (2015).
Mirrlees et al. recommended significant property and con-
sumption tax reforms. Beyond abolishing stamp duty, they 
called for council tax to be replaced by a housing consumption 
services tax intended to be similar to VAT, applicable to both 
rented and owner-occupied property. Business rates would be 
replaced by a land value tax and inheritance tax by a wealth 
transfer tax. Almost all exempt, reduced and zero-rated items 
would be subject to VAT, with increases in transfers to protect 
low-income groups.
While the authors did suggest bold reforms to the two main 
local taxes – business rates and council tax – they did not dir-
ectly comment on the level or range of taxes which ought to be 
available to local government, except to note the ‘fact that land 
and property have identifiable and unchangeable geographic lo-
cations also makes them natural tax bases for the financing of 
local government’ (Mirrlees et al. 2011: 368).
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the two 
proposals was their remits. Mirrlees et al. did not address the 
size of the spending and tax ambitions of the state and treated 
them as exogenous. They also were content to recommend re-
form which implied substantial tax increases for certain groups 
with reductions for others. Heath et al., however, recommended 
a level of taxation which allowed substantial cuts in total and 
avoided tax rises for any substantial group. This difference does 
not lend itself well to direct comparison of the two approaches 
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to the same problem. However, it does highlight that substantial 
and meaningful tax reform will always involve political hurdles 
in the form either of spending cuts to ensure nobody loses, or of 
tax rises to ensure that spending levels are maintained.
Other simplification proposals
Most other reform proposals have broadly echoed the approach of 
either combining a reduction in the tax share of national income 
with a substantial simplification of rates, thresholds and bases 
(as in Heath et al.) or have proposed pursuing the twin aims of 
simplification and realignment of tax with economic principles 
as recommended by Mirrlees et al.
Bourne (2014: 9) recommended a ‘simple, coherent marginal 
rate structure which is as flat as possible’, including national in-
surance and benefit withdrawal, arguing that ‘significantly lower 
levels of government spending could facilitate substantial margin-
al tax rate cuts’.
Herring (2015) recommended simplifying taxes which raise 
less than £5 billion annually by merging them with other taxes or 
abolishing them while cutting and rationalising operations, rates 
and thresholds for larger taxes. Measures included alignment 
of national insurance with income tax (with a view to merger), 
merging inheritance tax with capital gains tax, abolishing the 
additional income tax rate (currently 45 per cent) and allowing 
trading companies to become tax transparent on a similar basis 
to the US ‘S-corporations’ regime.
Proposals for a tax system to promote growth
of course, the proposals discussed above would have a side-ef-
fect of promoting growth. However, some discussions of the 
tax system have considered growth as the first-order reason for 
reform. In Tax Policy Reform and Economic Growth, the oECD 
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(2010) recommended broadening tax bases of both consumption 
and income taxes. It regarded recurrent taxes on immovable 
property (i.e. not taxes on property transfer) as the least damag-
ing tax. This was followed by consumption taxes as the next least 
damaging, personal income taxes and then corporate income 
taxes. Inheritance taxes were also described as having low neg-
ative incentive effects, partly because a large fraction of inher-
itances are unplanned. The oECD also suggest grouping reforms 
together as linked packages rather than isolated proposals can 
help overcome objections.
Saatchi (2014), however, recommended a move away from 
neutrality by abolishing corporation tax for small companies 
and capital gains tax for investors in small companies. The 
proposal carries substantial risks of avoidance and distortions 
but Saatchi justifies them on the grounds of the reduced ad-
ministrative costs, correction of existing regulatory distortions 
against small companies, labour and capital responsiveness to 
lower rates and it being only the ‘first step’ towards a broader 
reform.
Property and wealth tax reform proposals
Lawton and Reed (2013: 13) conclude: ‘it does not appear that 
housing is particularly undertaxed as an investment in the UK 
on average, although it is probably undertaxed as a consumption 
good’. In other words, perhaps the main recurrent housing prop-
erty tax (council tax) is not too high or should be supplemented 
with other forms of tax, but stamp duty is too high. The authors 
suggest that council tax could be either reformed with a new rate 
structure or replaced with a residential property value tax. They 
also acknowledged the economic distortion caused by stamp 
duty land tax but proposed only converting the structure from 
a slab rate to a marginal rate one (a reform which has since been 
implemented).
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Tax design rules
The primary function of a good tax system should be to raise 
money for necessary government spending while causing the 
least damage possible. The secondary function should be to 
charge people with the spillover costs of their economic activ-
ity that they create which would otherwise be borne by others. 
To meet these objectives, a good tax system should adhere to 
four rules based on the principles set out by optimal taxation 
literature.
Tax should be transparent and certain
Transparency and certainty within the tax system requires, in 
turn, that the following criteria apply.
• There should be a broad understanding of the basic facts of 
who pays how much and when.
• Rules, thresholds, schedules and rates should be as simple 
as possible. There should be as few rates and thresholds as 
possible.
• Tax should be codified so that taxpayers know what is 
expected and can arrange their affairs accordingly with any 
ambiguity kept to a minimum.
• A formal tax strategy should be adopted, with changes 
announced in advance with explanations how each helps 
implement the strategy or why a breach of the strategy is 
necessary.
Taxes should be as neutral as possible
Where feasible, this should be achieved by applying the same tax 
at the same rate to different activities. In special cases, separate-
ly designed taxes should attempt to ensure neutrality.
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Marginal rates should be low
To minimise disincentives (except for taxes expressly designed to 
make those involved in economic activity pay the external costs 
caused by that activity) tax rates should be comfortably on the 
left slope of relevant Laffer curves – in other words set so that 
any losses in revenue resulting from reduced economic growth 
are relatively low.
Pigovian taxes
Taxes designed to charge people for the costs that their activi-
ties impose on others should be set at a level to cover those costs 
alone at the margin. They should not be used to ‘punish’ particu-
lar activities or to raise revenue that goes beyond the revenue 
that would be raised from setting the taxes at the level necessary 
to reflect the external costs of the activity.
These design rules are usually complementary. Simpler tax sys-
tems are usually also less distortionary, more administratively 
efficient and more neutral. However, sometimes the rules will 
conflict. When conflicts arise, the rules should normally be 
applied in the order given. Transparency should normally take 
precedence over neutrality, which should in turn be favoured over 
efficiency. This is because government should not, as a matter of 
principle, fail to be as open as it can reasonably be to its citizens 
about the money it takes from them. Tax is morally problematic 
enough when applied honestly and transparently (see Butler in 
Heath et al. 2012: 79–87). These moral problems are exacerbated 
the more that tax is opaque and citizens do not know how money 
is taken, and how much is taken.
There is also a practical objection to sacrificing transpar-
ency for efficiency. It is difficult to know what the effects are of 
the uncertainty, suspicion and mistrust that can arise under a 
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system that is not sufficiently transparent to gain widespread 
legitimacy. The more opaque a tax system is, the less likely 
people are to be sure that everyone is paying a fair share of the 
burden, which, in turn, may lead people to be more inclined to 
avoid or evade their own taxes so that a culture of avoidance 
rather than compliance develops. This can be exacerbated by 
inaccurate media reports that result from journalists misun-
derstanding the system.
Whether efficiency or neutrality should take precedence is less 
clear. Neutrality may imply a single rate across a range of activ-
ities – or across different products in the case of a consumption 
tax. However, there is a different response of demand to changes 
in price across different products. In theory, taxes should be 
lower on a product if the change in demand caused by the tax is 
greater. However, varying tax rates in this way would breach the 
transparency and neutrality rules.
Normally, neutrality should be preferred over efficiency be-
cause a neutrality rule is more realistically achievable and offers 
more certainty. There may be cases, however, where the eco-
nomic inefficiency caused by tax neutrality is so great that it out-
weighs the normal preference for neutrality. By way of example, 
where capital is highly mobile, a tax on the foreign earnings of 
non-domiciled individuals (who are exempt from such a tax) may 
cause such individuals to leave the country and actually reduce 
tax revenues. The exemption breaches the neutrality rule, both 
between domiciled and non-domiciled taxpayers, and between 
foreign and domestic income of non-domiciled taxpayers. But 
such a breach may be preferable to the disproportionate breach 
of the efficiency principle that would arise from taxing such 
earnings.
A Pigovian tax designed to deal with negative spillovers be-
comes arbitrary and distortionary to the extent to which the 
tax exceeds external costs of the relevant economic activity. In 
some cases, it is possible for a tax on a product or activity that 
Smith.indd   182 14-Oct-16   3:20:11 PM
T H E PR I NC I PL E S oF A ‘G ooD’ TA x S y ST E M 
183
only reflects external costs to be arbitrary and distortionary, 
too. This is especially the case if an activity is taxed but close 
substitutes or those that have similar social costs are not. For 
example, a tax on fizzy drinks containing sugars that is not 
applied to ‘smoothies’ or other foods containing high levels 
of sugar would certainly be arbitrary and, potentially, distor-
tionary (because people may switch to smoothies only for tax 
reasons even though they prefer fizzy drinks which might have 
the same level of social costs attached). The administrative 
costs of the tax, together with the welfare cost to consumers 
who switch to the ‘second best’ substitute, could outweigh the 
welfare gains associated with the reduction of excess consump-
tion by those whose consumption is discouraged but who do 
not switch to substitutes.
Tax design rules to disregard
Sin taxes
Taxes on activities that impose costs on others can be justified 
on the basis of maximising efficiency and ensuring that the full 
costs of economic activities are incurred by those undertake 
those activities. They also reduce welfare losses insofar as they 
allow damaging taxes to be reduced. Sin taxes simply levied on 
activities of which other people disapprove fail to meet these 
criteria. Alcohol and tobacco duties offer an example of the line 
between a sin tax and a ‘Pigovian’ tax to reflect external costs. In 
a country in which the treatment for conditions associated with 
consumption of the products is socialised, the extent to which 
a duty reflects that cost (and funds the treatment) makes it a 
Pigovian tax. However, the extent to which the duties exceed the 
external costs defines them either as an arbitrary consumption 
tax for raising revenue, or as a sin tax to compel people to change 
their behaviour. As it happens, individuals have very different 
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capacities to consume alcohol and tobacco with differing de-
grees of harm, which means that the same tax can operate effec-
tively as a Pigovian tax for some but wholly or largely as a sin tax 
for others. of course, it is not realistic to design the tax system to 
avoid this problem.
Fairness
A good tax system should operate fairly in many ways. However, 
there is no sense of fairness in itself which does not arise from 
other principles and rules, such as economic efficiency, neutral-
ity and the rule of proportionality described by Smith. In so far as 
‘fairness’ involves playing by the rules and following established 
principles (the traditional meaning of the word), the principle 
should be embedded in any tax system that has the character-
istics described above. However, if we take fairness to mean that 
the result of the tax system should produce a particular distri-
bution of incomes that we regard as ‘fair’, the concept takes on a 
wholly subjective and unworkable meaning. No specific usefully 
definition of ‘fair’ will ever gain full agreement from more than a 
tiny number of people.
Progressivity
There is no intrinsic merit in the progressiveness of a tax system. 
A good tax system that aims to be neutral, economically efficient, 
transparent and proportionate may exhibit some progressivity. 
But how successfully a tax system helps the poor (or avoids fur-
ther impoverishing them) should not be judged by how relatively 
damaging it is to the rich by comparison with them. More so 
than the rich or people on middle incomes, the poor are likely to 
become unemployed if the tax system does not nurture growth 
and enterprise. The poor benefit substantially and often dispro-
portionately from strong economic growth, low unemployment, 
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high productivity and high wages. How a tax system best sup-
ports these aims, particularly over the long term, should there-
fore be reflected in an assessment of how successfully a tax sys-
tem treats the poor. We should not just consider the first-round 
effects of taxing rich people proportionately more than poor 
people.
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10 WHAT SHOULD A GOOD TAX SYSTEM LOOK LIKE?
Rory Meakin
The previous chapter reviewed the principles that underpin a 
good tax system, the practical impediments that might arise and 
those principles that can be disregarded. We now examine the 
kind of tax system that the application of the principles we have 
discussed might produce. We consider taxes on income, con-
sumption and wealth, and then corporate and local taxes. Finally, 
we list the ‘tax death-row’ of the current system – that is, those 
existing taxes that should have no place in a good tax system.
Tax on income
The evidence suggests that flatter rates of income tax are more ef-
ficient. A single rate of income tax across all income types would 
make a tax system transparent, neutral and less distortive. The 
proposals advanced by Heath et al. (2012) for a single income tax at 
a single rate, which would operate as the existing income tax does 
on self-assessed earnings and pay-as-you-earn income but through 
a new administrative regime for income from the corporate sector, 
offer the most compelling reform programme for taxes on income.
The taxes considered to be income taxes by the authors in-
clude both employee and employer national insurance as well 
as corporation tax1 and capital gains tax, which is correctly 
1 See the section on corporate taxes for further discussion of employer’s national 
insurance and corporation tax.
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identified as a duplicated tax on the increase in the net present 
value of future expected income from an asset.2
The two key features of the proposal were, firstly, a single tax 
on all income types, and, secondly, a single rate of tax, often re-
ferred to as a ‘flat’ rate. The benefit of a single rate is the neutral-
ity and simplicity it offers. As well as the obvious consequence of 
having only one tax rate to remember and calculate, by remov-
ing incentives for taxpayers to shift earnings from one type to 
another it also eliminates the need for much of the monitoring, 
anti-avoidance measures and compliance mechanisms involved 
with policing the distinctions inherent within the system. Decid-
ing how to receive and distribute income, and whether to struc-
ture it in the form of employment, self- employment, dividends, 
share buy-backs, contingent loan interest or personal service 
companies should become purely commercial ones, undertaken 
only for reasons of efficiency and governance.
The obvious break with the single rate lies in the personal allow-
ance or tax-free income. Tax systems have one for two main rea-
sons. Firstly, they remove the need to administer tax on the lowest 
incomes which yield little revenue. Secondly, they remove income 
tax from those on the lowest incomes, reducing any requirement 
for benefit payments to be made to the same taxpayer. This further 
reduces administration costs and improves work incentives by 
making the personal financial benefit of work more transparent. 
The level of the tax-free allowance should be set in tandem with ap-
propriate features of the benefit system to minimise opacity and 
inefficiency in the interaction between the systems.
2 Sometimes, income is disguised as capital gain, in which case, the capital gains tax 
is an attempt to tax income that might otherwise go untaxed (the solution to this 
problem is to reform income tax). More often, capital gains arise from shares rising 
in value either because investors expect higher future profits or because companies 
have retained profits for future investment. In these circumstances, the profits will 
eventually be taxed when they are distributed and a tax on the increase in the value 
of the share arising from the retention of profits or from higher expected future 
profits is, in effect, a double tax. 
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National insurance
National insurance operates as little more than a secondary 
income tax (Mirrlees et al. 2011). It is now almost identical in 
principle to income tax but unacceptably costly and opaque 
and wholly removed from its original function as a compulsory 
insurance scheme. A genuinely contributory social insurance 
system may offer some political-economy benefits of allowing 
policymakers to resist pressure to increase compulsory benefit 
levels (and therefore taxation) above their optimal levels, but it is 
unclear why those on higher incomes ought to be compelled to 
purchase more expensive/generous insurance or why that would 
not be best arranged by compelling high earners to purchase 
such cover directly rather than administering it through the tax 
and benefits systems. Whether we should revive a genuine con-
tributory social insurance system is a separate matter. However, 
we currently do not have one and the design of the tax system 
should reflect that.
other taxes which apply to income should also be abolished 
and incorporated into a tax on income along the lines of the 
Heath et al. proposals, including corporation tax,3 stamp duties 
on shares and property purchases (which are transaction taxes 
but can be seen as an advanced tax on the present value of ex-
pected future income from assets), and capital gains tax (which, 
similarly, represents an advanced tax on the increase in the pres-
ent value of expected future income from an asset).
Estate and gift taxes
Inheritance tax, which has the nomenclature of an income tax 
but operates as an estate tax on certain items, should also be ei-
ther scrapped altogether or merged into income tax, depending 
3 See the section on corporate taxes for further discussion.
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on whether the system views bequests from the perspective of 
the heir or the deceased.
If viewed from the perspective of the deceased, a bequest can 
be seen simply as a gift. When someone earns money, tax is nor-
mally paid on that income and then again on consumption when 
it is spent. A tax on bequests breaches the neutrality principle 
because money spent by an heir is subject to inheritance tax as 
well as to consumption taxes. It therefore distorts consumption 
patterns away from saving for future consumption by heirs in 
favour of immediate or sooner consumption by the benefactor. 
For example, parents might choose to spend money now buying 
private education to realise the full value of the assets they have 
instead of saving them and bequeathing the value less the deduc-
tion to pay for the inheritance tax liability.
Viewed from the perspective of the heir, however, an inher-
itance can be seen as income that would be tax-free if it were 
not subject to income tax or an equivalent inheritance tax. It 
therefore breaches the neutrality principle and, perhaps margin-
ally, the transparency principle to exempt bequests from tax by 
introducing separate rules for different types of income. The low 
rates principle is also breached, because revenue forgone from 
an exemption on bequests leads to higher rates for other taxes. 
Taxing bequests only, however, might open up a breach in the 
neutrality principle due to the exempt status of gifts made before 
the benefactor dies if these are untaxed. This then leads to the 
question of how to treat gifts.
Most countries do not tax gifts. The UK did, between 1975 
and 1986, when the ‘capital transfer tax’ replaced the estates tax 
and then was itself replaced by inheritance tax (Mirrlees et al. 
2011). Practical difficulties involved with monitoring transfers of 
value, especially between family members, go some way to ex-
plaining why the tax did not last long. There is a strong case to 
be made that a good tax system will subject all gifts, including 
bequests, to income tax on the recipient, because this approach 
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is transparent, neutral and lowers marginal rates. If one does 
not regard bequests as income in the proper sense of the word 
(but a voluntary transfer from one person to another), it could 
also be argued that exempting all gifts, including bequests, is 
more transparent and neutral. If this debate cannot be resolved, 
it could be argued that Smith’s principles of convenience and 
efficiency support exemption of bequests and gifts from tax 
on the ground that it is inconvenient for families dealing with 
death to be concerned with tax (which may partly explain why 
inheritance tax is so unpopular), and the administrative effort 
required by extending tax to bequests and lifetime gifts. Further-
more, the taxation of bequests and gifts can often be avoided in 
complex ways which make the tax system less efficient and less 
transparent.
Separate taxes with additional rules, thresholds, exemptions, 
allowances and rates for such gifts, however, cannot form a part 
of a good tax system.
Tax on consumption
Consumption taxes are less distortionary when broad-based. 
The evidence suggests that distortions can be reduced more ef-
ficiently by broadening the tax base for consumption taxes and, 
if necessary, increasing transfers to poor families to maintain 
their real incomes as recommended by Mirrlees et al. (2011). As 
well as reducing overall levels of distortion, the shift would make 
the tax system more transparent in how it distorts earnings and 
consumption patterns, strengthening transparency, neutrality 
and efficiency in the system.
At higher rates, VAT seems likely to be more efficient than a 
sales tax, which is likely to explain why economies rarely imple-
ment sales taxes above, or VAT below, rates of 10 per cent. Sales 
taxes impose a lighter total compliance burden on businesses 
because they are levied only on the final product, whereas VAT is 
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applied at every stage in a product’s production. A sales tax gives 
retailers greater incentives to evade the charge, because retailers 
are liable for the whole amount, whereas under VAT retailers are 
only liable for their added value. To avoid distortions and inef-
ficiencies created by greater evasion, a good tax system should 
therefore prefer a VAT to a sales tax if the revenue requirements 
mean that the rates need to be high. Policymakers should assess 
the trade-off between evasion and compliance burdens and se-
lect a sales tax or VAT accordingly.
Reduced rates, exemptions and housing
To better adhere to the neutrality and transparency principles, 
almost all exemptions and all reduced rates for VAT should be 
abolished.4 But new dwelling construction, repairs and main-
tenance, and rents should not be subject to VAT. Instead, these 
items should be captured along with the consumption value of 
owner-occupied housing with a housing consumption tax which 
should be set at the same rate as the standard VAT rate and 
should aim to mimic VAT.
A system such as this this operated in the form of domestic 
rates until its abolition in 1990, when it was replaced by the com-
munity charge (‘poll tax’) and then council tax. The rates were 
intended to be reassessed frequently but, in practice, reviews 
were usually long delayed, which led to even stronger pressure to 
resist reviews as the changes in particular households’ tax rates 
that the review would lead to would be so great. This distorted 
spatial patterns of housing consumption and opened a gap in 
the level of taxation on housing versus other consumption. To 
avoid repeating this problem, three design features should be 
implemented:
4 Including food, medicine, domestic fuel and children’s clothing.
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• Assessed rents should be automatically increased annually 
in line with a local rent index.
• Rent reassessments should be carried out at a fixed 
frequency, perhaps every four years.
• Rent reassessments should be staggered, ideally randomly 
but it may by more convenient to reassess whole streets, 
electoral wards or even local authorities in the same year for 
administrative efficiency reasons.
Then a tax should be charged on the assessed rental value of the 
house at a rate equal to the rate of VAT.
Financial services
Many financial services are currently not taxed, in part because 
EU law prohibits the use of VAT. But it is also because financial 
services do not operate in a way that allows for a VAT or sales tax 
to be applied easily (Mirrlees et al. 2011). Financial institutions 
sometimes charge an explicit fee for their services, but often the 
fees are hidden in a combination of deposit interest rates on bank 
accounts which do not fully compensate for the use and risk of 
capital, and lending rates which charge more than a normal rate 
of return would demand. With regard to insurance products, an 
insurance premium (say for house contents insurance) does not 
represent the value added to the customer of the policy because 
the pool of customers receive a large proportion of their premi-
ums back in the form of claims – thus the real value added of 
the policy is the premium less the ‘expected value’ of the claims 
at the beginning of the policy year. This is a sum which can be 
calculated in theory but not in practice.
However, this exemption of financial services breaches the 
neutrality principle and, in the case of the insurance premium 
tax charged on insurance products, it also breaches the trans-
parency principle.
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Two main approaches to dealing with this problem were iden-
tified by Mirrlees et al. (2011). one is to apply a VAT to the sum 
of wages and profits paid by providers of these services on the 
grounds that wages and profits approximate to the value added 
by the products. The second approach, which could be applied 
to banking services, involves a cash flow tax in which deposits, 
loan repayments, interest charged and other charges are taxed 
but withdrawals, interest paid and loans and deductible. This 
approach could be simplified by applying it only to retail trans-
actions, which would enhance overall neutrality by keeping in-
termediary factors of production untaxed.
Pigovian taxes
Pigovian taxes ought to be levied to reflect the known and direct 
costs which consumption of a particular product imposes on 
others. To the extent that these costs are uncertain and indirect, 
Pigovian taxes should be reduced. They should also be reduced 
by the extent to which other externalities are not reflected in the 
tax system, to avoid creating new distortions by arbitrary and 
selective treatment of externalities. For example, if there is an 
externality arising from the consumption of fuel oil for central 
heating in homes and yet domestic gas consumption is untaxed, 
taxing fuel oil and not gas would lead people to choose the latter 
for tax reasons alone, even if the costs of the former were less.5
Fuel and roads
Motoring creates costs for non-motorists, the most significant 
of which are the local environmental and forecasted climate 
5 of course, one of the problems of Pigovian taxes is that the range of imperfect 
substitutes for any product – as defined, in technical terms, by their cross-price 
elasticity of demand – is huge. As such, putting together the optimal set of Pigovian 
taxes is a (literally) impossible job. The best that can be achieved is to rectify some 
of the more clear and damaging externalities.
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change costs of emissions; road congestion to other road users; 
and costs of road maintenance and construction to taxpayers. 
The government should therefore continue to levy fuel duty to 
cover both the cost of carbon emissions, and the cost of road 
maintenance and congestion relating to the roads that it 
operates.6
The Stern Review (2006) estimated the environmental cost 
of carbon at $85 per tonne. This equates to about 14 pence per 
litre of petrol, without adjusting for inflation. This estimate is 
based on a US Environmental Protection Agency (2016) estimate 
of 8,887 grams of carbon emissions per US gallon. If we multiply 
the DECC (2015) assumptions for traded short carbon values in 
the emissions trading scheme (which reflect the cost of reducing 
carbon emissions elsewhere) by the emissions factors for petrol, 
this would imply a carbon tax per litre of 1 penny in 2015, rising 
to 16 pence in 2030 (both at 2015 prices), when a single global 
carbon price is scheduled to be operating.
Public sector expenditure on national roads in 2014/15 was 
£3.7 billion, equivalent to approximately 8 pence per litre of pet-
rol sold. A national fuel duty to account for climate change costs 
and road spending would therefore be set at up to 24 pence per 
litre. The arguments for fuel duty to cover the cost of congestion 
are so weak as to be non-existent when set nationally (Wellings 
2012) primarily because congestion is specific to locations and 
times. This is a problem which can only realistically be addressed 
using road pricing schemes.
Local road spending adds another £5.5 billion, equivalent to 
12 pence per litre of petrol sold, to the total. Local authorities 
should be given the power to raise their own fuel duty to cover 
construction and maintenance costs of local roads, local conges-
tion and other external costs such as noise and local air pollution.
6 That is, assuming other forms of direct charging for road use and a single carbon 
tax or cap-and-trade system are not implemented.
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It should be noted that the overall level of these motoring taxes 
is currently substantially above the optimal levels. It has been 
suggested that road building and climate change costs amount 
to about 36 pence per litre. These are dependent on the extent to 
which government finances road building and maintenance, and 
the accuracy of the climate change estimates, which are taken 
as given for the purposes of this discussion. Road maintenance 
costs in some rural areas (where costs are spread across fewer 
journeys) and in dense, expensive central urban zones (where the 
congestion and opportunity costs of road space are very high) 
may be much higher, however.
In contrast to that 36 pence per litre total, fuel duty is cur-
rently 58 pence per litre and vehicle excise duty (VED)7 raises 
£5.9 billion, equivalent to another 13 pence per litre. This charge 
is illogical, complicated and unnecessary. There are no external 
costs reflected in VED on cars that cannot be internalised by fuel 
duty, and congestion and parking charges. It also represents a 
regressive barrier to car ownership, effectively using tax to price 
poor people off the roads instead of low-value journeys, breach-
ing the good tax principles of transparency and neutrality. VED 
should be abolished, but a replacement tax levied on the heavi-
est road transport vehicles to reflect estimated additional road 
maintenance costs which are not covered by fuel duty may be 
acceptable.
While fuel appears to be substantially overtaxed due to fuel 
duty, other uses of fuel which create emissions are not overtaxed. 
For example, not only is there no equivalent duty charged on fuel 
for domestic heating and cooking, but it is also only subject to a 
reduced rate of VAT set at 5 per cent, a quarter of the standard 
7 VED could be justified if the marginal costs of road use are very low and therefore 
total costs are not covered by levies such as fuel duties. This is only likely to be the 
case in some areas of the country. If roads were privately managed, for example, in 
rural areas, an efficient charging system might involve an annual pass for access. 
However, in a uniform tax-funded system, it is very difficult to justify VED.
Smith.indd   195 14-Oct-16   3:20:12 PM
TA x AT IoN, G oV E R N M E N T SPE N DI NG A N D ECoNoM IC GRoW T H
196
20  per cent rate. These differences breach the neutrality prin-
ciple. A good tax system should treat emissions equally, ideally 
simplifying taxes (and opaque regulatory quasi-taxes such as 
renewables obligations) into a single carbon tax or bringing all 
emissions within a cap-and-trade system.
Gambling, alcohol and tobacco
Gambling, alcohol and tobacco consumption can be thought to 
impose costs on others, to the extent to which certain services 
are financed collectively. Medical treatments and the enforce-
ment of law and order attributable to both alcohol and tobacco 
are not insubstantial and, to the extent that consumption is asso-
ciated with increased expenditure on law and order and medical 
treatment, they represent costs to others which have either been 
externalised by collective financing or were inherently external. 
There are several problems with attempting to apply Pigovian 
analysis to taxes on gambling, tobacco and alcohol, however.
Firstly, because people’s physiological and behavioural re-
sponses to substances varies greatly, so does the extent to which 
a uniform tax adheres to Pigovian principles rather than being 
an arbitrary, distortionary tax. In other words, taxes can encour-
age people who can cope well with gambling, alcohol or tobacco 
consumption to consume less than optimal quantities, thus 
harming their quality of life.
Secondly, further distortions are caused by a tax system that 
does not cover all external costs (and external benefits). Why 
should smoking be discouraged through the tax system if there 
are other activities that are not taxed and that lead to problems 
for which the law may also require collectively financed treat-
ment, such as horse-riding or boxing?
Any assessment of the average external cost imposed on 
others through alcohol and tobacco consumption should be 
discounted to reflect both of these conceptual problems before 
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attempting to arrive at an economically efficient tax. In this case, 
the government would come closer to meeting the principles of 
transparency and neutrality if alcohol were taxed at a single rate 
per litre of pure alcohol irrespective of the nature of the drink 
containing it and gambling and tobacco similarly had their tax 
structures simplified (ending the distinction between rolling 
and pipe tobacco, for example). Attempts to focus alcohol taxes 
on ‘problem drinkers’, such as by taxing spirits or high strength 
beer more heavily, will further distort consumption and add 
complexity and consumers will respond by demanding products 
just under the thresholds.
It is also worth noting that evidence that price mechanisms 
can affect problematic behaviour is weak. Manning (1995) found 
that the ‘results indicate that both light and heavy drinkers are 
much less price elastic than moderate drinkers. Further, we can-
not reject the hypothesis that the very heaviest drinkers have 
perfectly price inelastic demands.’
Given the extent of the discounts necessary to adjust average 
estimated external costs down to reflect the problems above 
in order to calculate an economically efficient Pigovian tax, it is 
likely that the tax may be small. As such, abolishing such taxes 
altogether may be the best way to meet the principle of efficiency 
(due to the high costs of collection and compliance relative to low 
receipts and any benefits from the tax from aligning social costs 
and benefits of the activity) and the principle of transparency (due 
to the complexity of maintaining taxes which serve minimum 
fiscal or Pigovian economic functions), even within a collectively 
financed medical treatment and law enforcement environment.
Taxes on wealth
The case against taxes on wealth in general is overwhelming be-
cause they breach two principles of good tax design. They breach 
Smith’s convenience maxim because they are levied without 
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a flow of cash to finance them. And they breach his efficiency 
maxim because they are associated with a disproportionately 
large behavioural response as owners of wealth seek to avoid 
them. There is also a strong case against wealth taxes due to 
the distortion they create between consumption and savings (or 
viewed another way, between consumption now and consump-
tion later). This distortion means that immediate consumption is 
privileged and saving (and therefore investment) is discouraged, 
reducing productivity growth.
Consider two individuals who each earn £10,000. The first opts 
to spend all the money now. The second, meanwhile, opts to save 
it. A 1 per cent wealth tax would mean the second earner would 
effectively only receive £9,900 thereby introducing a disincentive 
against saving money, distorting the decision of when to spend it. 
If the risk-free interest rate were 3 per cent, this 1 per cent wealth 
tax would be equivalent to a 33.3 per cent tax on interest. How-
ever, investment returns should, in any case, be taxed separately 
if it is deemed appropriate to tax interest. Tax on interest has the 
same effect, introducing a distortion between spending now and 
later by discouraging the latter, although the case for taxing in-
terest is somewhat stronger than taxing capital itself.
Location value tax
one exception, however, is tax that captures the location value of 
land. If properly constituted, a tax on location value may cause 
disproportionately little economic damage, because land cannot 
be hidden or taken overseas to avoid the tax and owners cannot 
respond to the tax by producing less value in its location – for 
the reason that they are not responsible for it in the first place. A 
location value tax involves a tax on the value of land in a given 
location which is normally calculated on the assumption of the 
land being in its most valuable permitted use. However, it is a tax 
on the land value only and not on any associated buildings.
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In one sense, implementing a location value tax on land own-
ership would appear to breach the neutrality principle because of 
the seemingly arbitrary treatment of different asset classes (land 
would be treated differently from business capital, for example). 
However, the overriding economic objective of the neutrality 
principle is to minimise arbitrary distortions in the economy, be-
cause these lead to economic inefficiency. But, given the strong 
theoretical case that there are minimal such distortions caused 
by a tax on location value, it seems that the neutrality principle 
is not strongly engaged here. Given the powerful economic effi-
ciency merits of this tax, a good tax system ought to disregard 
the formal neutrality objections.
A further objection arises from the fact that the burden of a 
location value tax falls on the owner of the land at the time when 
the tax is announced. The value of the land should fall immedi-
ately by the discounted present value of the expected future tax 
payments required under the tax. It is therefore a windfall tax on 
landowners and amounts to arbitrary and retrospective confis-
cation of the value of their assets. This would ordinarily consti-
tute an unacceptable obstacle to the design of a good tax system 
but these objections could be outweighed by the otherwise highly 
efficient nature of the tax together with some carefully designed 
transitional measures. The loss of value to landowners who have 
done little to improve their property except wait while the amen-
ities and services provided by others have spilled over into the 
value of their land, pushing up its value, may not command wide-
spread sympathy. But breaching the neutrality principle in this 
way does not seem fair to those whose investments – and the sac-
rifices of deferred consumption – were used to buy land rather 
than other asset classes. And some portion of the location value 
is likely to have been bought with money earned from labour or 
other investments. Finally, in a property market where many 
properties are purchased with mortgages, a tax could push many 
landowners into negative equity, causing some combination of 
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property market ossification as owners become unable to move 
and financial market distress as owners default on debts. These 
effects could cause problems in the wider economy.
Because the present value of a cash flow in the future is lower 
than one now, and lower still for one even further into the future, 
the extent to which the tax represents a windfall charge on the 
asset’s value at the time of the announcement is governed by the 
length of the delay until its implementation. A delayed and possibly 
phased introduction should be considered to reduce the impact on 
financial markets and minimise potential immobility from nega-
tive equity. This, along with two other factors should reduce the 
extent of the regrettable windfall tax element of the charge.
The first is the fact that location value of land is almost al-
ways also owned by the same agent who owns the value of the 
improvement to the land and usually any structures on it. This 
of course does not reduce the extent of that on the value of the 
location that would be expropriated, but it would reduce the 
extent of it measured against the whole value of the property. 
The second is that the tax should not be designed to appropriate 
100 per cent of the location value, both to ensure a margin of error 
so that it does not exceed 100 per cent and also to leave some 
private incentive for the landowner to navigate any regulatory 
or bureaucratic obstacles such as land use planning which may 
otherwise impede more efficient land use changes.
Another transitional option could be that location value 
tax might replace the community infrastructure levy and ob-
ligations such as affordable housing requirements made under 
section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Abol-
ishing these two policies would constitute a windfall gain to 
landowners which would counteract the windfall loss imposed 
by a location value tax. A government might therefore wish to 
consider making properties which would have been subject to 
these charges immediately liable for the location value tax while 
delaying its introduction on other properties. The same principle 
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also applies to business rates and council tax, so governments 
might also wish to delay their abolition until they introduce the 
location value tax.
As long as there are more economically damaging taxes which 
could be reduced – including on property – the objective of a lo-
cation value tax should be to extract as much of the economic 
rent from land ownership as possible. Implicit in this condition 
is the assumption that the tax can reduce landowners’ incentives 
to apply for planning permission to develop land and that dis-
tortions caused by blunting this profit signal should be incorpor-
ated into analysis of its relative harm compared with other taxes. 
However, land-use planning restrictions currently depress the 
value of agricultural land by as much as 99 per cent. A location 
value tax would mean that the tax authority would benefit when 
the planning authority granted permission which increased the 
value of land. If the taxes accrue to the same authority which de-
cides planning policy, it could improve the incentive structure 
faced by decision-makers in planning authorities, leading to less 
inefficient land-use planning policies.
A detailed feasibility study ought to be commissioned, but 
there does not seem to be any fundamental reason why a location 
value tax could not be implemented by extending the process 
used by the Valuation office Agency for business rates.
National accounts valued total housing rental values at £226 
billion in 2014, comprising £59 billion of actual rental payments 
and £166 billion of imputed values for owner-occupied housing. 
If we assume that one-third of this amount is the value of the 
location, this equates to an annual location value of housing at 
£74 billion. A tax that captured 75 per cent of that could raise 
£56 billion. Non-domestic property has been valued at £1.9 tril-
lion. Assuming a location value yield of 5 per cent and a variety 
of location value assumptions depending on the type of property, 
perhaps £27 billion might be raised from offices, retail, infra-
structure and other non-domestic property.
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Similarly, the oNS estimated average farm rental values at 
£171 per hectare in 2013/14. Assuming that 75 per cent of that 
total represents the location (and unimproved land) value, and 
that a tax might collect 75 per cent of that, a tax on Britain’s 
18,456 hectares could yield £1.8 billion. In total, these amount 
to an estimated £84 billion of revenue that should be substan-
tially less economically damaging than other tax types. Equiv-
alent to 4.6 per cent of GDP, this compares with the £66 billion 
raised by council tax, business rates and stamp duty land tax 
in 2014/15.
There would be many practical administrative questions 
to answer, such as measurement of plots, whether gardens 
would be assessed separately from land with structures (or 
permission for them), whether to assess the charge based on 
an estimate of rental values or sale values, and how to mini-
mise the negative impact on current owners. But its introduc-
tion should be considered alongside the array of related taxes 
which ought to be abolished: business rates; stamp duty land 
tax; council tax (which in any case should be replaced by a 
previously discussed simulated extension of VAT to housing); 
and fiddly local quasi-taxes (the community infrastructure 
levy and so-called ‘affordable housing requirements’ and 
other obligations under ‘section 106’ of the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1990).
Corporate tax
The economic literature suggests that, generally, only final goods 
should be taxed (at the same rate) to avoid distortions in how 
businesses choose factors of production and in consumption 
patterns. This supports the principles of transparency and 
neutrality because a consumption tax on final goods is easier to 
attribute and is therefore transparent and also more likely to be 
neutral. Intermediate taxes, therefore, should be abolished. This 
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would include, prima facie, employer’s national insurance8 and 
business rates.
Commercial property
To the extent to which business rates are a tax on location, they 
have very low inefficiency costs, for the reasons described in the 
previous section on wealth taxes. By contrast, to the extent to 
which they tax improvements or structures that are used for 
business (e.g. offices, factories, shops, etc.), they represents an ar-
bitrary distortion discouraging the use of property by businesses 
in the production of goods and services for consumption. Com-
mercial property is consequently underused, reducing product-
ivity (and therefore wages).
It should be noted that we should not argue that commercial 
and residential property should be taxed the same way in order 
to achieve neutrality. Commercial property is a factor of produc-
tion that leads to the production of goods that are then taxed at 
the consumption stage. A good tax system should seek neutrality 
in property use by taxing the consumption of residential prop-
erty (whether rented or imputed from owner occupancy) and by 
taxing the value of final goods and services consumed which use 
commercial property in their production.
The distortions created by taxes on intermediate factors of 
production breach the principles of good tax design in several 
ways. Beyond the breach of neutrality discussed above, they also 
constitute an impediment to tax transparency and serve to ob-
fuscate the incidence of who pays how much of which taxes.
Consumers can easily calculate how much VAT they have 
been charged because VAT is administered with reference to the 
price of the good or service purchased and the burden falls large-
ly on the consumer. But a consumer is much less able to calculate 
8 See taxes on income section for further discussion
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how much of the purchase price was accounted for by business 
rates in the various stages of production, for example.
This application of the principles of transparency and neutral-
ity extends beyond property taxation to profit taxes, employer 
labour taxes and, to some degree, Pigovian taxes.
Corporate profits
The oECD found that corporate income taxes (such as the UK 
corporation tax) have the most negative impact on economic 
growth, among consumption taxes, property taxes and income 
taxes (Arnold 2008). Specifically, corporate income taxes have 
the following problems:
• They weaken the signal to reallocate resources from low-
value activities to high-value activities between different 
companies and also within the same company by reducing 
after-tax profits.
• They bias ownership structures in favour of debt capital and 
against equity capital.
• They distort spending patterns in favour of current 
expenditure, which is fully tax deductible, and against 
capital expenditure, which is not (capital allowances 
partially ameliorate this).
• They discourage investment by reducing retained earnings, 
which would otherwise be spent on capital investment 
goods directly by the company or invested with financial 
intermediaries to the same effect by third parties.
Mirrlees et al. (2011) proposed an allowance for corporate equity 
(ACE), which would provide companies with an allowance for the 
normal return on equity investment with the aim of tackling the 
problems identified above and restricting corporation tax to ex-
cess returns, which should disproportionately reduce its negative 
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impact on investment. This approach has been adopted in Italy 
and was recently recommended by Keable-Elliott and Papworth 
(2015). While this approach has certain advantages, the measure 
has flaws which render it an unsatisfactory response to the prob-
lems of corporation tax.
The first flaw is that taxation of retained earnings and there-
fore investment would remain in place, thereby continuing to 
reduce growth and productivity to some degree leaving margin-
al rates higher than they might otherwise be. The second flaw 
is that a breach of the neutrality principle would remain. Debt 
finance would continue to enjoy a tax advantage over equity fi-
nance, high-value activities would still be disadvantaged relative 
to low-value activities, and capital expenditure would still be 
disadvantaged relative to current expenditure, with all the in-
efficiency costs remaining, albeit reduced in scope. But perhaps 
the most dissatisfying flaw is that the proposal would worsen the 
overall transparency of the system.
The difficulty of defining profit and attributing it to the 
right jurisdiction for tax purposes is at the heart of much of 
the operational dysfunction and public disquiet over corpo-
rate tax in recent years. The very existence of corporate in-
come taxes serves to obfuscate the economic functioning of 
tax to the general public, who, understandably, do not take the 
time to study tax incidence. The burden can only be borne by 
some combination of capital, labour or consumers. Corporate 
income taxes hides this truism by disconnecting the official, 
legal incidence with the real, economic incidence. This means 
that many members of the general public struggle to under-
stand its consequences, leading to mistrust of the system and 
a sense of unfairness.
A much more conceptually satisfying approach to the problem 
would lie in abolishing tax on corporate income altogether and 
reforming personal income tax to ensure complete neutrality 
between all forms of labour and capital income, recommended 
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by Heath et al. (2012). The authors proposed a ‘single income tax’ 
with tax on capital income administered at the corporate level 
in a similar way to PAyE tax on wages (see Heath et al. (2012) for 
further details).
The debt–equity bias would then be eliminated, along with 
disadvantages to capital expenditure and high-value activity. The 
reduction of investment inherent in a tax on retained corporate 
earnings would also be removed, further enhancing productivity 
growth.
Employer labour taxes
Similarly, a good tax system would not feature any employer 
taxes on labour (such as employers’ national insurance con-
tributions) for essentially the same reasons: they artificially 
separate the official, legal incidence of tax from its real, eco-
nomic incidence, breaching transparency and neutrality prin-
ciples for no obvious gain. It is likely that taxes on employers 
worsen economic efficiency by raising the cost of employing 
labour. While the burden of employer taxes on labour is borne 
by employees in the long term in the form of lower wages, de-
scriptions of them as employment-reducing ‘ jobs taxes’ are 
plausible in the short term as wages take time to adjust to 
changes in employer taxes.
Business Pigovian taxes
A good tax system may, however, allow for Pigovian taxes admin-
istered by business when the circumstances are such that charg-
ing it to the final value of the consumption is too removed from 
the external cost which the tax seeks to internalise, or where the 
administrative costs would be prohibitive.
The general principles of when Pigovian taxes can operate as 
part of a good tax system are discussed in the section on taxes 
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on consumption. Briefly, they should seek to internalise costs 
which the activity or consumption creates for third parties, but 
that this should be discounted to take account of uncertainty in 
measurement, and the incompleteness of the tax system’s Pigo-
vian scope, to avoid creating distortions between consumption 
where some activities with negative externalities are taxed and 
others are not.
Adhering to the transparency principle presents a hurdle for 
Pigovian taxes because separate taxes, rates, rules and thresh-
olds should be avoided where possible. But a further hurdle exists 
for taxes which are paid by companies. Taxes on intermediate 
stages of the production chain should be avoided because they 
breach the transparency principles (because they disconnect 
legal incidence from economic incidence). However, at least 
conceptually, an exception could be made for Pigovian taxes 
because they can be thought of as a charge to reflect the exter-
nal costs of an activity or mode of production. For example, if 
it is believed that taxes should be charged to reflect the cost of 
carbon emissions, this should only be done in respect of those 
forms of energy generation that emit carbon. So, some producers 
of energy may pay such a tax and others not, reflecting the differ-
ent extent to which their methods of production lead to higher 
carbon emissions.
The bank levy
An example of where a Pigovian approach might be acceptable 
is in the case of the bank levy, which is a tax on bank liabilities. 
The bank levy was introduced to compensate taxpayers for the 
costs to taxpayers involved in bailing out banks considered to 
be too big to fail. Its function is therefore akin to an insurance 
premium as much as it is to a Pigovian tax. A bank levy can be 
justified when taxpayers are exposed to potential costs arising 
from the inevitability of a bailout due to a combination of their 
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systemic importance to the wider economy and the inadequacy 
of insolvency laws to ensure orderly failure.
A bank levy’s current acceptability, however, does not imply 
that it ought to be a permanent feature of a good tax system. It 
can only be part of a good tax system if the regulatory environ-
ment is flawed and requires taxpayers to bear risks of bank fail-
ure. The current design also fails to reflect the risk profile of the 
banks concerned. While the size of the balance sheet is loosely 
linked to the potential size of taxpayers’ exposure, it is a crude 
measure and arguably fails to fully account for risk factors which 
influence the likelihood of failure. It is beyond the scope of this 
section to recommend how a closer alignment might operate, but 
a good tax system should avoid charging a more prudent bank 
the same levy as a bank with riskier characteristics.
Local taxation
There is a strong link between the efficiency of local government 
and the extent to which revenues are raised locally. Countries 
with more devolved government tend to deliver more efficient 
public services (Gemmell et al. 2013) and have lower levels of 
spending and taxation (Buser 2011). There are few reasons to sup-
pose that tax systems which are perfect for their locations would 
vary much from place to place, but evidence suggests that those 
which do not allow for a high degree of local variation tend to be 
worse than those which do (see Heath et al. (2012), Booth (2015) 
and Packer and Sinclair (2015) for further discussion and review 
of the literature).
The overall extent of local taxation should be determined by 
the scope of local government. Broadly, local spending should be 
financed by local taxes, so that the mix of local versus national 
taxes should consequently be determined by the mix of local ver-
sus national expenditure.
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Some taxes are better suited to local authority control than 
others. A location value tax could be levied by local authorities, 
which could then receive all its revenues. This could raise up to 
4.6 per cent of national income,9 compared with the 3.6 per cent 
raised currently by council tax, business rates and stamp duty 
land tax combined.
A surcharge on fuel duty may also form part of a good local tax 
system. Ideally, market-based mechanisms for allocating road 
space (such as road pricing and better parking charges) would 
eliminate most of the negative local externalities associated 
with driving, but in their absence a case can be made for this 
a local fuel duty (see the consumption taxes section for further 
discussion).
It is difficult to imagine a value added tax being suitable for 
devolution to local level because of the fact that production tends 
to be national and VAT is administered in all parts of the pro-
duction chain. Potentially, a separate VAT apparatus might be 
required for each authority, with exempt status for ‘exports’ and 
a liability on ‘imports’ to the local authority area. By contrast, 
a local sales tax on final consumption values would be much 
simpler to administer at local level, and they are used in many 
countries.
Similarly, income tax on labour could be suitable for par-
tial devolution, as recommended by Heath et al. (2012). This 
allows local authorities to breach the principles of trans-
parency and neutrality which the ‘single income tax’ proposal 
would achieve because the rates on capital income and labour 
income in an authority would no longer be the same if the 
authority chose to alter the tax rate on labour. The nature 
of the single income tax proposals regarding capital income 
9 See the section on wealth taxes for further discussion.
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Box 4 Tax death-row
The tax death-row comprises a list of the twenty main taxes which 
should no longer exist once a good system has been implemented. 
There is also a brief note explaining why they should be abolished. 
Some have already been discussed when exploring matters of a 
good tax system but some are mentioned for the first time.
Tax death-row: existing taxes with no place in a good tax system
Corporation 
tax
Replace with a tax on corporate income from capital.
Affordable 
housing and 
other s106 
obligations
Obligations under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1990, which operate effectively as taxes on property development 
with some of the cost being borne by land values, should be abolished, 
albeit with some of its function replaced by a location value tax.
Aggregates 
levy
This tax on quarrying aggregates exists to reflect the associated 
externalities but the harm to local environments from quarrying 
would be better managed by regulation that requires sites are made 
good after aggregates have been extracted.
Air passenger 
duty
Fiddly and already partially covered by the EU’s emissions trading 
scheme, flights should be fully brought into the ETS
Alcohol duties The case for Pigovian tax on alcohol is weak with socialised healthcare 
provision but becomes almost non-existent in its absence.
Apprentice-
ship levy
The apprenticeship levy will makes a badly designed income tax 
system even worse, introducing new distortions, further opacity and 
additional complexity. It should be abolished.
Bank 
surcharge
No principled reason exists to support the bank surcharge on profits. 
Profitability is a poorer indicator of taxpayer exposure than balance 
sheets, which the bank levy captures more effectively when a flawed 
regulatory environment exposes taxpayers to risk of bank failure. It 
should be abolished.
Business 
rates
A halfway house between a damaging intermediate tax on commercial 
property and an efficient tax on location value, business rates should 
be replaced by a location value tax.
Capital gains 
tax
Most capital gains represent double taxation on the difference in 
the present value of expected future income between the dates of 
purchase and the sale of the asset. This is already effectively taxed 
and so presents an obstacle to the efficient reallocation of capital 
assets within the economy.
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Climate change 
levy and 
renewables 
obligations
Following the abolition of exemptions on renewable energy 
sources, the climate change levy now operates as a tax on 
industrial energy use irrespective of carbon emissions. It 
should be abolished and replaced with either a comprehensive 
carbon tax or the full inclusion of emissions into the EU-ETS, 
which would allow regulatory quasi-taxes such as renewables 
obligations to be abolished.
Community 
infrastructure 
levy
The complex, arbitrary and contentious community infrastruc-
ture levy should be abolished, albeit with some of its function 
replaced by a location value tax.
Corporation tax Replace with a tax on corporate income from capital.
Council tax Confused, outdated and unpopular, council tax should be 
replaced by a location value tax.
Diverted profits 
tax
This would be defunct when profits are not taxable.
Gambling 
duties
The case for Pigovian tax on gambling is almost non-existent.
Inheritance tax There is a coherent, strong case to tax inheritances as part of 
income in the hands of the recipient, but the case for outright 
abolition is probably stronger still, for reasons discussed in the 
section on income tax. There is no case at all for the existing 
inheritance tax with its poor choice of base (the size of the 
estate bequeathed) and its substantial and highly distortionary 
exemptions (such as artworks and agricultural land).
Licence fee There is no principled case for a tax on the ownership or use of 
televisions or other broadcasting receiving equipment.
Stamp duty 
land tax
Similarly, there is no good reason to tax the transactions of 
properties. This tax artificially depresses property values, 
discourages investment and distorts the allocation of assets 
– for example, by discouraging older people from moving to 
smaller accommodation when they no longer need as much 
space after their children have left the family home.
Stamp duty on 
shares
There is no good reason to tax the transactions of shares and this 
tax artificially depresses equity values, discourages investment 
and distorts the allocation of assets
Tobacco duties The case for Pigovian tax on tobacco is weak with socialised 
healthcare provision but becomes almost non-existent in its 
absence.
Vehicle excise 
duty
There are no principled reasons to retain VED on cars, but a per-
vehicle tax on heavy transport vehicles to reflect external costs 
of road maintenance not already covered by fuel duty could be 
acceptable.
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mean that, like VAT, they are administratively unsuitable for 
devolution.10
This breach of neutrality and transparency is unlikely to be nec-
essary with existing local expenditure levels of around 6 per cent 
of national income because other sources could easily meet that 
level of expenditure while adhering more closely to the principles 
of good taxation. It may also be preferable to devolve the revenues 
(although perhaps not the ability to set the rate, in order to main-
tain neutrality between types of consumption) from the housing 
consumption tax proposed in the consumption taxes section.
Though the local variation of income tax is not of itself desir-
able, the benefits arising from localisation might be greater, es-
pecially as it would strengthen the transparency of local govern-
ment finance. For example, Booth (2015) proposes a substantial 
and symmetrical devolution of expenditure below a federal Brit-
ish government which would retain control of little more than 
external affairs, defence, working age welfare and the servicing 
existing national debt. This would be combined with localisation 
within the constituent nations of a federal UK. He cites findings 
from Blöchliger (2013: 4) that demonstrate: ‘Doubling sub-central 
tax or spending shares (e.g. increasing the ratio of sub-central 
to general government tax revenue from 6 to 12%) is associated 
with a GDP per capita increase of around 3%.’
The shape of a good tax system
overall, a good tax system should be radically simpler than 
the current system, comprising a single income tax at a single 
rate charged on all income; a single consumption tax with no ex-
empt items; and a location value tax on all land to extract a large 
proportion of the rent from the unimproved value. There could be 
10 See Heath et al. (2012), Meakin (2012) and the section on corporate taxes for further 
discussion.
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additional Pigovian taxes limited to internalising external costs, 
or equivalent rights trading schemes, such as either a carbon tax or 
an extension of the EU emissions trading scheme; a bank levy; and 
a local fuel duty. Specific taxes on different types of consumption 
should be avoided wherever possible, as should different taxes on 
different types of incomes. Transaction and wealth taxes should 
be avoided, with the exception of a location value tax.
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11 THE FUTURE FOR TAXATION IN THE UK
Rory Meakin
In the previous chapter we looked at how the principles and rules 
of a good tax system should be applied in practice in different 
areas of taxation; which taxes ought to be abolished; and then 
the overall shape of a good tax system. This chapter considers 
the specific rates necessary to capture a given share of national 
income and the distribution of the burden by income groups. It 
will also examine a range of tax administration aspects relating 
to matters such as the need for a formal tax strategy, annual 
budgets and monitoring of reliefs and exemptions. The proposals 
model the effects of introducing the following tax system:
• Heath et al. (2012) style ‘single income tax’ set at 15 per cent 
of income above a 2014/15 personal allowance of £10,000.
• VAT set at 12.5 per cent, with most reduced, zero and exempt 
rates increased to the standard rate.
• A new housing consumption tax on rents and imputed rents 
to mimic VAT at 12.5 per cent.
• A new location value tax designed to capture an average of 
75 per cent of the location value of land ownership.
• Fuel duty retained and set at an average of around half its 
current rate.
• Bank levy, receipts from the emission trading scheme (ETS), 
climate change levy and other HMRC taxes left with receipts 
unchanged but some operational reform.
THE FUTURE 
FOR TAXATION 
IN THE UK
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• Corporation tax, national insurance, capital gains tax, 
inheritance tax, council tax, business rates, the television 
licence fee, the apprenticeship levy, stamp duties, alcohol 
duties, tobacco duties, vehicle excise duty and air passenger 
duty all abolished.
At these rates, it is estimated that national account taxes would 
capture around 22.5 per cent of national income at market  prices,1 
or around £410 billion in 2014/15.2 This is roughly equivalent to 
the top end of the level of government spending that, it has been 
suggested, might lead to the highest level of economic growth.
Distributional issues
What activities and events will the proposed system tax?
These proposals would lead to one third of revenues being raised 
from VAT (not including the housing consumption tax) and an-
other third from income tax. Another quarter would be raised by 
property tax (including a housing consumption tax) with other 
taxes raising the remaining tenth. This contrasts with the status 
quo where, in 2014/15, over half of revenues are raised by income 
taxes with VAT raising one fifth and property taxes one tenth. 
other taxes raise the remainder, around a seventh of the total.
As a share of GDP, the proposals represent a substantial cut 
in income taxes, which would capture an estimated 7.3 per cent 
of GDP (down from 17.8 per cent under the status quo). overall, 
VAT would increase slightly, to 7.2 per cent (from 6.8 per cent). 
Property tax would rise to 5.6 per cent (from 3.6 per cent). other 
taxes would fall to 2.3 per cent (from 4.7 per cent).
1 Perhaps around 25 per cent of national income at factor cost.
2 on a static basis; dynamic effects are ignored.
Smith.indd   215 14-Oct-16   3:20:15 PM
TA x AT IoN, G oV E R N M E N T SPE N DI NG A N D ECoNoM IC GRoW T H
216
The shift can be characterised as a move from income and 
arbitrary sin taxes towards heavier property taxes and a broader, 
flatter VAT. The increase in property tax is substantial. At 3.6 per 
cent of GDP, the UK already has the highest property tax receipts 
in the oECD. The proposals involve a substantial reduction in 
the harmful consumption and transaction elements of property 
taxes and an elimination of tax on business property. There is, 
instead, a tax on location value. overall, this package should sub-
stantially improve economic efficiency.
The removal of tax on working capital in the UK corporate 
sector by abolishing corporation tax and applying tax only to 
distributed income should also represent a further structural 
enhancement of the tax system’s economic efficiency.
Distributional effects on households by income decile
The proposals represent a substantial tax cut, with national 
account taxes capturing an estimated 22.5 per cent of GDP (at 
market prices), down by a third from the current level of 33 per 
cent. The overall package would be substantially progressive at 
the lower end of the income distribution but mildly regressive at 
the upper end. The removal of regressive taxes on property and 
‘sin’ drives the progressiveness of the package at the lower end, 
but these reforms have less impact at the higher end of the dis-
tribution, where the reductions in progressive income taxes are 
more significant.
Basic static modelling would suggest that the poorest decile 
would enjoy tax cuts worth 26 per cent of gross income, followed 
by 19 per cent, 17 per cent and then 13 per cent for the fourth poor-
est decile before further falling to 7 per cent for the fourth richest 
decile (see Figure 19 and Table 18). The third richest decile would 
enjoy a cut of 9 per cent while the richest two deciles would both 
see their tax cut by 13 per cent of their incomes.
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All deciles would enjoy substantial cuts on a static analysis 
and the overall package is progressive. But it should be noted 
that such a static analysis is likely to underestimate significantly 
the extent of progressivity of the reforms. As we noted previously, 
the structural inefficiencies which would be reduced substantial-
ly should have an effect on employment, productivity and wage 
levels. These effects disproportionately benefit the poor as they 
are more likely to be at the margins of the labour market in in-
secure, low-paid employment or unemployed. Moreover, Alloza 
(2016) recently found that marginal tax rates have a significant 
effect on the mobility of people through the income deciles, re-
ducing the probability of changing income decile by 0.8 per cent 
for each percentage point increase in marginal tax rates.
Figure 19 Impact of tax changes by income decile
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Tax administration
An important factor to consider when assessing whether a tax 
system meets the transparency, neutrality and low margin-
al rates rules is its administration and maintenance, which 
should be kept to a minimum. Tax should be predictable and 
stable to minimise the marginal rates necessary for a given 
revenue target. To achieve this aim, the government should 
publish a formal tax strategy, index all thresholds, end tax 
policy announcements in annual budgets, subject all tax policy 
decisions to dynamic scoring, improve monitoring and analysis 
of tax expenditures, and advise taxpayers of details of any tax 
they have paid.
Formal tax strategy
A formal tax strategy that expresses the government’s medium- 
and long-term intentions should be published to provide tax-
payers and policymakers with a framework for the overall dir-
ection for any future changes in the system. This should reduce 
uncertainty and improve the coherence of decision-making. The 
government should commit itself to stating how every change in 
tax policy adheres to the strategy and explain why the strategy is 
being contravened where it is necessary to do so.
Threshold indexation
A good tax system should retain a minimum number of thresholds, 
but those which do remain should be indexed to the appropriate 
index to ensure the thresholds meet their aims with the mini-
mum of intervention and uncertainty. For example, income tax 
thresholds should be indexed to average incomes and  Pigovian 
taxes should be indexed to measures of the externalised harm.
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Annual budgets
Tax policy decision-making should be taken out of budgets and 
implemented separately from periodic statements involving eco-
nomic and fiscal forecasting so that fuller attention can be de-
voted to the implications of both tax policy changes and changes 
in budgetary and economic forecasts, respectively. Tax policy 
changes should not be announced within a week of a periodic 
statement of accounts unless there is an unavoidable emergency 
that cannot wait.
Full dynamic scoring
HMRC developed a computable general equilibrium model which 
was used to analyse recent cuts in the main rate of corporation 
tax, providing the Treasury with a fuller (yet still incomplete) 
analysis of the dynamic effects of tax policy changes on revenues. 
This has obvious consequences for the transparency of the sys-
tem and meeting the low marginal rates rule. Dynamic model-
ling should be further developed and its use should be applied to 
all proposed changes to tax policy.
Tax expenditure monitoring
A good tax system should retain as few exemptions, thresholds 
and rates as possible to adhere to the transparency, neutrality 
and low marginal rates rules. While tax exemptions or targeted 
cuts are not the same as spending measures, they often have 
substantially equivalent effects on incentives, distortions and 
outcomes. The negative impact of the tax system on taxpayers 
is not limited to the cash value confiscated. It also arises from 
the incentives a system creates which distort decision-making 
by economic agents. This distortionary welfare loss can be as 
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much of a problem for a tax break as it is for equivalent spending 
programmes. Tax breaks that remain should be subject to close 
monitoring to ensure that they continue to meet their objectives 
and the aims of the government’s tax strategy.
Tax transparency
Tax should be made as transparent as possible. Where possible, 
the legal incidence of tax should lie with those who bear the 
economic incidence. Where this is not possible, those who bear 
the economic burden should be kept informed. For example, em-
ployee remuneration slips should include a total for wages that 
includes employer’s national insurance contributions, which 
should also be included in the entry for the employee’s total tax 
figure. Similarly, price labels and till receipts should include the 
taxes charged to purchases.
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